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Struggling to survive

KEPA's Impoverishment Analysis Indonesia

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Kepan toimintaa tuetaan julkisin varoin ulkoasiainministeriön kehitysyhteistyöosaston kansalaisjärjestömäärärahoista.

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Introduction

Indonesia is an island nation of approximately 18 000 islands with a population of approximately 230 million. Independent since 61 years, Indonesia has developed from a plantation-based and mining-based economy installed by the Dutch colonialists to a mixed economy with manufacturing, services and resource extraction. Subsistence agriculture and small-scale artisanal fishing tend however to be the norm for most people living in the rural areas while in the cities a large part of the population are employed in the informal sectors of the economy.

Industrial and agricultural development has been historically happening at a highly uneven pace when comparing the so-called 'inner islands' (Java, Madura, Bali and to an extent Sumatra) with the 'outer islands.' This inner/outer islands dichotomy has often been criticised, and quite rightly so, for it implies a hierarchy in which the 'inner islands' are the centre of power, developed and cultivated, while the 'outer islands' are backward, underdeveloped and primitive. For the purposes of this analysis, however, this concept is useful, as it points to the question at the heart of the matter: why should the polluted urban sprawl of Jakarta be considered developed and superior compared to, say, an indigenous fishing community in Borneo with a centuries-old culture? And why should the resources of that fishing community be harnessed and exploited to serve the needs of the 'inner islands' and the other metro poles of this planet?

Much of the industrial modernisation happened during the 33-year military dictatorship of General Suharto, which also left a legacy of immense foreign debt and severe environmental degradation. The industrialisation process was based on a policy of a rapid expansion of the export sector, fuelled by debts and foreign direct investments (FDI). The process was paralleled by a rapid expansion of the cities, especially those in Java. Following the fall of Suharto, in part precipitated by the Asian economic crisis of 1998 that put an end to the country's 'tiger economy', the country has been in the midst of a process of democratisation. In spite of the rapid process of industrialisation and post-industrialisation in the urban centres, the majority of the people still live off the land as subsistence farmers.

Indonesia is generally considered to be a middle-income country. Overall, Indonesia is ranked in the UNDP's Human Development Report 2005 at Rank 110 out of 177 countries compared (UNDP, 2005). The differences between the 'metropole,' i.e. the inner islands and the 'periphery,' i.e. the outer islands are however great, especially when considering the availability of basic services and of social and economic opportunities available. The crude geographical division into metropole and periphery, though useful to a point, obscures the fact that there are local elites in the peripheral regions who are well-integrated into national and international networks, have considerable political and social leverage and are making sizeable profits while even in the metropole, large portions of the population are politically, socially, culturally and economically marginalised.

This study looks at these economically, socially and politically marginalised sectors of society, the impoverished, both in a 'metropolitan' area (Kampung Kolong Tol in North Jakarta, Java) and in a 'peripheral' area (Maladofok, South Sorong regency, West Papua).

For the location of the study areas, see **Annex 1**. The two sites were chosen based on the recommendations of the partners from UPC and Triton, respectively, in order to be able to look at issues of impoverishment both in an urban and a rural environment.

This study is one of three case studies carried out in 2005/2006 in Indonesia, Tanzania and Zambia as part of KEPA's (Service Centre for Development) impoverishment analysis. The aim of these studies is to look at the local reality and to hear the local people. How the local people define and experience poverty? What are the structures and practices which create and maintain poverty in the target areas? These studies focus on three main focal issues:

1. Functioning of local economies and their linkages to national/international economies
2. State and civil society relations
3. Relevance of national and international policies and programmes to reduce/halt poverty

The Indonesian study was carried out by three main researchers, Hary Prabowo, Melevlev Bahrumrum (INSIST) and Henri Myrttinen (KEPA Yogyakarta), who visited both study areas in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. In the field

studies, they were assisted by local community organisers and researchers who have been actively working with the respective communities over a period of years. In Jakarta, these were Ali and Wardah Hafdiz from the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC, Jakarta) as well as and in Papua Ronny Dimara (Triton, Sorong), Max Binur (Belantara, Sorong) and Septer Manufandu (Foker, Jayapura). Further support was given by Anne Schönstein and Kurniawan Muhammad, two student assistants from the Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta.

The researchers carried out theoretical background research on the issues and interviewed people who have been working with the chosen communities. During the field visits, group discussions were held with the communities and individual interviews were carried out. Unfortunately, the research visits were a kind of repeated 'parachuting' exercise, as the researchers had neither the time nor the resources available to them to spend extended periods of time with the communities, as would have ideally been the case.

The study will first present the two cases in brief after which the above three issues, the local economy, the state/civil society relations and the relevance of poverty reduction programmes will be discussed from the point of view of the study areas and their inhabitants.

Who is poor? - A few words on poverty

Perhaps the concept of poverty itself – and with it, by implication that of impoverishment – should also be reconsidered here. This is something which we encountered throughout the field research. By conducting research for an impoverishment analysis we *a priori* labelled the communities in question as being poor, impoverished, marginalised – even if they themselves do not necessarily see themselves as falling into that category. In many societies and cultures, poverty carries a strong negative stigma with it and thus people understandably might resent to be called that. An example of this is the reaction of urban squatters in Manila to the research being conducted in their community quoted in Velasco, 2005:

Bhoy Vino rejects the use of the term squatter as being derogatory and says *'Hindi kami squatter. Nakikitira lang kami rito!'* (We are not squatters. We just live here!) to which his wife Edna laughs and replies *'Hindi ako squatter. Maganda ako!'* (I am not a squatter. I am beautiful!)

The two Indonesian case studies brought up quite different views on poverty and impoverishment as seen through the eyes of the respondents. In Maladofok, the head of a family of four which lived off approximately 25 USD a month (thus well below the internationally used 'a dollar a day'-line) did not see himself as being poor as the family was still able to feed itself and more or less buy the necessary essentials. Also, once outside money did come into the community via remittances of the few villagers working in Sorong, these were not used for immediate necessary expenses but rather for building a new church.

By contrast, the urban poor community in Jakarta is much more politicised and class-conscious, referring to themselves as 'the poor' (*orang miskin* as opposed to the more common 'small people' or 'ordinary people'- *orang kecil / wong cilik or orang biasa,* respectively). In part, this is due to the active work of grassroots organisations such as the Urban Poor Consortium in the greater Jakarta area who have organised and politicised many of the communities through their struggles against the local government and private developers. The level of knowledge about links of their local situation to national and global developments is also higher in Jakarta, with many of the respondents linking their situation with specific government policies as well as those of the World Bank, IMF and WTO. This can also be seen as one of the results of the work of the community-organising carried out by the UPC but also due to the easier access to information in the capital as opposed to the periphery.

These different reactions to the terms 'poor' or 'poverty' are not only about the pride and self-esteem: the community and individuals in question may well define being poor in a very different way from the economically and socially privileged[1] outside observer.

1 Privilege, of course, also lies in the eye of the beholder

Official definitions of poverty

Aside from the difference between the communities' own views and outsiders' views, there are also differing official, statistical views on poverty. The official Indonesian government definition for the poverty line is whether or not one is able to provide oneself (or be provided with) 2100 kcal/day of nourishment. At the moment, this would equal approximately 153 000 Rp or USD 17 a month. This is of course almost half of the UN's USD 1 /day poverty line. If one takes the Indonesian government poverty line, 39 million Indonesians were officially poor in 2006, a 4 million rise compared to 2005, mainly thanks to the 'pro-poor' fuel price hikes (see below). If one takes the one-dollar line, some 80 million Indonesians live in poverty. To put the concept of medium-income country further into perspective, two-thirds of all Indonesians live off less than two US dollars a day.

In a recent study published in The Lancet, (van Doorslaer et al, 2006) it was pointed out that the a-dollar-a-day line is an insufficient benchmark, as in practice in most countries it is only enough to cover basic food costs. Paying for medical services (or for example education) requires higher incomes, as was also visible in the two areas chosen for this study. According to van Doorslaer et al.,

"Our estimate of the overall prevalence of absolute poverty in these [11 Asian] countries was 14% higher than conventional estimates that do not take account of out-of-pocket payments for health care."

Introduction to the study areas

As an illustration of the basic differences between the situation in Jakarta, the capital city, and Sorong in the far east of the country, we chose to compare some of the basic indicators for human development (HDI) used in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Reports (HDR) globally and for Indonesia. The two case studies are from the kabupaten (regencies) of North Jakarta and South (rural) Sorong, respectively (**Table 1, Annex 2**).

Even when using a somewhat crudely generalising tool as the HDIs, the concentration of opportunities to escape impoverishment in urban areas as opposed to the situation in the countryside becomes evident. While North Jakarta ranked 4th nationally (out of 341 districts), neighbouring, more rural Bekasi and Tangerang ranked 144th and 92nd, respectively. The difference is even more visible in the second case study: while rural Sorong ranked 290th, the city itself, with its oil and gas industry, came into 22nd place. The oil and gas industry also explains the high wages for men in Sorong – the wage index only takes into account those working in the formal sector, which is a minority of the population and this minority mainly works in the well-paid oil and gas sector.

One major problem with the HDI-approach is that it does not sufficiently take into account the living conditions of those who form the focus of our study: those who are marginalised and who do not figure in the official statistics as they are not officially registered as inhabitants of the area and do not have the identity card (KTP) necessary for accessing many of the municipal services. It also does not take into account the vast differences visible in the study areas: the difference between those who live in expansive 'executive style' housing complexes and shop in air-conditioned shopping malls in North Jakarta compared to those living literally around the corner in corrugated tin huts; or the privileged status of the non-Papuan 'transmigrant' farmers compared to the Papuan villagers increasingly pushed into subsistence farming. Thus the figures give a rosier picture of the living condition than what they really are like.

Jakarta – 'The Big Durian'[2]

Jakarta, the capital, is located in western Java and is the administrative and economic centre of Indonesia. Greater Jakarta is home to perhaps 25 million people, mainly Betawi, Javanese and ethnic Chinese but also a mix of practically all other ethnic groups in Indonesia plus foreigners. Jakarta, like its sister cities such as Sao Paolo, Lagos, Mumbai or Nairobi across the global south, strikes one at first sight as a 'doomed megapolis.' Dysfunctional public services, traffic chaos, corrupt police, air and water pollution, crass differences between

2 In an ironic reference to New York's 'Big Apple,' Jakarta is often called the Big Durian after the pungent and spiky tropical fruit. As with the fruit, Jakarta tends to be an acquired taste.

income groups – all of these are very much present in Jakarta as well. As Ryszard Kapuscinski puts it, describing the phenomenon of opulent displays of wealth co-existing next to the squalor of slums,

"Capital (largely foreign) has constructed its fragrant and shining sanctuaries, these excellent enclaves, but it has neither the means nor any intention of developing the rest of the country." (Kapuscinski, 1994)

At the same time, the positive aspects are present as well, the vibrant social and cultural networks, especially amongst the urban poor.

Administratively, Greater Jakarta – or Jabotabek, standing for Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi which melt into each other – falls into three provinces: the federal district of Jakarta (DKI[3] Jakarta) and the provinces of Banten and West Java. These are then further divided into regencies, of which DKI Jakarta for example has six.

The Jabotabek area is undoubtedly the economic centre of Indonesia and thus acts also as a magnet for rural poor across the archipelago. The economy ranges in the area from traditional rice-farming to investment banking and much of the country's manufacturing industry, including the sweatshops and *maquiladoras*, are in the area.

Kampung Kolong Tol, Jakarta

The case study site from Jakarta is an 'illegal' settlement in the northern part of the capital city. The Kampung Kolong Tol or 'Toll Road Village/Neighbourhood' has been constructed next to and underneath the bridges of one of the toll roads connecting central Jakarta with the airport and surrounding urban centres. Around 4000 people live in the settlement, mostly in makeshift houses. The first impression of the settlement is that of a 'classic' third world urban slum: the ramshackle houses made of plywood and corrugated tin sheets spread for several kilometres under the toll road overpass, wires and antennas poke out haphazardly, children run around playing on the mud road, as does the occasional chicken. The families, usually consisting of four members, share the small space inside the houses with the material possessions they have been able to acquire – usually some furniture and a gas stove, occasionally a refrigerator or a TV set.

The existence of the *kampung* (neighbourhood) is considered illegal by the government since it is situated mostly under the toll way—a prohibited area to be lived in. Therefore, the people live there without the legal recognition represented by certificate of land ownership. The land is legally owned by PT Citra Mandiri Nusa Pala or CMNP, the company which is in charge of maintaining and running the toll roads. Because of the status of the settlement, the people are under the constant threat of eviction by the government.

In 2002, the government planned to evict the kampung but the people resisted. People then negotiated with the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure and they were promised a delay of the eviction until April 2004. People used the opportunity to strengthen their organisational and advocacy efforts so that they could negotiate with the government more effectively. A partial eviction was carried out in June 2006, followed by further negotiations. At the time of writing in October 2006, the negotiations still continue and people still live in the area.

The illegal status of the settlement has become the main reason for the government not to permit the kampung to have officially recognised local administrative structures such as a neighbourhood heads (RT and RW, in Indonesian). This also means that people can not have an identity card (KTP) and thus the existence of these people is not registered by the government. Only about a quarter of the inhabitants have valid ID cards for Jakarta. Most of them were registered by Kartu Penduduk Musiman or KIPEM[4](seasonal identity card) and ID which is released by the local government in their villages.

The impact of this is that these people can not access facilities and services provided by the government such as electricity, education, or health service, or at least not officially. It has forced people to try to use other residential addresses to get the necessary papers and to have access to these services. This mostly involves paying bribes, though even following the officially sanctioned route, with all the necessary documents in hand, often also involves the payment of bribes. One example of the use of these informal procedures is gaining access to electricity by paying not to the providing company but directly to the electricity board officers.

3 DKI = Daerah Khusus Ibukota, special capital city district

4 KIPEM are issued by the respective heads of the village offices for 6 months maximum.

Bribery is also a common way of dealing with the police and stories of police corruption were a recurring theme in the interviews. According to several respondents, Ramadhan was the worst time of the year in terms of bribes, as the police and civil servants were seeking to augment their meagre salaries before the Idul Fitri celebrations with bribes.

The inhabitants have to buy their water from water vendors as there are not enough wells nor is there a working water supply system. The water supply system in Jakarta has been privatised, with the usual promises of improved service for the customers, better returns for the shareholders, a more wide-ranging network, etc. The performance of the two European investors, Suez Lyonnaise from France and Thames Water from the UK has been underwhelming to say the least. Prices have risen more than the new owners had promised, water availability and quality have plummeted and the water supply network has not been expanded.

Health care is a major problem in the kampung, especially in the rainy season. The area is frequently flooded and there is little in the way of a proper sanitation system. Dengue fever tends to spread during the rainy season as well. In March 2004, for example, the Health Department of Tanjung Priok regency, under the jurisdiction of which the kampung falls, reported 40-100 cases per day, resulting in 14 deaths. Due to

Table 2: Inhabitants of two streets in Kampung Kolong Tol

Jl. Warakas V Rw 09, Kelurahan Warakas, Kecamatan Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Uta**ra.**

Inhabitants	Jobs	Ethnic background	Average Income per month
60 families (~550 people)	Beggars, singing beggars, rubbish pickers, street vendors, manual labour, sex work, and other informal economic activities	Javanese (Cirebon, Tegal, Indramayu, Pemalang, Brebes), Pandeglang, (Sundanese)	Rp. 500.000-Rp.700 000

Jl. Warakas VI Gg. 21, Kelurahan Warakas, Tanjung Priok sub-district, North Jakarta **.**

Inhabitants	Jobs	Ethnic background	Average Income per month
40 families (~350 people)	Beggars, singing beggars, rubbish pickers, street vendors, manual labour, and other informal economic activities	Javanese (Cirebon, Tegal, Indramayu, Pemalang), Maduranese, Sundanese (Pandeglang)	Rp. 500.000-Rp.800 000

its illegal status, the settlement is not fumigated by the city authorities like other areas are.

Most of the people from the neighbourhood work as street vendors, traders, labour and other informal economy activities. Their average income range is between 10 to 30 000 rupiah (approximately USD 1-3) day. Most of them moved to the settlement in 2000 because they were no longer afford to buy or rent houses in legal kampungs after the financial crisis hit the country in 1998, severely impacting their incomes. The cost for buying or renting houses in the kampung is much cheaper than in the legal neighbourhoods

The majority of the inhabitants in the settlement originate from the province of Central Java. Because this province is relatively close to Jakarta, they can visit their place of origin up to several times a year. Some of them left their family in Central Java and when they get money, they send it to their family. It is more effective to spend money in their villages of origin in Central Java where the living cost is much cheaper than Jakarta. Others are from West Java or, further away, from the island of Madura in eastern Java.

Maladofok, South Sorong Regency, West Papua

Sorong is located on the western tip of West Papua, in what is known as the 'Bird's Head' region due to the shape of the peninsula. It is one of the centres of Indonesia's oil and gas industry and has approximately 500 000 inhabitants, a further 300 000 live in the surrounding rural area, which is the focus of the study. By now, the majority of the inhabitants of Sorong are non-Papuans, i.e. mostly migrants from Java and Sulawesi. In the rural area, there is still a Papuan majority though the transmigration programmes of the government (see below) have also brought in Javanese migrants to the rural areas.

West Papua is the easternmost province of Indonesia and is on the one hand blessed with abundant natural resources but on the other hand, and not unrelatedly, it also has, according to the UNDP's Human Development Report, some of the lowest rates of development, malnutrition, the highest HIV/Aids rates, a volatile political situation, and a huge gap between native Papuans and immigrants (or *transmigrants* as they are called in Indonesian) from other parts of Indonesia, with the transmigrants enjoying a much higher standard of living than the local inhabitants. They also wield greater political and economic power as well as social status than the original Papuan inhabitants. The attitude towards Papuans is often marked by overt or covert racism and disparagement (Marut et al., 2006).

West Papua (also sometimes called West Irian, Irian Jaya or West New Guinea) consists of the western part of the island of Papua, which it shares with Papua New Guinea (PNG). Following the fall of the Suharto dictatorship and the independence of Timor Leste, the Indonesian central government tried to appease the pro-independence movements both in Aceh and West Papua by according the two areas special autonomy in 2000. What this implies in reality is still a matter of debate, given the Indonesian central government's tendency to view law-making and implementation, in a very post-modern way, as on-going narratives, as socially constructed discourses rather than as legally binding texts. In Papua, even the extent of the special autonomous province is in doubt, as there are mutually contradictory presidential decrees giving special autonomy to a new province of West Papua but also ones dividing the area into 2 or 3 new provinces –with or without special autonomous status. Under this division, Sorong would fall under the province of West Irian Jaya with Manokwari as its capital. This has led to some groups in Sorong demanding their own province altogether. As at the time of writing the implementation of these administrative acts is uncertain, we will use the base data for the whole of the province of West Papua as a basis.

The population of the province of West Papua is approximately 2,5 million and by now the non-Papuan immigrants make up around 40 % of the population. The local population speaks hundreds if not thousands of different languages and dialects (depending on the method of classification) while the transmigrants speak their respective local languages of their regions of origin, such as Javanese, Sundanese, Bugis or Betawi. The *lingua franca*, as elsewhere in the country, is Indonesian. The majority of the Papuans are Christians (both Catholic and Protestant), though animism is also abundant, while most of the transmigrants are Muslims.

The regency of South Sorong is sparsely populated, much of it consisting of rainforests, swamps, mangroves and mountains. Most of the arable land has been 'reclaimed' from the jungle and has mostly been given to either transmigrants for rice cultivation or to commercial plantations (mainly

rubber and palm oil). A minority of Papuans still lives according to a traditional semi-nomadic lifestyle but most have settled (or have been settled) in villages and in the semi-urban and urban areas. Many of the Papuan villages still rely on 'slash-and-burn' methods for cultivating the land as opposed to the more sophisticated methods and government support available to the transmigrants.

The West Papuan situation can not be understood at the micro-level without an understanding of the forces at work on the macro-level, and the overriding issue is what is called 'the M issue,' with M standing for *merdeka,* or independence. When Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands – officially in 1945 but *de facto* after another 5 years of bitter guerrilla warfare – West Papua remained under Dutch control. The Dutch administration tried to build up Papuan nationalism with goal of eventually having an 'independent' West Papua/West New Guinea with intimate ties to the Dutch 'motherland,' while the Indonesian government under Sukarno campaigned both militarily (unsuccessfully) and diplomatically (successfully) for an inclusion of the area into the Republic of Indonesia.

The dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the future of West Papua was settled by organising a UN-supervised referendum, the 'Act of Free Choice.' However, instead of having a full referendum, only approximately 1500 tribal chiefs were allowed to take part in the process and allegedly they were subjected to heavy intimidation by the Indonesian military. Unsurprisingly, the chieftains voted for inclusion into Indonesia and in 1969 West Papua became the province of Irian Jaya[5]

Simultaneously, however, a West Papuan independence movement, the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) took up arms against the Indonesian occupation. The OPM has ever since carried out a small-scale guerrilla campaign which has been met with massive reprisals. Exact figures are hard to come by but pro-independence activists allege that up to 100 000 people, mainly civilians, have died in the conflict since the late 1960s. In addition to the armed struggle, political movements calling for an independent West Papua have sprung up and have formed an uneasy coalition in the Papua Presidium Council. The independence movement enjoys widespread support amongst the indigenous Papuan population, though most people keep these sentiments to themselves given the possibility of harsh reprisals. In May 2005, for example, two men were sentenced to 15 and 22 years in prison, respectively, simply for displaying the banned Papuan independence flag.

In addition to the symbolic and political independence and sense of both 'national' and personal dignity that the establishment of an independent state promises, a key factor in driving the independence struggle are economic concerns. There is a very strong feeling that the resources of the territory have been appropriated by outsiders and the original inhabitants have become second-class citizens (if even that) on their own land, with their ancestral lands, their arable land, their forests, water resources, their mineral wealth, their wildlife, their traditional products taken away from them and converted to financial wealth in Jakarta or further abroad. Resentment against this led to widespread protests by Papuans in Jakarta and in Jayapura in early 2006, during which the offices of the American gold mining company Freeport McMoRan were ransacked in Jakarta and six police officers killed in Jayapura.

Transnational corporations and the Indonesian security apparatus play a major role in these processes. Whether or not independence would make any kind of positive impact on the lives of the people is of course an open question, with neighbouring Papua New Guinea and newly-independent Timor Leste presenting a rather grim example of what can go wrong even if nominal independence is gained. The two countries have been plagued by continuing political instability, poverty, violence and increasing dependence on Australia.

Apart from the whole issue of self-determination and internal colonialism that is specific to West Papua, the question of land rights in the area is centred around the same unresolved question

5 We have not been able to confirm this but according to some sources the name Irian Jaya, which used to be the name of the province and means 'Victorious Irian', comes from the Sukarno-era acronym of Inisiatif Republik Indonesia Anti-Nederlands, in line with other acronyms such as Nasakom (Nationalisme, Agama, Komunisme – the official policy of Sukarno of combining nationalism, religion and communism) or Tahuvip (Tahun Vivere Pericoloso – The Year of Living Dangerously, the prophetic title of Sukarno's last official speech to the nation before the alleged G30S (Gerakan 30 September – Movement of September 30) coup d'ètat attempt in 1965 that ended Sukarno's rule and resulted in the massacre of 500 000-1 000 000 alleged communists

that is being faced in other parts of Indonesia as well: the conflict between the traditional '*adat*' commons on the one hand and state and private ownership on the other hand.

According to Indonesian law (open, as mentioned above, to constant re-negotiation by the relevant actors), all land not owned privately or falling under 'adat' ownership is owned by the state. It is then the responsibility of the state to use this in a way to bring maximum profit to the Indonesian nation and its people. While this is a grand goal in theory, its implementation in practice has proven to be a bit more difficult, especially when one considers the extent to which the concept of maximum profit to the nation may easily become mixed up with the concept of maximum profit to oneself in the minds of administrators and local military commanders working for the benefit of the nation in difficult conditions for a meagre pay[6].

The failure of this concept of three-fold land ownership is especially evident in West Papua. While theoretically most of the land should be under the control of the traditional communities, the state has considered many of these areas as being 'uninhabited,' or cheated communities out of their land for paltry compensations or, where this has not worked, taken the land over forcibly. Sometimes the tribal chiefs have not been aware that they have actually signed away the land or have done so without actually having the authority, e.g. in matrilinear societies where land is owned by the women but ends up being signed away by a male chief. Once again, private and state interests have often become mixed up in the process. At times, the communities have been able to keep their land but have lost their resources, e.g. timber, often at gun point.

Compensation is occasionally paid, but usually either only benefits the tribal elite and/or is far below the market value of the land or resources. For example, the Indonesian state oil company Pertamina has promised the residents of South Sorong regency a boarding house for students who go to Sorong city to high school in compensation for drilling for oil on their land. But even this paltry compensation, a house in exchange for oil, given by the state oil company of an OPEC member state, has not been fulfilled.

The beneficiaries of this land grab have been transmigrants, who received many of the most arable lands; well-connected state bureaucrats and businessmen (including those from the pro-Indonesian Papuan elite) and companies, both national and international, often with a ravenous appetite for land and resources. West Papua is home to the world's biggest gold and copper mine, run by Freeport McMoRan (USA); Asia's biggest natural gas field is to be opened up in Bintuni Bay next year by BP; Chinese, Indonesian and European oil companies are active in the Sorong area; the province is a major source for mostly illegally logged tropical hardwood for the Chinese, Japanese and European markets, Taiwanese and Thai fishing fleets have (partially illegally) been given concessions to fish in the waters off Papua. In the first six months of 2006 alone, over 300 foreign ships fishing illegally in Papuan waters were detained. Chinese companies have been especially active in expanding into Papua, with Petrochina buying the rights for operations in South Sorong regency from Pertamina. BP's gas field project in Bintuni Bay has also affected Sorong, as the city is being used as a logistical base for BP's operations. This has led to calls that some of the community development money and tax proceeds coming from BP should flow to Sorong as well.

In addition to purely economic reasons for these activities, there is also an inherent, development-based racism that becomes apparent when speaking with non-Papuans, be it in Papua itself or in other parts of Papua. Not only the province but its native inhabitants as well are seen as 'under-developed' and thus needing 'outside guidance' (Marut et al, 2006).

The issue of land ownership is especially central to those tribes in Papua which draw upon the specific area of land which they occupy as a source of cultural identity, be it through myths of creation linked directly to that area, ancestors buried in that area, or sacred forests, groves, mountains or bodies of water. This also means that the Papuan communities are less mobile and flexible than the transmigrant communities. In Sorong, a number of transmigrant communities have benefited from the expansion of the city by selling the land they had originally received from the government for farming to developers building new supermarkets and residential areas.

6 According to a local joke, the 'soldiers come in with an M-16 and leave with 16 M,' i.e. 16 Milyar (billion) rupiah

The Village of Maladofok

The second case study area is the village of Maladofok, a Moi tribe village, some two-three hours drive inland from the city of Sorong, depending on the weather conditions. Sorong, as mentioned above, is one of the centres of the Indonesian oil and gas industry and, according to the UNDP HDR for Indonesia, the town boasts the highest average wages for men employed in the non-agricultural sector in all of Indonesia. This statistic however obscures the fact that most of the population – women, farmers, fisherfolk, the informal sector - does not fall into this privileged category. It also obscures another sad reality, that of the racial divide between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots.' Most of those employed in the non-agricultural sector, especially the more highly qualified jobs, are non-Papuan immigrants. Increasingly, non-Papuans are also taking over the less formal sectors of the economy in Sorong as well, with practically all vendors in the central market, virtually all taxi and motorcycle taxi drivers, street-side vendors and small-scale café owners being transmigrants.

Maladofok has a population of approximately 350 people and is surrounded by forests. The only connection to the outside world is a dirt road which becomes impassable when there is heavy rainfall. As there is no public transport to Sorong, transportation needs to be arranged by means of group taxis. Electricity is supplied by a generator, each household has to pay monthly. There is no water supply in the village and the villagers have to walk for about 10-20 minutes to the water source. Two wells were installed earlier, but these are already dysfunctional. There is one church situated in the middle of the village, a school and a health station which has been unmanned for the past seven years. The educational and health infrastructure is, in other words, quite poor. The elementary school in the village has only 3 classrooms which need to be shared by all of the students from grades 1 to 6. There are also 3 teachers. However two of these do not live in the village and are often not around. A doctor occasionally visits the village but all serious cases would need to be transported to hospitals in Sorong. Given the prohibitive costs of this, many resort to traditional medicines. According to the villagers, there have also been several cases of people dying on the way to Sorong as the transport was organised too late. Many of the children have swollen abdomens, either due to malnutrition or the substandard water supply. There are also numerous cases of eye infections, possibly also due to water-borne diseases.

There is a great sense of frustration in the village and a situation in which the villagers find themselves in a new system which they have yet to master, while on the other hand the old traditional system that they know well seems does not apply to their life anymore. The most common comment about their own condition was *'susah'* – difficult. According to one villager, they 'feel marginalised on their own land,' as their possibilities of economic and social advancement are blocked by non-Papuans who have taken over, or more correctly, created the economy in Sorong. The lack of proper medical and educational facilities is lamented. As one of the elder villagers put it, 'previously, we still at least had medical workers here, now we have nothing. We don't have the money to buy the schoolbooks our children need, how are they supposed to study without schoolbooks?'

Local economies

In both cases, much of the local economy revolves around small-scale, mostly informal activities. In Maladofok, practically all people (apart from the local priest and the teacher) are small-scale subsistence farmers. Apart from cultivating crops for their own use, the farmers grow two cash crops which they sell in Sorong. In early 2005, the villagers estimated their cash crop sales as being:

- Langsant or duku, the small, yellow fruit of the lansium tree which can be harvested once a year, yielding about 1.680.000 fruits per year, and
- Minyak kulit or tree bark oil, which can be harvested once every 3-4 weeks, yielding around 10-15 litres (l litre sold for USD 9-10 in early 2005)

Approximately once a month, the family heads make the journey to Sorong to sell the excess produce and to buy necessary products, such as rice, cooking oil and clothes. On average, the sales amount to approximately 30 USD per family. When interviewed in early 2005, the villagers agreed that this was 'good enough,' as it covered most basic needs. The situation has changed by 2006, however, with the fuel price hike. This has greatly increased the cost of transport to town to now approximately 5-10 USD as well as raising

the prices of goods to be purchased. Electricity generation has also been reduced after the price of petroleum went up.

A limited source of additional income are the remittances sent by the handful (6-8) villagers who have managed to find work in Sorong. These remittances were used to build a new village church.

The community in Kampung Tol consists mainly of people working in the informal urban economy of Jakarta, working as small-time traders, *becak* (bicycle rickshaw) and *ojek* (motorcycle taxi) drivers, running small food stalls or small workshops, e.g. for sewing or for motorcycle repairs. Incomes tend to hover at best between the poverty line of 1USD per day and the common Indonesian income of 2 USD per day. Some community members work outside of the settlement, for example as maids or as parking attendants.

Jakarta being the economic centre of Indonesia, the people of Kampung Tol are inevitably linked to national, and via the national to global economic networks. Using Hardt and Negri's terminology they form part of the 'multitude' which is simultaneously exploited but also integrated into the 'biopolitical[7]' globalised economy (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

The links between the villagers in Maladofok and the national and global economic networks seems more tenuous. The main point of interaction with outside economic networks is the selling of surplus produce in the markets of Sorong and the consecutive buying of products.

The lands around Maladofok have however been integrated into the global economy to a larger degree than the people. West Papua is one of the resource bases both for Indonesia itself and for much of East Asia. As mentioned previously, the province has the world's largest gold and copper mines, numerous oil and gas fields, forests and fishing grounds. In a sense, Papua is both an internal and international colony, providing resources for the Indonesian and global economies. The area around Sorong has numerous oil fields and the Indonesian state-owned oil company Pertamina has already been prospecting some 10 km up the road from Maladofok.

Somewhat ironically perhaps, people in and around Sorong often face great difficulties in buying petrol for their own use in spite of living in a major petroleum exporting area. The price of petrol is also around 15% higher in Sorong than for example in Java. According to the villagers, the sale of petroleum products in Sorong is in the hands of a cartel of transmigrants from Makassar. The oil economy of Sorong is very much an 'enclave economy' connected directly to the greater national and international economic networks with little, if anything, trickling down to the poorer segments of society. The same can of course be said, in part, for those participating in the better-paid jobs of Jakarta's formal economy – the money that goes into driving an imported car, eating at Kentucky Fried Chicken and shopping at Carrefour's will in all likelihood not trickle down in any noticeable way to the people of Kampung Kolong Tol.

A serious environmental and cultural problem in Papua is the large-scale logging of what is still left of the rainforests. The cultural aspect of this is that the forests are considered by many of the tribes as their spiritual and physical link to the land and to their ancestors. Many of the Papuan tribes, be it in West Papua or across the border in Papua New Guinea, define their identity through their link with the land and the forests and this link – and with it their cultural identity – is severed (Marut et al., 2006). Many of the illegal logging operations are run by Malaysian, Korean and Chinese companies with the protection and involvement of the Indonesian police and military. Most of the hardwood goes to the rapidly growing Chinese market but also to European and North American customers (Telapak/EIA, 2005). The demand for Papuan timber has greatly increased with the construction boom in China in preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.

Illegal logging has also been a problem in Maladofok. The ancestral forests were logged by PT Intimpura Timber, a company working under the protection of the military. Villagers were dissuaded from protesting by the military, which made several visits to the village. The company operated in the traditional forest until 2003, at which point the forests had been depleted of the most valuable trees. However, the company did pay some compensation to the community, including installing two wells and a generator. Some in the community also received new houses but since these were not built for all, this has

7 The term 'biopolitical production' is used by Hardt and Negri (2004) to describe the forms of production today, 'to highlight that it not only involves the production of material goods in a strictly economic sense but also touches on and produces all facets of social life, economic, cultural, and political.' (p. xvi)

also led to new tensions in the community. The value of the compensation could not be ascertained but according to the villagers it was much less than the value of the wood that was logged, and rather paltry when one keeps in mind that the rainforest that was logged is not a renewable resource and the loss also meant the loss of the source of spiritual ancestry for the community.

A Sorong-based NGO, Belantara, has been active in carrying out livelihood projects in villages in South Sorong regency, including Maladofok, in order to encourage the local population to use the timber to produce goods for sale themselves rather than selling off only the wood.

Relationships between civil society and the State

In terms of impoverishment, the key issue when looking at the relationship between civil society and the State after the end of the Suharto dictatorship has been the continued, though diminished, belief of the State in '*developmentalism*,' i.e. the positivist discourse that has been dominant in Indonesia for the past 50 years, stressing the need for outside aid and investment, as well as 'free market' reforms in order to develop the country into a western-style capitalist economy. While some sectors of civil society share this vision, most civil society organisations are critical if not completely opposed to this paradigm. The relationship between the state, especially its security apparatus, and civil society thus tends often to be an antagonistic one. Also, in both communities examined in our study, the communities have a tense relationship to the state, with the situation in Kolong Tol being perhaps tenser now than the situation in Papua. This, however, is not so much linked to ideological differences about the pros and cons of developmentalism, but rather because these communities have been forced to be at the receiving end of the practical consequences of this paradigm.

In the case of Kolong Tol the situation of the people is defined by their lack of security: they do not have a "stable" place to stay in and are threatened by the very institutes that are supposed to protect their rights as citizens. In addition to the constant threat of eviction, the lack of official documents makes them vulnerable to and dependent upon paying off members of the state apparatus. Corruption is endemic in the Indonesian police force and civil service. Unless the government changes its policy on ID cards or illegal settlements, these migrants will not be able to get out of this trap of insecurity.

The political mobilisation of the urban poor in the Greater Jakarta area has not been universally welcomed, and in addition to harassment by the state security apparatus, urban poor activists have also been targeted by right-wing 'goon squads' such as the FBR (Betawi Brotherhood Forum). Though the members of these groups are themselves from the lower economic strata of society, they operate against their own class interests but on behalf of the interests of the local power elites and with the tacit approval of the security forces. In mobilising against the activists, the FBR draws on their 'ethnic' Betawi background, i.e. their claim to be the original inhabitants of the Greater Jakarta area whose rights have been diminished by the influx of outsiders. The political agenda of the FBR is exclusivist, socially conservative and increasingly misogynist. Through these groups, which have excellent connections to the police forces, military and political elites (including the family of ex-dictator Suharto), the class struggle can be manipulated and changed into an intra-class struggle between the poor themselves, pitting Betawi against other ethnic groups, Muslims against Christians, women against men.

In Papua, on the other hand, the relationship between the state and Papuan civil society tends to be defined by the conflict over the status of the province, as mentioned above. Indigenous Papuans are considered by the police and military as being all potential OPM sympathisers and supporters. Though the intensity of the armed insurgency is minimal at best, the security forces conduct regular and heavy-handed 'sweeps,' often resulting in civilian casualties. Maladofok and its environs have also been regularly been declared 'red areas' resulting in the area being cordoned off while the security forces carry out their activities. At times, these military operations are used as a cover for illegal economic activities, e.g. illegal logging, by the security forces (Aditjondro, 2004).

In addition to the threats caused, ironically, by the security apparatus to the communities, the people in the case areas studied also need to interact with other officials, such as the school boards, water and electricity suppliers, and the health services. In all cases, the services are either substandard (e.g. education), not available

(e.g. health services; water and electricity in Maladofok) or only available through the use of corruption (water and electricity in Jakarta). The interviewees do not see the state as a guarantor of their safety and security but rather as something to be avoided interacting with at all costs.

Poverty reduction policies and programmes

During the interviews, the respondents did not recall any government-funded or other poverty-reduction programmes which would have impacted their lives in anyway. This perception is interesting, as the lives of both communities have been heavily impacted upon by programmes, implemented by the government and demanded, supported and sometimes paid for by outside agencies, which have been billed as measures to reduce poverty.

Transmigration

One of the programmes with the most profound impacts on Indonesian society outside of Java has been the so-called transmigration programmes of the Suharto-era. The aim of the scheme was two-fold: reduce rural poverty on the most heavily-populated islands of Java, Madura and Bali by moving landless peasants to 'emptier' islands while simultaneously kick-starting development on these 'underdeveloped' islands with the help of these 'more cultured and cultivated' transmigrants from the 'inner islands.' The programme was heavily funded by the World Bank.

The poverty-reduction impact of the massive relocation scheme has been mixed. Though the transmigrants were given preferential access to land and resources, they were often not successful, due to climatic and soil conditions, in growing the crops they were supposed to grow (mainly rice). Nevertheless, they were and still are in a better position than the local population who do not have the access and political support enjoyed by the transmigrants. Many of the transmigrants have moved on from agriculture to trade, business and administrative positions. What the scheme has however been successful in doing, unfortunately, has been spreading resentment against the transmigrants, especially the Javanese. From time to time, the tensions between the transmigrants and the local population erupt into conflicts, some of which have been exceedingly bloody (e.g. the conflict in West Kalimantan in 2000-2001).

Implicit in the transmigration scheme was and still is a prevailing view of the inhabitants of the less-populated islands, and especially of the indigenous inhabitants as being more backward than those of Java, Bali and to an extent Sumatra and that the culture of these more 'inner' islands is more 'developed' (*maju*) and thus more desirable than that of the more peripheral areas. This has had lasting impacts on the everyday lives of people. Papuans have, for example, for a large part internalised the discourse that theirs is an inferior culture (see for example Marut, 2004).

Food culture, for one, has been changed on the 'outer islands,' with negative consequences for food sovereignty. Local staple foods, such as sago or cassava, have been replaced by rice. The food sovereignty issue is made more difficult by the lack of control over land and resources leading to a dramatic impact on the living standards of the indigenous Papuans, an impact which has been exacerbated by processes of trade liberalisation and cultural changes brought upon by Indonesian rule. In terms of food sovereignty, the prime example for illustrating this is rice. Previous to Indonesian rule, practically no rice was cultivated on Papua and local carbohydrate needs were covered by sago, cassava, boiled bananas, yams and sweet potatoes. The 'cultural colonialism' of Indonesian rule, however, with its heavy Javanese bias, has, in effect, e.g. through the educational system, the example set by transmigrants and through the media convinced Papuans along with other East Indonesians that in order to be a fully-fledged and fully-fed Indonesian citizen, one needs to eat rice at least twice a day. Knowledge of the use of local plants as a source of nutrition is fast being lost. This shift in nutritional habits coupled with a liberalisation of the rice markets in South-East Asia has turned Indonesia, previously self-sufficient in terms of rice, into a net rice importer and most of its small-scale farmers into net food consumers rather than producers.

Nowhere is the impact of these trends more visible than in areas where rice has not been one of the staple crops and where its production is unsustainable, e.g. in Papua and other parts of eastern Indonesia. The prime lands have been given to non-Papuans for rice cultivation – eventhough the land is unsuitable for it. The Papuans

have been pushed off the arable land and have become dependent on rice grown by others – but living on unproductive land, they can scarcely afford the rice anymore, let alone other sources of nutrition. As mentioned above, in Maladofok, one of the villages in West Papua studied as part of the impoverishment analysis, the average family's monthly income of approximately USD 30 was just enough to drive into the next town to buy rice and cooking oil once a month. This was supplemented by beans, papaya leaves, sago and occasionally chicken or pig meat from the village. The result is chronic malnutrition, at least amongst the indigenous Papuan population. The situation in West Papua has for now, however, not reached the same catastrophic proportions as in the province of East Nusa Tenggara, where around 60 people died of chronic malnutrition in June 2005.

This increased demand for rice, along with other factors such as the liberalisation of rice trade in Southeast Asia, have turned Indonesia from being self-sufficient to being a net rice importer. The situation will become more precarious for the inhabitants with the introduction of another government policy which has been demanded for years by Indonesia's outside creditors.

The difference between the lives of the local people and the transmigrants was very visible in Papua. Maladofok, as outlined above, does not have any paved roads, no shops, no safe water supply, no health care workers, an overcrowded school and relies on an unreliable generator for electricity, fuel for which has to be brought in from Sorong. On the other hand, the nearby transmigration settlement S.P.[8] has paved roads, steady electricity supply, shops, food stalls, petrol is readily available, and the wealthier inhabitants have TVs, satellite dishes and computers. S.P.1 I is home to approximately 3000 inhabitants, only 10 % of which are indigenous Papuans. The settlement has 3 kindergartens, 3 elementary schools, one junior high school and one senior high school.

Slashing the Fuel Subsidies

A recent development which will undoubtedly have a massive impact on the lives of the two communities studied has been the gradual slashing of the fuel (BBM) subsidy, first by raising fuel prices by around 60-70% in early 2005 and another 127% in October 2005. This again is billed as a pro-poor move, as the money saved by the government by not having to pay the subsidy would flow into education and health projects. Furthermore, the argument goes, the subsidy was of the greatest benefit to the upper and upper middle classes who, with the oversized SUVs so popular in Jakarta, consume the most petrol and thus gain the most benefit from the subsidies.

What this line of reasoning fails to take into account is that for the upper classes, the relative impact of the rise in the petrol price will be much smaller than for those earning less. If one earns, say US $ 2000 a month, the increase from US$ 0.15 per litre of petrol to US $ 0.50 has a relatively small impact. However, raising the price of kerosene, which is used for cooking by those who can not afford using gas, from US$ 0.05 to US$ 0.25 has a massive relative impact on those living off US $ 1-2 a day. The central government has started a new subsidy scheme to try to lessen the negative impacts of the price hike on the poorest sections of society by paying approximately US $ 9[9] per month for three months per family to those deemed to be in the poorest sector of society. The payment of these subsidies has been marred by irregularities. Funds have gone 'missing' and eligibility for compensation has been unclear. In some regions for example, there have been reports of the local government not recognising woman-headed households as being eligible for the compensation. Also, those who are most vulnerable, i.e. the ones who are not officially registered, could obviously not apply for the compensation.

The situation is even more difficult in rural areas where people rely on road and boat travel to reach local towns for selling their produce, for health services or for school. Meeting the transportation costs has already often been difficult; the fuel price hike will undoubtedly make it impossible for many to access these services. The initial rise in transportation costs has been around 30-50%, based on personal experiences of the authors. As a respondent interviewed in

8 S.P. = Satuan Pemukiman

9 Almost simultaneously, members of parliament approved a wage raise of approximately US$ 900 per month per MP for themselves, justifying this in part because of the higher prices caused by the fuel price hike. Assuming that the average family would have 4 members, the annual wage increase alone of the MPs equal the subsidy given to 1,2 million

one of the river communities around Buntok in Central Kalimantan pointed out, even if the central government actually did use the savings from the fuel subsidy to support education and health projects (which many doubt), what good would the best hospital or school that money can buy do to the villagers when they can not afford the boat ride to the clinic or school?

The rise in fuel prices has, as a knock-on effect, immediately also raised the prices of basic necessities. The price of rice in Yogyakarta, for example, almost doubled overnight following the second price hike. Again, the impact is relatively greater for the economically poorer sections of society who have to use a greater share for their income for food.

Given the shorter distances and the possibility of alternate modes of transport, the negative impacts will be less for the urban poor in this respect, though they often face other obstacles in accessing basic services as outlined above. The problem of not being able to buy kerosene, however, will be greater in urban areas as the rural alternative of switching back to wood or wood coal is not available. The net effect of the price hikes will in all probability lead to a decrease in the incomes of the urban poor, as the customers of the sellers working in the informal sector as well as of the becak drivers tend to be from the lower income sectors of society whose buying power has decreased.

Some of the views taken by government officials but also representatives of international development organisations betray a lack of understanding for the situation. The vice-president for example quipped that having to queue for kerosene was not that bad as people should be used to queuing, for example for cinema tickets. It is doubtful whether he reflected upon the fact that most of the people who rely on kerosene will not have had the extra cash in their pockets to have been able to buy movie tickets in the first place. A foreign head of a regional UNDP programme on the other hand expressed his incredulity about why becak drivers would be protesting the fuel hikes as higher would 'obviously' increase their market share in urban transport, overlooking the fact that becak drivers and their families also tend to rely on kerosene for cooking and must also face higher food prices – along with the reduced incomes of their primary customers.

If the government does indeed fulfil its promises and use the money saved from slashing the fuel subsidies for education and health care, there is still a major risk that its other policies would undercut any potential benefits. The government has, in line with demands from the WTO, from donor countries and agencies, announced that it will open up and privatise both the health and education sectors, thus guaranteeing better services for those who are able to pay – and worse for those who can not.

Urban development

In the case of Jakarta, a further direct threat to the community is that of urban development. This is also often justified as an anti-poverty measure by the authorities. Urban development in Indonesia tends to be a top-down approach, one often enforced by brute force. The ideological roots lie in what is often called 'developmentalism' in Southeast Asia. In order to have developed and clean, 'western' cities with wide-laned roads, shopping malls, office buildings and the like, all traces of 'underdevelopment' such as traditional markets, becaks, street vendors or roadside kitchens need to be purged. And with them, the people need to go, preferably back to the underdeveloped countryside or to the margins of the city (until the next eviction). Measures to enforce this include razing of squats, bans on informal economic activities, bans on small-scale traditional transportation systems, sanitation laws and the deportation of people who do not have valid identity cards. These 'sweeps' are carried out especially after the end of Ramadhan, for the city dwellers return to their villages of origin to celebrate *idul fitri*.

Gender and impoverishment

One very important issue which needs to be looked at in more detail is that of gender. The economic activities, the social and political positions of power and even the spending of what free time is available in both Kampung Kolong Tol and Maladofok is highly gendered. In the interview situations, the difference between the Papuan and Jakartan respondents was quite striking. Whereas in the Jakartan interviews, men and women would openly and loudly give their opinions, in Sorong the community gathered together and let two-three elder men speak on behalf of the community. In part, this can be seen as reflecting the higher level of politicisation and thus readiness to voice their opinions to outsiders on the part

of the Jakartans, while the political situation in Papua has traditionally been one in which free speech has been discouraged. On the other hand, it can also be seen as indicative of the gender power balances in the communities.

While the urban, culturally mixed Jakartan kampung offers women new (if limited) socio-economic possibilities, the community in Maladofok, for better and for worse, retains its traditional gender power balance. While few new socio-economic possibilities are available, there is on the other hand the cultural safety net of the community still present. In Kampung Kolong Tol, most women participate in the informal economy, including the most precarious sector, i.e. sex work. In Maladofok, women work in their traditional roles both in the fields and at home.

What seems to be an initial trend in the research that we have done here, and which would need to be investigated in further detail, there seems also to be a crisis of masculinity, with men finding it more difficult to cope with the forces of transition[10] which are challenging their communities, leading to frustration, abuse and violence. This is especially true in Papua, where feelings of inferiority have been instilled into Papuans and this frustration turns into violence against the self, reflected in massive alcohol abuse by Papuan men, and in violence against others, which in turn is reflected by very high rates of domestic violence. A further problem for many Papuan men has been that their social and economic marginalisation has meant that they are not able to come up with the necessary bride money for having a traditional marriage, thus becoming more cut off from the traditional Papuan gender roles.

While women might, then, be in general able to cope psychologically better than men with the situation, the odds are stacked against them socially, politically and economically. Going back to the UNDP's Human Development Report, the Gender Development Index figures for North Jakarta and Sorong are as found in **Table 2 (Annex 3)**

What is most striking is the difference between the two areas, whereas the difference between women and men remains approximately the same – with the clear difference of average wages for men in Sorong which are higher than for men in Jakarta while the ones for women are lower then Jakarta. As mentioned above, though, the wage statistics in Sorong give a skewed picture as the male wages on reflect the minority of men, practically all non-Papuan, who have positions in the formal economy, especially the well-paid oil sector. The difference in opportunities for women are however much more pronounced in Papuan regencies with a smaller percentage of better-off transmigrants. In neighbouring Manokwari, for example, the average girl only receives 3,4 years of schooling. In Jayawijaya, it is only 1,5 years.

In Jakarta, the appearance of the above-mentioned right-wing groups can also be seen as a gendered backlash by men seeking to re-impose conservative gender views on women. Recent sharia-influenced communal bylaws, some of which have also been passed in several municipalities in the Greater Jakarta region, have greatly reduced the space available to women. These include provisions such as a ban on women moving around outside after dark, a measure that is ostensibly supposed to cut down on the sex industry but in actual fact discriminates against women's basic human rights and also makes life extremely difficult for women working outside of the house who can seldom make it back home before dark.

Thoughts and Conclusions

Struggles of territoriality – politics of place and identity

In a sense, both case studies show communities caught up in a daily struggle for economic (even sheer physical) survival, a struggle often against the state, made more difficult by the range of outside forces affecting them which are often referred to, perhaps sometimes somewhat simplistically or demagogically, as the forces of neo-liberal globalisation. There are many ways of defining or classifying these struggles. One possibility is to see them, following Fabros et al., 2006, as

'struggles of territoriality'... a search for space which is both a physical/geographical place and a socio-political location.

10 At the other end of the power spectrum, of course, it is mainly the already privileged men in positions of power in the economy, society or politics who stand to gain most from the processes of globalisation

The communities both in Maladofok and Kampung Tol both are struggling for physical and geographical space – more tangibly of course in North Jakarta than in Papua. Directly linked to this struggle for a geographical space is that of identity. For the Papuans that of an increasingly threatened 'Papuan' identity linked to their ancestral lands and traditions. For the people of Kampung Tol, this struggle has, as outlined above, become a more (class-)consciously political struggle, linked to their identity as members of the urban underclass of Jakarta. This is also linked to a process of regaining lost dignity, as both communities and their members tend to be labelled as being underdeveloped and thus inferior.

Continuing with Fabros et al., 2006,

this 'politics of place' demonstrates how a collective longing for [physical/geographical and socio-political] space, or even a sense of place, can serve as a springboard for establishing movement identity and solidarity that is recovering voices and choices that have been stripped off these communities.'

The struggles of the marginalised thus involve finding a sense of self, rediscovering agency and dignity as well as losing the fear of standing up for their rights.

Informality vs. formalisation

Given the high level of informality in both local economies, the question arises whether formalisation, as currently proposed by several leading economists, would be a solution to the problems faced by these communities. In our opinion, it could be a partial solution, especially in the case of Kampung Kolong Tol. Gaining the official residency permit would allow the community members to at least have theoretical access to the basic services provided by the municipality. Having residential permits and right to settle on the land would also put them in a more secure position vis-à-vis the police, pre-empting possible eviction and deportation. But would it miraculously propel them out of poverty? Hardly. Many neighbourhoods in Greater Jakarta may not be in as a precarious legal situation, having legal rights to stay on the land, but remain in the same precarious economic situation. They have the right to sell their land or to use it as collateral for loans – but if they sell their land or default on the loans, where would they move to from the city and from the urban neighbourhood that sustains them, is their social, economic and cultural home? To an overcrowded countryside where there is no land for them and no social network to fall back upon? Or to an illegal settlement further out in the periphery? Ideally, of course, the urban poor would use the loans to set up thriving businesses and move up the social ladder, eventually settling in the gated compounds of the *nouveau riche*. Some might succeed in this but it is unlikely that it will be the majority.

In Maladofok, formalisation is not the main problem. The inhabitants all have the necessary papers and the land is officially recognised as belonging to the Moi tribe. The problem here is the implementation of the regulations. Though they have theoretical access to for example health care, there has not been a health worker in the village health centre for eight years. Though the land is classified as ancestral land of the Moi tribe, this did not stop Intimpura Timber from logging the forest with the support of the local police force. Thus the problem lies not with the formal rights but with the lack of respect for these rights. As far as land sales are concerned, as noted above, many of the Papuan transmigrants have been selling their land. The local Papuan population, however, has a more 'organic' link with the land, as it is the source of ancestral identity, making selling it much less of an option. Furthermore, given the frankly racist socio-economic marginalisation of indigenous Papuans, it is unlikely that many banks would look favourably at a loan application from Maladofok which has ancestral land as a collateral – unless the land proves to have oil or gas reserves beneath it.

What is to be done?

There are no quick and easy solutions to the problems faced by the two communities in question. Some of the answers are to be found on a local, others on a provincial, some on a national and others on a global level. On the local level, the communities can seek to find alternative solutions to their problems, be it through political activism as in the case of UPC in Jakarta or through seeking to find alternative income sources as in the case of Sorong. Ensuring that the local governments fulfil the basic needs of the communities in terms of human security would then be a further task, which requires advocacy both on a local and regional/

national level. Nationally, the donor-funded or donor-inspired 'poverty-reduction' programmes, such as the previous transmigration programme or the slashing of the fuel subsidies should give both the central government and the major donor agencies some food for thought. In Papua, one of the 'meta'-issues which needs to be addressed sooner rather than later is illegal resource extraction and the complicity of the security forces in it, together with the human rights issues involved. On the national/global level, the impact of TNCs, be it through the privatisation of water in Jakarta, the marginalisation of street vendors through supermarket chains or the extraction of oil and gas, should be revisited not from the point of view of the shareholders but of those whose lives and livelihoods are most impacted upon by these projects.

Annex 1

Map 1. Location of the study areas Jakarta and Sorong

Annex 2

Table 1: Comparison of Human Development Indexes between Indonesia, Jakarta and Sorong (Sources: UNDP, 2004; UNDP, 2005) (F=Female, M=Male)

	Rank	Rank nationally (out of 341 districts)	Life expectancy at birth (years, 2002)		Estimated income* (USD)		Adult literacy rate (% of age 15 and above, 2002)		Mean years of schooling		Population with sustainable access to improved water source (%)	Population with access to medical facilities (%)	Births attended by skilled health personnel (%, 1995-2002)	Poverty rate (%)
			F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M				
Indonesia	111	-	68,6	64,6			83,4	92,5			78		64	27,1
North Jakarta		4	74	70,2	785	1245	96,9	99,5	9	10,7	97,7	98,5	97	4,7
Sorong, rural		290	66,7	62,9	745	1526	83,8	89,3	6,1	7,6	42,2	67,8	76,4	43,1

**Average non-agricultural wage using exchange rate 1 USD = 9500 Rp. The inadequacy of the common estimated PPP income becomes evident when comparing the estimated national income for Indonesian men in the global UNDP HDR of 4161 USD a year with the highest provincial average non-agricultural wage in the national Indonesian report of 2482 USD a year for men*

Annex 3

Table 2. UNDP's Human Development Report, the Gender Development Index figures for North Jakarta and Sorong are as follows (UNDP, 2004) (F=Female, M=Male)

	Life Expectancy (years)		Adult Literacy Rate (%)		Mean Years of Schooling		Participation in Labour Force (%)		Average Wage (1000Rp)		Overall GDI ranking (out of 341)
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	
North jakarta	73,3	69,4	95,6	98,7	8,5	10,0	35,2	64,8	621	986	29
South Sorong	66,7	62,9	83,8	89,3	6,7	8,1	35,8	64,2	590	1028	306
Indonesian Overage	68,1	64,2	85,7	93,5	6,5	7,6	37,5	62,5	462	681	

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