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Civil Society in Zambia and Mozambique

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Abbreviations

CBO	Community based organisation
CCJDP	Catholic Centre for Justice Development and Peace
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
EPA	Economic partnership agreement
FDC	Community Development Foundation (Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade)
FNDP	The Fifth National Development Plan
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
G20	A platform for Mozambican civil society organisations participating in Poverty Observatories
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
KEPA	Service Centre for Development Cooperation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Organization Coordinating Committee
PARPA	Plano de Acção para a Redução de Pobreza Absoluta (Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural adjustment programme
UNAC	National Union of Peasants
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP	United National Independence Party
WfC	Women for Change
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZCTU	Zambian Congress for Trade Unions

Preface

This Working Paper explains the current state of civil society in Zambia and Mozambique. A brief overall background presented by Mark Waller covers the common contexts of Zambia and Mozambique and their respective histories. This provides a setting in which to see the development of and the issues facing civil society in Zambia and Mozambique in terms of being relatively young independent states with histories of colonial domination.

Toni Haapanen's texts on the Zambian and Mozambican civil societies are mainly based on the background papers, inquiries and interviews which KEPA (the Finnish Service Centre for Development Cooperation) commissioned in 2006 in order to have an updated view of Zambian and Mozambican civil societies. His presentation is a synthesis of notions of such persons who, one way or another, are familiar with these civil societies. Therefore, they are by no means all-embracing studies of these two diverse civil societies but they still cover a range of issues and contain some fresh views on the present state of Zambian and Mozambican civil societies and their future challenges.

The summary on Zambian civil society is mainly based on the background papers written by Mulima Akapelwa and Wezi Kaira & Leonardo Katongo. When these papers were prepared Akapelwa headed the governance department of the Catholic Centre for Justice Development and Peace (CCJDP) in Lusaka, whereas Kaira and Katongo were studying at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Helsinki in Finland. They based their views on interviews with key informants of Zambian civil society, previous studies and their own personal experiences from their home country. Additional information was collected by interviewing Senja Väätäinen from KEPA Zambia. As a Project Advisor working with Finnish civil society organisations (CSOs) active in Zambia and their local partners she had a good opportunity to observe local civil society, up to the grassroots level. KEPA's Network Coordinator Kirsi Salonen has also given valuable comments on the draft. She has worked for two years at KEPA Zambia as Policy and Information Officer.

The text on the Mozambican civil society is mainly based on the background paper written by Muntaz Omar R. Adam and on interviews with Amade Sucá, Santos Simione and Nilsa Cassamo by KEPA's Programme Advisor Outi Hakkarainen in Maputo in March 2006. Adam is an expert in international relations. She has collaborated for example with the Mozambican Debt Group and Strategic Consultancy Centre in International Relations (CCBAG) in the areas of poverty, social and economic development and advocacy, as well as in monitoring and evaluation of public policies. Amade Sucá was at the time of interview working as a development policy officer at KEPA Mozambique. Before joining KEPA he worked for the National Union of Peasants (UNAC). Santos Simione has worked as an assessor for the Mozambican chapter of the Africa Groups of Sweden, which is a solidarity organisation that supports reconstruction and democratisation processes in southern Africa. Simione helps foreign civil society organisations to fit their work into the local context. Nilsa Cassamo was the coordinator of the management team of LINK NGO Forum, an umbrella organisation of Mozambican CSOs. KEPA's Policy and Information Officer Esa Salminen has revised and updated the text on the Mozambican civil society.

Wishing you inspiring reading,

Outi Hakkarainen
Programme Advisor, KEPA

Notes on the history of Zambia and Mozambique

Mark Waller

Common legacies and contexts for civil society development

When we consider the present state and potential of civil society in Zambia and Mozambique it is worth going back a bit to look at the contexts in which these countries have emerged since their independence from colonial rule. The social-political climate in which the newly independent countries found themselves in their immediate post-independence situation did much to shape the kind of civil society that consequently developed under the new dispensations. The character of these civil societies is described in the reports on Mozambique and Zambia. The point here is to look at some of the historical legacies and contexts that have influenced the civil society development in the two countries.

Independence was a new starting point but one with a burdensome inheritance from the use of the countries as colonies by Northern powers – in the case of Zambia and Mozambique, the UK and Portugal respectively. Underdevelopment in every area of life, with meagre infrastructure and services in the capitals and few urban centres and generally non-existent ones rurally, was the main legacy. This translated into heavy and self-perpetuating impoverishment pressures: poor health and widespread disease, food and water insecurity, a lack of jobs, a lack of schools, and a skewed economy geared to resource exports.

The liberation process of African states from European colonial control dominated the history of the Southern African region since the mid-20th century. The final stages of the liberation process saw the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1989 and finally South Africa in 1994. The liberation struggles of these countries, and the support of the first three, once they were independent – plus other African states, including Zambia, that had achieved independence earlier – for the end to Apartheid rule in South Africa had profound impacts on social-political-economic development in Southern Africa.

In addition, the post-colonial relations of new and not-so-new independent states, such as Zambia and Mozambique, have been determinants of their development, with deep indebtedness to Northern donors and financial institutions and unfavourable trade conditionalities exerting massive economic pressures that have immediate and long-lasting social and political ramifications. Though the achievement of liberation by countries in Southern Africa brought an end to overt armed conflict, it was only when South Africa's Apartheid regime was forced towards negotiating a democratic transition in the country that its military and economic destabilisation of its neighbouring countries stopped.

The support of countries such as Zambia and Mozambique for South Africa's exiled liberation movement and their opposition to Apartheid rule had made them targets of South African destabilisation, threats and economic pressure. There were no normal trade relations with South Africa, which was under UN and OAU economic boycott and sanctions, and this too warped the potential of economic growth of Zambia and Mozambique, as well as their neighbours.

Nowadays, the post colonial legacies that both countries face are also reflected in their difficult economic trajectories in relation to the North and to international financial institutions. The prescriptions by the World Bank, IMF and G8 for the economic course of these and other African countries revolve around policies for 'macro-economic stability', variously described under the name 'Washington Consensus'. This, according to the economist who coined the term, comprises ten policies:

- fiscal discipline
- reordering public expenditure priorities
- tax reform
- liberalizing interest rates
- competitive exchange rates
- trade liberalization
- liberalization of inward foreign direct investment
- privatization
- deregulation
- property rights

These policy prescriptions are located within poverty reduction efforts developed according to the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Country) pro-

grammes introduced by the IMF and World Bank in 1996. Linked to these programmes are Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which retain emphases on macroeconomic austerity and privatisation.[1] A major cause of the impoverishment of Zambia and Mozambique, like its neighbours, has been the debt burden they have shouldered. Before debt relief, this accounted for 66.4% of Mozambique's GDP and 60.8% of Zambia's. Mozambique's $US4.2 billion was cut so that its service ration to GDP was 35.5% in 2006, dropping to 20% in 2007 but is now rising again.[2] Zambia's $US 7.1 billion external debt has been cut to $0.5 billion.[3] Debt relief is conditional on the devotion of the resources it frees to HIPC strategies, though this has had some benefits, for instance with the free rural healthcare programme created by the government in Zambia in 2006.

The conditions outlined above form the broad outline of the context facing the countries of Southern Africa. These conditions are part and parcel of the concerns of civil society in general terms and NGO activity in particular, and the political conditions and developments that accompany and reflect them have been a formative influence on how civil society has developed.

Zambia

Following the carve-up of Africa by the colonial powers in the 1890s, much of what is today Zambia was under the control of the British South Africa Company. In 1911 it became known as Northern Rhodesia and in the 1950s was made part of a federation of the other British colonies of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The post-World War II era was a time of much nationalist activity against colonialism and for independence in Africa as a whole. The Northern Rhodesia African National Congress was founded in 1948 and until 1958 was the main voice for independence in the country. A more radical wing of the NRANC split off in 1958 in opposition to acceptance of a new constitution introduced by the colonial government.

The new, more overtly anti-colonial organisation, the Zambia African National Congress was headed by Kenneth Kaunda. It was banned and its leaders imprisoned. On his release, in 1960, Kaunda formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and, with the support of the trade union movement, began to campaign for national independence. Britain was aware that its days of colonial control were numbered, but wanted to stave off majority African rule by giving white settlers powers beyond their numbers. The prevarication over direct elections and one-person-one-vote rule saw a campaign of initial peaceful resistance by UNIP-led nationalists turn to violent uprisings and sabotage.[4]

In October and December 1962 two phases of elections were held and, though Britain had tried to ensure continued and strong settler influence, the Legislative Council held an African majority, involving a coalition of NRANC and UNIP. The Council pressed ahead with creating full nation status for Zambia, by withdrawing from the federation concocted by Britain, demanding full national self-government under a new constitution and a new National Assembly based on a broad democratic franchise. The federation was dissolved in December 1963 and the following year Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia.

Kaunda was president for the next 27 years, under a one-party state that banned organised political opposition. Economic policy followed nationalisation and collectivisation programmes, but with little leeway to develop wealth. Zambia faced heavy developmental problems at independence: it had very few educated Zambians able to run government, the economy was heavily dependent on copper mining for foreign exchange earning and had been dependent on foreign (mainly British) management.

The potential for regional support and cooperation was meagre: to the south there was white-controlled Southern Rhodesia, whose minority regime declared independence in 1965, Portuguese-controlled Mozambique, South-African controlled South-West Africa and to the west Angola, also a Portuguese colony. Over the next decades Zambia gave support to the liberation movements of these states. Rhodesia closed its borders with Zambia and in 1981 the South African army occupied the South-West corner of Zambia as a base for attacks against the South African ANC, which largely operated from outside South

1 Bond 2006.

2 Rabobank Groep.

3 Zambia's Minister of Finance Mr Ng'andu P. Magande reported in his budget address to the National Assembly, 25 January 2008, that overall external debt increased in 2007 to US$ 2,035.2 millon from $1,859.0 million in 2006. $US 980.7 million of this is private sector external debt. The minister reported that one reason for the increase is undelivered HIPC debt relief. www.zambia.co.za

4 Larmer 2006.

Africa. Zambia's main lifelines of trade were by rail to Tanzania and the port of Dar es Salaam.

The pressure on Zambia was eased with first Angola's and Mozambique's independence in 1975, and then Zimbabwe's independence in 1979. However, by the end of the 1970s, world copper prices were at an all-time low and the country was one of the world's poorest. In the 1980s Kaunda looked to the IMF for help, and received aid in return for stiff austerity packages that saw the a price hike on foodstuffs of up to 70%.[5] Low copper prices on international commodities exchanges meant that Zambia had major problems servicing its debt. High food prices led to violent protests in which altogether thousands were killed in the following years. Beleaguered by growing opposition and economic dead-ends, Kaunda decided to amend the constitution to legalise political parties and brought elections forward, to October 1991. UNIP and Kaunda were replaced in power by Frederick Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy.

Chiluba sought further help from the IMF and from the World Bank. His government introduced reforms commensurate with IMF and WB programmes: economic restructuring, privatisation, cuts in public spending and price increases on consumer goods. Chibula was replaced by Levy Mwanawasa in elections held in December 2001, and was re-elected in 2006. Poverty in the country worsened in the 1990s. A 1993 estimate put 86% of then 9.5-million population living below the poverty line and 50% of the working population being unemployed.[6] Zambia's Central Statistical Office puts the poverty rate at 68% of the current 11.7-million population. The resurgence of world copper prices since 2004 has meant that Zambia receives better revenue than during the long slump in copper. However, better income and GDP growth, plus some pay-offs from debt relief have yet to dent poverty levels or reduce growing economic inequalities.[7]

Mozambique

When the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola became independent in 1975 – following a peaceful revolution in Portugal and protracted liberation struggles inside the two countries – their newly independent status faced immediate problems. South African military aggression against the two states escalated as colonial domination withdrew. The reason was Angola and Mozambique's support for South Africa's anti-apartheid liberation movement as well as the Marxist revolutionary character of the new leaderships of the two countries.

Mozambique was a particular target, as it borders South Africa. At the time, Zimbabwe was white minority ruled Rhodesia, an ally of South Africa that applied roughly the same supremacist and segregationist policies of Apartheid. One of South Africa's and Rhodesia's first initiatives was to pump money into the creation of an armed opposition to the country's new government, headed by FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – founded in 1962), which had taken power unopposed and was attempting to install a top-down Marxist-Leninist economic system. RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) was the result, set up as a fifth column in Mozambique from among disaffected ex-Portuguese colonials, former FRELIMO officials and peasant recruits. When the Rhodesian system gave way to free elections and the creation of independent Zimbabwe, South Africa became RENAMO's sole support, providing training, bases, funding and equipment for the force. The main purpose of RENAMO was to destabilise the country by attacking infrastructure and communities.

By the end of the civil war, in 1992, an estimated one million Mozambicans had been killed. By the early 1980s, however, the strategy of destabilisation was seen to be failing and was creating increasing criticism of South Africa, even from its own allies in Europe and the US. The pointlessness of the destabilisation was encapsulated by the widely-reported bombing of a government-owned jam factory in May 1983. The US, under President Reagan, put gentle pressure on South Africa to mix diplomacy with its military might.[8] The result was the Nkomati Accord of 1984, under which South Africa disavowed support for RENAMO in return for Mozambique winding down support for the African National Congress. This increased commercial contacts between Mozambique and South Africa, but the latter's support for RENAMO continued covertly.[9] The main effects of the destabilisation were to cause terror and insecurity especially in rural areas, and the targeting of all government structures, includ-

5 *Jubilee Research.*

6 *CIA, The World Factbook, Zambia.*

7 *IRIN 2008.*

8 *Hanlon 1986.*

9 *Thompson 2001.*

ing health clinics and schools, did little but compound the levels of existing poverty. This was exacerbated by the vast numbers – estimated at four million – of internally displaced people, who had moved to refuge settlements near Maputo and other centres, and more than a million refugees who fled the country. The campaign by RENAMO continued until the late 1980s. In 1986 Mozambiquan President Samora Machel and 34 others are killed when their jet plane crashed inside South Africa. Initial enquiries exonerated South Africa, but later investigations found that the Pretoria regime had probably guided the plane off course.[10]

FRELIMO elected Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano president. In the late 1980s there were signs that FRELIMO was changing its stance on its efforts to impose state socialism from above, in light of the poor results attained by agricultural collectivism, changing circumstances within the Soviet bloc (its longstanding locus of support in the global North), and a desire to end the civil war, the disastrous effects of which were dragging the country away from any chance to reconstruct.

At its 1989 congress FRELIMO changed much of its ideological orientation, and thereafter peace talks were attempted with RENAMO, which finally got going in Rome. FRELIMO agreed to allow opposition parties and the creation of a new Constitution in 1990 posited the country as a multi-party democracy. The Italian government and Catholic Church were appointed as mediators in the peace settlement. The peace treaty took three years to agree, and was signed in October 1992. Zimbabwean and Malawian armed forces, which had been in Mozambique to support government troops in protecting transport routes, were withdrawn. The peace agreement provided for a new national armed force composed of FRELIMO and RENAMO troops. A UN monitoring force was deployed to work with a FRELIMO and RENAMO commission on this reconstitution of the military. The agreement also provided for elections. These were scheduled for 1993 but held in 1994, mainly due to the failure of RENAMO to implement military demobilisation and freedom of movement and political organisation in the areas of the country it controlled. In the elections FRELIMO took 44% of the vote to RENAMO's 37.7%. Chissano and FRELIMO also won parliamentary and presidential polls in 1999 by clear but not overwhelming margins. FRELIMO has held onto power in subsequent elections. RENAMO has sought electoral alliances with smaller parties.

The end to the civil war, opening up of political plurality and participation by FRELIMO and RENAMO in parliamentary decision-making, set the ground for establishing stability and normality. By 1996 1.6 million refugees had returned to the country. Mozambique sought international investment under a World Bank structural adjustment programme that helped spearhead a mass privatisation effort of 1,200 state enterprises on a scale unmatched anywhere in the world.[11] Preparations are underway for the privatisation of remaining parastatals, such as electricity, telecommunications, ports and railways. In 2003 Mozambique received a $US 11.8 million IMF loan following a positive review of its performance by the Fund's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The World Bank has predicted average growth at 7% through 2008.[12] According to a study presented at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) in September 2007 most of the growth in GDP goes to the top 20%, while for half the population poverty is deepening and for people in between insecurity is rife, depending on the vagaries of the market.[13]

10 *Mail&Guardian 2006.*

11 *Encyclopedia of the Nations.*

12 *US Department of State Background Note.*

13 *Hanlon 2007.*

Civil society in Zambia

Toni Haapanen

Zambian civil society can be roughly divided into five categories: (1) trade unions, (2) local Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and informal civil groups, (3) religious organisations, (4) local NGOs, and (5) international NGOs. According to an EU study on non-state actors, at the end of 2004 there were 41 registered trade unions, about 11,000 NGOs and almost 14,000 religious organisations in Zambia.[14] Amounts of CBOs and informal civil groups are also high, but exact numbers are not available.

Trade unions are usually not seen as an integral part of Zambian civil society, because they tend to focus on issues that primarily affect the well-being of their members, i.e. different occupational groups in the formal sector. Trade unions are also generally not seen as representatives of the poor or as directly working on issues affecting the marginalized. However, trade unions do sometimes collaborate with other CSOs and networks in civil society, and the promotion of pro-poor policies has also appeared on their agendas.[15] The powerful coalitions of trade unions are the Zambian Congress for Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Federation for Free Trade Unions of Zambia.

A large part of civil groups are small community based organisations (CBOs), or other interest groups, such as religious organisations that exist not only for their members' self-interest but also for society's good. CBOs are very common, even though not very strong or visible. For example, community schools run by CBOs are widespread.[16] Religious organisations, such as the Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace (CCJDP) and Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), are strong and operate at both grassroots and national levels.[17]

In addition to religious organisations, formal non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are present and have an influence in Zambian civil society. There are several international NGOs operating in Zambia, but the voices of locally based NGOs have lately increased steadily. To name a few, Women for Change (WfC), the Non-Governmental Organization Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), the Oasis Forum, and the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) are among the most well-known NGOs and networks.[18]

International NGOs such as World Vision, CARE, Concern, Save the Children, Transparency International, Women in Law Southern Africa and Plan International have their local branches in many countries including Zambia. Their Zambian branches are focused on local issues and employ local people, but some of them, like Oxfam, are also internationally oriented with rather similar agendas and objectives in all countries they operate in.[19]

There is also a group called "non-governmental individuals" or "briefcase NGOs", which promote issues that favour the ruling party's positions, are against the public interest, or otherwise operate for their founders' personal benefit. Usually these fake CSOs lack constituency, and many of them only operate in name.[20]

Networking and cooperation

Zambian CSOs are generally specialised on certain issues and divided into thematic groups. Networking, cooperation and coordination between CSOs is often weak. There appears to be a lot of competition over funding, target areas and target groups, which often hampers co-operation and sharing of resources between CSOs.[21]

Some Zambian CSOs, however, have found common ground for cooperation around specific themes. Lately, one of the most visible alliances has been the Oasis Forum, which was established to resist Chiluba's illegal attempt to run for a third presidential term, and is now focusing its attention on the constitution process. Another alliance is the NGOCC, an umbrella organisation of the women's movement. However, its role as a true umbrella has been questioned.[22] CSPR has as its members NGOs and community based organisations from various sectors and promotes the participation in the PSPR and other policy proc-

14 Corella et al. 2006.

15 Akapelwa 2006.

16 Kaira & Katongo 2006

17 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

18 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

19 Kaira & Katongo 2006.

20 Akapelwa 2006.

21 Akapelwa 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

22 Akapelwa 2006.

esses to do with poverty reduction.[23] In any case, more networking and cooperation is needed. For instance, there is no proper coordination for CSOs working on disability issues.[24]

Geographical coverage

Geographical coverage of Zambian CSOs is skewed, since most of them are based in the capital Lusaka or other urban areas. CSOs' operations also tend to concentrate along the railway route, from the Copperbelt to Livingstone in the south, and other easily reachable areas. More remote rural areas often lack the presence of large and well-established CSOs. Generally, CSOs have least presence and activities in the poorest provinces, such as the Northern and Western provinces.[25] Trade unions, particularly those associated with civil service, are an exception to this, since they are widespread across the country and have memberships in all towns.[26]

Many CSOs, however, create linkages with individuals and groups in smaller towns, which helps them to carry out their activities. Larger Lusaka-based CSOs like CSPR, JCTR, WfC and NGOCC hold workshops and make field trips to more remote parts of the country in order to collect first hand information from the people and sensitise them in different issues. Some international CSOs have also established operational bases in their more distant working areas.[27]

Legal status and political space

The procedure for setting up and registering a CSO in Zambia is basically open and transparent. Nevertheless, there are still grey areas in legislation, which have been misused by authorities. The Public Order Act has sometimes been misapplied by the police to deny groups the possibility to demonstrate. Lately, there has been talk at the governmental level about scrutinising or limiting CSOs' activities. There have been demands to have CSOs' accounts professionally audited, and also to disclose their sources of income. These demands may have been targeted especially towards the Oasis Forum and some women's organisations. Theoretically, the state even has the power to de-register an organisation without explanation.[28]

In 2007, the government introduced a proposal for a new NGO Bill and policy. At their best they could have become instruments that guide the cooperation between government and CSOs, but at their worst severely restrain CSO activities. After some pressure from civil society and the donor community the process was halted. The NGOs have formed a Code of Conduct, which for the first time introduces standards for previously loosely and variedly regulated NGO activities. It encourages more effective and efficient ways of working and improving the partnership between the NGO sector, the government and the private sector.[29]

Current legislation does not provide a regulatory framework for the engagement of CSOs in governmental policy matters. Although the engagement of CSOs is not institutionalised, the political space for CSOs does exist. Political space for dialogue opened up and grew especially after the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2002, and ever since CSO involvement in some national development planning processes has been increasing.[30]

Resources

Zambian civil society employs a significant portion of highly educated workforce in the country. Vacancies in CSOs are often preferred to those in the public sector, as many CSOs with foreign funding pay considerably better salaries. While this may be an advantage for civil society in many ways, it is a disadvantage for the public sector, which suffers from the lack of educated employees. For instance, there is a severe shortage of qualified doctors and teachers.

Zambian CSOs rely to a large extent on foreign funding, which is typical for Southern civil societies. The availability of foreign funding is a condition of existence for many CSOs, as their possibilities to increase self-sufficiency are still rather weak, and as there is not much domestic funding available. This naturally creates and maintains dependency on foreign, or Northern, funding agencies. Although there has been much debate on the negative impacts of these imbal-

23 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

24 Väätäinen 2006.

25 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

26 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

27 Kaira & Katongo 2006.

28 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

29 Salonen & Väätäinen 2007.

30 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

anced dependency relations, the situation has not greatly changed. Imposing "Northern" development agendas, the changing order of donors' themes of focus, competition between CSOs over foreign funding, the implication of project-type approaches to almost any kind of work, and the lack of long-term planning are still prevailing issues. These also tend to weaken the ownership of Zambian CSOs towards their projects and beneficiaries.[31]

In addition to financial capacity, CSOs operating at grassroots level often lack technical, leadership and strategic capacity, which restricts them from growing beyond certain limits. Lack of resources and competitiveness between CSOs also impairs their possibilities for strategic co-operation in order to cover remote areas. Another growing concern among CSOs is the diminishing resource allocation from bilateral donors to CSO sector, as the current trend is moving more towards governmental budget support.[32]

Civil society in action

During recent years, advocacy and political work have become more popular among CSOs in Zambia, but a clear majority of them is primarily engaged in service provision and empowerment programmes. Service and empowerment oriented activities focus on HIV/AIDS and other health issues, education, micro-credit, small business management, agriculture, relief for refugees, clean drinking water, sanitation, disabled, elderly care, orphans and street children.[33]

HIV/AIDS related work is very common. About one out of six Zambians aged 15-49 years are estimated to be HIV positive, making Zambia one of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa worst affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. More than four times more girls aged 15-24 years are infected than their male counterparts.[34] However, the growth of the proportion of the HIV-infected population seems to be levelling off now.[35] Seemingly, the various HIV/AIDS related work of numerous CSOs has also contributed to this by complementing government efforts. Most emphasis has been put on preventive measures, including education and behavioural change, but issues around access to treatment and the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS have lately gained attention. On the other hand, the HIV/AIDS boom and the strong emphasis by donors on the issue have also brought about difficulties and conflicts between CSOs, and many of them suffer from the lack of true ownership in their work.[36]

Among the advocacy and policy oriented CSOs the current priority areas are good governance, human and labour rights, poverty reduction, trade justice, HIV/AIDS related policies, and to a lesser extent gender, environmental issues and access to land. Some CSOs have also tried to influence national policies on water, agriculture and education. Lately there has been a significant increase in the number of CSOs providing legal aid.[37]

Human rights advocacy has focused on rights to education and health services, as well as on children's and disabled people's rights. About two thirds of Zambia's population are less than 25 years of age, which creates enormous challenges for society and, for instance, the education sector, which already suffers from a shortage of qualified teachers. Less than 10 percent of the labour force works in the formal sector, while the remaining 90 percent are in the informal sector with unsustainable incomes. Trade unions, however, are not very active, and are focusing on the formal sector. Other CSOs seem to have far too little capacity in this regard, and they clearly lack resources to address the needs and rights of the majority of workers on the informal sector.[38]

The fight against corruption has been an issue for Zambian civil society over the years. Recently, however, the involvement of CSOs in resisting corruption has maybe slightly diminished. One possible reason for this could be that the government has set up its own Anti-Corruption Commission, and it has began to prosecute cases where corruption has been revealed. Unfortunately the culture of corruption is still very widespread in the country, as reported both by the government and Transparency International (TI).[39] TI has been active in analysing the public expenditure and publishing detailed information on mismanagement of funds. JCTR and other church bodies are also active in the anti-corruption debate.

31 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

32 Akapelwa 2006.

33 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

34 UNAIDS 2006.

35 UNAIDS 2008.

36 Akapelwa 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

37 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

38 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

39 Akapelwa 2006.

Other policy issues on the agenda of NGOs have included parliamentary reforms and engagement, an electoral review, and more recently the adoption of a new constitution through a constituent assembly, and including a sufficient bill of rights in the constitution. One of the most visible civil society actors in the constitution process has been the Oasis Forum, which was originally formed to oppose president Chiluba's attempt to go for a third term. After Chiluba's attempt was stopped in 2001, the Oasis Forum focused its attention on the constitution process.[40] After a long public debate, president Mwanawasa's government finally agreed to form a Zambian Centre for Interparty Dialogue. The new constitution will be adopted through a constitutional conference.

Many feel that the government has been reluctant to promote freedom of speech at a speed that many CSOs and media have demanded. Journalists are still being prohibited from publishing articles that are too critical of the government. In 2005 the editor-in-chief of the main independent newspaper was arrested after calling the president stupid, but he was freed after heavy pressure by the CSOs. Active organisations on the press freedom front include the Zambia Union of Journalists, Media Institute of Southern Africa, and the Press Association of Zambia.[41] The Freedom of Information Bill, Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, and Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation Act are still pending.[42]

Many CSOs have felt that since the introduction of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1991, poverty has generally increased in Zambia.[43] At first, the economic reforms and policies brought by the SAP and other external pressures were only addressed by very few CSOs and the Catholic Church. In 2002, however, the government introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP). Civil society actors were engaged in this process, which considerably increased their awareness of economic policies.[44]

The implementation of the latest PRSP came to an end in 2005. The Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) for 2006-2011 was finalised in 2006 and officially launched at the beginning of 2007. These processes have brought advocacy on poverty issues and policies more strongly on the agenda of several CSOs. The main coalition on this front is CSPR. CSOs have criticised the PSRP and the National Development Plan for not being ambitious enough in addressing the plight of the poor. CSOs have demanded participation not only in planning, but also in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the National Development Plan. The PRSP/FNDP processes have clearly increased CSOs' interests towards policy work on the national level.[45]

Zambia reached the completion point of debt relief within the HIPC initiative in 2005, and a substantial part of country's debts were cancelled by multilateral and bilateral creditors. CSOs' attention shifted from debt relief to campaigning for trade justice, aid provision and the quality of aid, even though JCTR still follows the debt issues and advocates better loan contraction processes.

In addition to following the WTO negotiations and the Doha round, the current negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP countries have received some attention in Zambian civil society. Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia has been one of the NGOs working on the technical issues of trade, together with JCTR/Jubilee, PELUM, CUTS and others. There is also a little more dialogue and engagement with the World Bank and IMF, but general mistrust of these institutions persists in civil society. The central issues in this regard are the conditionalities of aid given to Zambia. [46]

The bilateral donors are increasingly moving to budget support rather than project support at the country level. This has raised concerns among CSOs, who remind that budget support should not be to their detriment. They have demanded that continuous and sustainable funding arrangements, technical support and capacity building must still remain the key forms of support. CSOs have also been increasingly involved in contributing to national budget planning, analysing how government allocates its resources, and monitoring expenditures and actual programmes on the ground. However, this area is still rather new for CSOs.[47] It is receiving more and more support with for example the EU starting to fund expenditure tracking by the CSOs.[48]

Local governance is another emerging area, but the uptake of this by CSOs has been limited. A decentralisation policy has been approved by

40 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

41 Kaira & Katongo 2006.

42 Salonen & Väätäinen 2007.

43 Akapelwa 2006.

44 Kaira & Katongo 2006.

45 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

46 Kaira & Katongo 2006.

47 Akapelwa 2006.

48 Salonen & Väätäinen 2007.

the government, and some larger CSOs are trying to build the capacity of provincial and district teams to be able to take up a role in the local governance.[49]

Gender issues have been addressed especially by local CSOs, and activities related to gender are predominantly focused on the grassroots level, and much less on governmental policies. Typically, women's empowerment at grassroots level means micro credits and advice for beekeeping, poultry rearing, fish farming and other forms of small-scale production. Advocacy on gender issues has concentrated mainly on women's rights, empowerment and participating in economic and political activities.[50] On a national level, CSOs have been advocating the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the SADC women's protocol on minimum representation.[51] Gender has been one of the main issues among the CSOs, but the funding from bilateral and other donors for it has been falling as the donors have increasingly moved to support work on HIV/AIDS.[52]

Environmental issues, such as the management of natural resources, sustainable agriculture and land related problems, are also on the agendas of Zambian CSOs to some extent. Land degradation due to unsustainable farming practices and policies, wildlife protection and illegal poaching, among other things, have adversely affected the natural environment in Zambia. Nevertheless, there are not many environmental CSOs in the country, and environmental issues have not been among the top priorities of 'regular' CSOs. Economic and social concerns tend to gain the most attention of foreign donors. However, concerns about the impact of climate change on rainfall and thus on poverty and food security have been on the rise, and it may be that environmental issues will receive growing attention from CSOs in the future.[53] Environment is also included as one of the cross-cutting themes in the Fifth National Development Plan.[54]

All the areas of advocacy and political work mentioned above deal with impoverishing structures of society – locally, nationally and globally. However, it should be pointed out that only a small, although growing, fragment of civil society is oriented on political work. In addition to the relatively low attention towards gender and environment, there are also issues that have been recognised as important, but which are not paid much attention by the civil society. Such issues are, for instance, corporate social responsibility, the monitoring of bilateral commitments and policies of multilateral institutions, the impact of tourism on rural livelihoods and the strengthening of grass root movements.[55]

Ownership

According to the sources used for this summary, most issues that are in the focus of CSOs are also relevant for the poor and marginalised in the country. Limited geographical coverage in the remote rural areas weakens ownership. This is evident especially for those Lusaka based CSOs working on national policy issues, but who have little or no connections with the majority of people.[56]

Issues prioritised by local people often deal with ensuring sustainable livelihood: food on the table, crop markets, infrastructure, education and health facilities. Some also feel that a lot of time has been spent on political talk at the expense of grassroots development and efforts for improving food security. Advocacy oriented CSOs may justify their approach by considering, for instance, that a better constitution would positively affect development and ensure people's rights to basic needs. Nevertheless, the use of participatory methods for planning and implementing activities has become a norm among the larger CSOs.[57]

In certain cases the local elite have clearly more power in steering CSO work than those who should be the actual beneficiaries. Top-down approaches occur also when local CSOs tailor their programmes according to the expectations and wishes of donors. The accusations of lack of legitimacy and representation, however, have been strongest from the government side, when politicians defend their position as democratically elected bodies.[58]

49 Akapelwa 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

50 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

51 Kaira & Katongo 2006.

52 Akapelwa 2006.

53 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

54 Salonen & Väätäinen 2007.

55 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

56 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

57 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

58 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

Civil society and other sectors

Generally CSOs act both as partners and watchdogs of the government. CSOs have become important complementing partners for the government in the provision of services such as clean drinking water, health and education facilities. Although this partnership has worked relatively well, there is a fundamental problem regarding the funding of CSOs, which is too often given only for "projects" and with no guarantee for sustained support. This neoliberal approach, which gives the third sector more responsibilities, can also hinder the development of state-based service provision. Although civil society has become more recognised as a vocal and influential sector by those in power, state actors tend to consider service provision as the primary role for CSOs.[59]

For example, different CSOs have started to run community schools with partial government support. Government has taken up some of the responsibilities in these schools, such as providing salaries and study materials. Most children that could not access education for a variety of reasons are now attending these community schools. On the other hand, many community schools would not run without the extra voluntary work provided by committed teachers. Teachers have also gone on strikes to address these problems.[60]

There have been positive experiences of cooperation on governance issues and public expenditure, and it seems that the relationship between the state and the third sector is gradually becoming established. For example, CSOs participate in official committees dealing with trade issues. Still, they are usually involved only in the very first levels of governmental decision-making, and are excluded from its final stages. In the end, this can lead to decisions that are not supported by CSOs, but the government can claim that civil society was involved and "heard" in the process.[61]

Civil society functions as a mediator between people and the government. Opinions and demands "from the grassroots" are transferred through CSOs to public decision-making. But it can take years, and the eventual decisions may not necessarily reflect the needs of the marginalised as they initially expressed them. Sometimes dialogue with government has been possible only by means of mass demonstrations and even court cases against the government.

CSOs have also been pressing government to act in people's interests in the constitution process. In 2006 the Oasis Forum published the names of the members of parliament who opposed setting up a constituent assembly to facilitate the process.[62] The constitution process has started slowly, but now a rough road map, including a constitutional conference, exists.[63]

When CSOs have tried to influence decision-making concerning the army or the security wings, or monitor their work, the response from the state agencies has been non-cooperative. It seems, however, that human rights abuses by state security wings are decreasing now, which may be due to CSOs' sustained pressure and work for raising awareness on the issue.[64]

The relationship between civil society and the private sector in Zambia is generally quite weak. A few CSOs receive funding from the private sector, and some CSOs provide market linkages, information on commodity prices and even rehabilitation of infrastructure in rural and urban areas. Some CSOs and private sector companies are also co-operating on HIV/AIDS programmes.[65]

Generally, there are stronger ties between the state and private sector than between the state and civil society. The government tends to pay much more attention to the demands of the private sector, even though this approach has not led to an improvement in the general poverty situation, and may even have worsened it in some cases. In years of drought, companies have been allowed to overprice grain, with disastrous consequences for the poor. Negative environmental impacts have also occurred when companies have been granted the unregulated use of natural resources, or when the government has been negligent towards their actions. On the other hand, CSOs have not yet taken steps to establish a stronger relationship with the private sector in the areas of social responsibility.[66]

Larger CSOs are well linked to international organisations and the embassies of developed countries. International cooperation in advocacy work has increased. Also information exchange on international trade and debt issues, techni-

59 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

60 Akapelwa 2006, Väätäinen 2006.

61 Akapelwa 2006.

62 Akapelwa 2006., Kaira & Katongo 2006.

63 Salonen & Väätäinen 2007.

64 Akapelwa 2006.

65 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

66 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

cal support, training of local staff, and support in cases of harassment or the unfair detention of activists have been forms of international cooperation. For example, JCTR and CCJDP joined Jubilee International and networked with AFRODAD, EURODAD and Global Justice when campaigning for debt relief. Of course, local chapters of international CSOs have much more crossborder relations.[67]

Sometimes the attitudes of some Northern donors are felt to be paternalistic. The imposition of foreign agendas takes place when the relationships with Zambian CSOs are mainly based on funding. Northern CSOs sometimes lack transparency and may change their focus areas without much warning. Most international CSOs shy away from advocacy themselves, but help foster and create advocacy groups instead.[68]

Future challenges

While the poverty situation in Zambia does not seem to be improving, basic service provision, empowerment, and the dismantling of the impoverishing structures will remain the central challenges for civil society. Although this analysis has put more emphasis on advocacy, there is no reason to underestimate the role and importance of CSOs in service provision. For example, because about 60% of rural health institutions are currently run by religious organisations[69], it is unlikely that the situation would rapidly and radically change, although budget support may gradually increase the state's capacity in service provision.

Corruption is widespread, and governance on all levels should be made more transparent and supportive of citizens. This will remain one of the main challenges for CSOs and the government. Although corruption is found especially among the state actors, it also remains as a problem for CSOs internally.[70]

Technical skills are needed especially in policy work. When dealing with the government, CSOs constantly face a problem of understanding and being aware of diverse political issues. International CSOs' role in capacity building in this area remains essential. There is also lots of room for advocacy work at the local level, and strengthening of the grassroots movements is very important. The local governance system is weak and power has been centralised on capital despite the existing decentralisation policy. CSOs could play an important role in building more transparent and democratic local governance where people could much more directly and equally influence decision-making that affects their well-being. This is also linked to the environment and the use of natural resources. Private sector activities too often despoil the environment, and the majority of people do not have a say in decision-making that concerns the use of resources in their own environment. The linkages between environmental degradation, local democracy and poverty are too little emphasised by civil society actors.[71]

In general, wider geographical coverage and local participation remain crucial challenges for Zambian civil society. Decentralisation of CSOs' power structures and activities could also improve ownership towards and by the marginalised. Ensuring direct participation at different levels requires establishing a good system of feedback in regard to CSOs' operations.[72]

There is still an urgent need for strengthening networking and cooperation between CSOs nationally and internationally. This would not only reduce overlapping activities and enhance effectiveness but also help in attempts to resist government's pressure and control. The NGOCC and Oasis Forum do not unite different CSOs very widely, and they are focused on rather narrow sectors. To encourage cooperation instead of competition, of course, requires new innovative approaches from donors. Because financial dependency on foreign donors will persist in Zambia, the donors have to take seriously the demands of local CSOs to speak for themselves. While there is a need for flexible, continued and sustained funding arrangements, which genuinely take into account the needs of the local CSOs and the prevailing situation in the country, there is also a need for donors to rethink their approaches. The changing trends of development cooperation policies in the North influence the agendas of local partners in the South. Too often this causes a lack of ownership and hinders long term planning and sustainable work on issues that cannot be solved during the few years of project cycles.[73]

67 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

68 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

69 Akapelwa 2006.

70 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

71 Akapelwa 2006.

72 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

73 Akapelwa 2006, Kaira & Katongo 2006.

Civil society in Mozambique

Toni Haapanen

According to Adam[74], modern organised civil society in Mozambique is a product of the transformations that have taken place in the country and society during at least the last thirty years. Already before Mozambique's independence, in 1975, civil groups were organized as associations, even though the Portuguese rulers and the political environment in general did not favour their existence. An example of such groups is the *grémio africano*, which made initial efforts to organize labour in the area.

Today the largest or most influential actor groups in Mozambican civil society are conventional NGOs (both domestic and international), different kinds of religious groups and associations, trade unions, community based organisations (CBOs), as well as different types of informal groups and traditional organisations that mainly work on the local level.[75]

NGOs, and the large NGO networks, are usually the most visible part of Mozambican civil society for outsiders, because they have access to national media and because they often cooperate with famous international NGOs. Such national NGOs include theRural Organisation for Mutual Support (ORAM), Foundation for Community Development (FDC), Mozambique Debt Group (GMD), Fórum Mulher (Women's Forum), Mozambican NGO Forum TEIA, UNAC, and many others.

In addition to national NGOs, also many international NGOs work directly with local communities. International NGOs often cooperate with local NGOs in terms of assistance to a number of projects, exchange of information and experiences, joint advocacy actions, institutional capacity building, as well as technical and financial support. Examples of such international organisations are Action Aid, World Vision, Care, Trocaire, SNV, MS, KEPA, Diakonia, Swedish Africa Group and Oxfam.[76]

Religious groups carry out considerable work particularly in local communities, where they enjoy major recognition. Religious groups include organisations such as the Mozambican Christian Council and the Muslim League, and many other smaller associations and informal groups.[77]

Trade unions play a decisive role in Mozambican society, although they have recently been losing some of their strategic relevance, mainly due to their political alliance with the ruling regime. Influential trade unions include the Mozambique Workers' Organisation (OTM), Confederation of Free and Independent Unions of Mozambique (Consilmo) and National Union of Commercial and Insurance Workers (Sinecosse). There are also a number of other professional associations, which join specific groups of workers who strive for preserving of their rights. Examples of such associations are the Bar Association, the Engineers and Medical Associations of Mozambique, as well as the Mozambican Economists Association.[78]

Community-based organisations (CBOs) work on diverse issues in local communities, and generally seek local solutions to the problems of the most vulnerable groups. In terms of organisational structures and approaches, CBOs are often replicas of larger national CSOs. Normally CBOs have quite weak institutional capacity and they rely on the support of foreign NGOs. Nevertheless, CBOs have an important role when they try to fill the gaps that the absence of state structures and services leave in rural areas.[79]

Of local importance are also different kinds of informal groups and traditional organisations that are very practical in their work, but which lack fixed and complex structures. Usually they have been formed for specific issues and they often play a key role in the direct resolution of diverse issues in local communities. Nowadays many of these groups, however, have transformed themselves into formal associations.[80]

Geographical coverage

In general, CSOs' activities are concentrated more in Maputo and other urban centres rather than in rural areas. CSOs are continuously spreading to other provinces and rural areas, but the popu-

74 Adam 2006.

75 Adam 2006.

76 Adam 2006.

77 Adam 2006.

78 Adam 2006.

79 Adam 2006.

80 Adam 2006.

lation density of rural areas is quite low and communities are scattered over vast regions. Also the lack of infrastructure and good road connections continue to be obstacles for reaching more remote areas.

Nowadays many CSOs are becoming more professional and institutionalised, but this is mainly so among those CSOs that have their bases in Maputo. At the same time, grassroots activism seems to be declining. In general, CSOs outside Maputo are still rather weak, for instance with regard to their abilities for making more in-depth analysis on issues they are working with, but they seem to be progressing in these terms. On the other hand, the image of CSOs presented by the media can be somewhat skewed; activities of urban CSOs appear to be more visible to the international community than those of rural-based CSOs.[81]

Networking and co-operation

Mozambican civil society organisations have sought stronger unification, co-operation and joint co-ordination of activities though different kinds of thematic networks. Some of the main platforms bringing together different groups and organisations are the Mozambique Debt Group, Fórum Mulher, Land Forum, Mozambique Social Forum, ROAD (network of organisations working on environment and development), ROSA (organisations working on food security), Rede da Criança – the Child Network, G20 and FAMOD – the Mozambique Network of Disabled People Organisations, among others. CSOs have also been building partnerships and alliances with each other along with the political space that has opened during the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PARPA) processes. The Mozambican platform of CSOs participating in PARPA processes is called G20. CSOs are also increasingly identifying themselves as partners in other governmental plans and programs.[82]

Despite the emergence of these networks, there are still vast thematic and geographical areas where co-operation between CSOs is weak or non-existent. Coordination and communication between CSOs are improving in Maputo and some provincial capitals, but not yet so much at the district or local levels. Weak coordination increases the operational costs of activities and makes it difficult to find out and include more rural areas in these activities. In part, this is due to a certain sense of jealousy and competition between CSOs concerning activities and funds. Another reason for the lack of coordinating and co-operative bodies is that participation in the work of an umbrella organisation is often not prioritised among the individual CSOs. Also, the lack of proper communicational infrastructures constrains communication within networks. In addition, large differences between the networked CSOs may result in difficulties. For instance, there have been attempts for joint actions between organisations located in large urban centres and small community based organisations, but this has not yet succeeded to bring results that widely reflect to the well-being of the target groups.[83]

There may also be a need to enhance co-operation and defend common interests on a more general level in Mozambican civil society.

There exists a general umbrella organisation, LINK NGO Forum, which was formed to facilitate the cooperation between big and small organisations, offering legal facilitation, giving advises in setting up an organisation, and to facilitate international organisations to come to work in Mozambique. In 2007, LINK faced severe financial and administrative problems, and many members left. As this goes to print, LINK is practically non-functional. There has been an initiative to found a similar co-operation platform, under the name JOINT, but it has not started functioning.

CSOs are now increasingly turning to thematic networks if they need information on specific issues. One of the more active ones is the National Governance Platform, which brings together both international and national CSOs working in all the provinces of the country on good governance.

Legal status and political space

Currently, Mozambican legislation is rather progressive in regard to civil society and its position is considered legitimate, at least theoretically. The concept of civil society is clearly stated in law, but civil society is seen only as comprising registered associations, and thus excluding different kinds of informal civil groups and movements. Further, there is no law that would guarantee CSOs access to information on govern-

81 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

82 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

83 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

mental affairs. This severely hinders the work of CSOs operating on advocacy issues.[84]

The approach of the current government towards international CSOs has raised concerns about whether state control will increase in the future. On the other hand, a conference held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation with foreign CSOs gave positive signs, as the contribution of foreign CSOs in poverty reduction efforts was recognized, a communication system was established and the minister reaffirmed the need for working together. However, little has been done at national, provincial and local levels so far.[85]

Since the establishment of a multi-party system, and especially during the last few years, the political space for CSOs has become wider. Traditionally, both the government and the CSOs themselves saw the role of CSOs merely as being the implementers of projects and providers of services. The view of civil society as having a complementary role in regard to the state's service provision is still strong, and there seems not to be very critical voices among the CSOs in this regard. Since at least the beginning of the 2000s, the role of civil society, and especially those CSOs with resources for advocacy work and operational basis in the area of Maputo, has turned into pressuring the government to implement pro-people policies and fulfil its commitments. In addition, CSOs have representatives in the National Election Committee and the president for the committee is appointed among its CSO members. Although this process appeared to lack true ownership and although there were no consensus on who could "represent civil society", at least the government made a gesture to show that it somehow takes this sector into account. In general, the political dialogue with the government has become more institutionalised during the recent years, especially along with the PARPA processes. Currently, the decentralisation process has made possible the participation of CSOs in local governance through consultative councils and monitoring. This process is still weak, but many believe that it will be improved in the future. Both service provision and advocacy roles can be combined. For instance, if the government is planning to build a school in a far away district but does not have the resources to do it, CSOs can help to build that school. In case the government does not even have such plans, CSOs can pressure the government to include the building of the school on its agenda.[86]

Funding

In general, Mozambican CSOs rely very much on foreign funding and there is a lack of reliable local funding sources. In many CSOs the members do not pay membership fee or develop any activity that would generate incomes. As in many other developing countries, a large portion of CSOs in Mozambique tend to define their agendas and operational spheres in line with the donors' agendas, and in some cases, even in line with what the government prefers. Sometimes these agendas and issues do not fully correspond or deserve the same priority to problems at grass roots.[87]

CSOs find it often difficult to criticise their donors. In addition to international donors and the government, some CSOs receive funding from the private sector. For instance, the national aluminium company, MOZAL, funds many local CSOs. It would be almost impossible for these CSOs to organize a demonstration against the company if it was building a factory that caused pollution. The same counts for funding channelled through the government.[88]

In some partnerships international CSOs clearly dictate the objectives and activities of the local CSOs. Sometimes foreign CSOs even try to apply identical approaches as they have in other countries, without taking in consideration the local context. There is also a lack of basic institutional support, when certain donor-CSOs only finance activities but do not give institutional support for salaries and other institutional costs.[89]

Civil society in action

Since the end of the civil war, the living conditions of the people in Mozambique have improved significantly. For instance, the percentage of undernourished population decreased from 66 % at the beginning of the 1990s to 45 % a decade later, according to the UNDP.[90] However, the situation is still grim in many areas. About

84 Adam 2006.

85 Sucá 2007.

86 Adam 2006, Sucá 2007, Simione, Cassamo & Sucá 2006.

87 Adam 2006.

88 Simione, Cassamo & Sucá 2006.

89 Adam 2006.

90 UNDP 2006.

38 % of people are reported to live on less than one dollar per day, and about 78 % with less than two dollars per day. Mozambique is ranked at 168 out of 177 countries in the comparison of Human Development Indexes. Life expectancy at birth is less than 42 years, and the probability at birth of not reaching age of 40 is as high as 50 %. The UNDP's estimation of HIV prevalence is about 16 % among the 15 to 49 age group. More than half of the population does not have access to improved water sources, and two-thirds lack improved sanitation.[91]

The population of Mozambique has almost doubled since 1975, being now around 20 million. The country is vast, over 800,000 square kilometres, and the population density is only 25 persons per square kilometre. Population growth is subsiding, and the annual growth rate being currently 1.7 %. On average, the population is very young. The share of population under 15 years of age is about 44 %, and only 3.3% are over 65 years. Urban population has increased rapidly. In 1975 the share of urban population was 8.7% and in 2004 already 33.7%. It is estimated to increase up to 42.4 % by 2015. Anyhow, approximately two-thirds of the population still lives in rural areas.[92]

The development strategy adopted by the government considers rapid economic growth as the basis for poverty reduction. This has resulted in a strong emphasis on the development of the private sector. In practice, this model has not necessarily resulted in the improvement of majority's living conditions.[93] In 2004 the government launched a study, according to which poverty had gone down dramatically, from 69 % to 54% during the last six years. The report was criticised for not looking into the distribution of the wealth. In Maputo, where the economic growth has been the fastest, the poverty figures had actually increased.[94]

Against this background, it is no wonder that issues related to diverse aspects of poverty dominate CSOs' work in Mozambique. But the diversity of specific issues under this general theme is high, as is the diversity of different types of CSOs in the country. Usually CSOs deal with issues relating to agriculture and rural development in general, income generation, gender equality, disabled, elderly people, children and youth, health and especially HIV/AIDS, primary education, human rights, workers' rights, environment, trade, as well as political advocacy, among several other issues.

Issues related to agriculture have a prominent role in Mozambican civil society. More than 75% of the population works in small-scale agriculture. For many CSOs the solutions to agrarian development implies providing incentives for small and medium agro-industrial companies. Many also focus on the local governance and its policies on rural environment. The funds allocated from the state budget to agriculture have been reduced over recent years, and some CSOs claim that the state does not invest enough on agriculture and rural development. CSOs have also demanded more space for the participation of rural citizens in governmental development processes. In practise this would mean more institutionalised dialogue between the stakeholders, drafting and implementation of appropriate local programs and concrete plans for development.[95] On the other hand, CSOs' participation in local consultative councils has shown positive signs in this regard.[96]

CSOs have been successful in the realization of some major activities, which were before seen as being the government's responsibility. Such activities include the construction of schools, health centres, wells and support to small and medium income generation projects, among other things.[97] CSOs have not only been able to co-operate with each other for joint implementation of programs in prevention and fight against HIV/AIDS; they have also succeeded to collaborate with the governmental bodies in these issues. For instance, anti-retroviral drugs against AIDS were not permitted in the country before CSOs pressured the government, saying that they would plan and organize its use. The government also took on this process and included it in the national health programme. Furthermore, some Mozambican hospitals, mostly at district level, are nowadays supported by CSOs, who provide them with some financial resources, technical support or with specific programs.[98]

Of course, the increasing role of civil society in service provision reflects the neo-liberal approach that has steered national development schemes. When the government has become de-

91 UNDP 2006.

92 UNDP 2006.

93 Adam 2006.

94 Valtonen 2004.

95 Adam 2006.

96 Sucá 2007.

97 Adam 2006.

98 Sucá 2006.

pendent on the activities provides by CSOs, these organisations have on their behalf become largely dependent on foreign donors. In this sense the situation does not look very sustainable. On the other hand, foreign governments and donors have recently shifted towards direct budget support for the government. At least, this has led the representatives of the government, civil society and donors to decide jointly on the future priorities in the country's development, as stated by Graça Samo, the director of Fórum Mulher.[99]

There is currently a large convergence trend among Mozambican CSOs towards more advanced cooperation between them, which move the agendas of CSOs from the local micro level to the national or governmental macro level. CSOs are increasingly focusing on national policies, making their own policy analyses, drafting alternative proposals, and influencing the agendas of international donors. Yet there is a great interest and commitment among CSOs to get more involved in advocacy work at policy and decision making processes. Those working in the area of advocacy concentrate on impoverishing structures and mechanisms, such as Mozambique's external debt, political and economic governance, corruption and accountability, inappropriate financing mechanisms, unfair rules of international trade, conditionality of aid, and inappropriate development policies in general.[100]

Several CSOs organise joint advocacy work and campaigns, including research and policy analysis, as well as production of position papers on public policies. Recently the process for designing a new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, PARPA II, has engaged several advocacy oriented CSOs. Many CSOs are also involved in the implementation and monitoring of development policies and programs.[101] In 2003 a consultative forum called the Poverty Observatory was set up to evaluate and monitor the implementation of PARPA. Members in the national Poverty Observatory include governmental officers as well as representatives from the academic community, private business, international development institutions, and civil society organisations. In addition to the national Poverty Observatory in Maputo, local observatories have been established in all provinces recently.[102] However, a recent report on the Poverty Observatory process found that it has not evolved into an effective participatory mechanism, mainly because it has been restricted to being a consultative body with no channels for feedback, social accountability and other forms of citizens' empowerment and participation. The Poverty Observatory structure is led by the government alone, which has converted it into a governmental instrument for public hearing and uncommitted consultation. For these reasons the process has only seldom been able to generate the data and means for an adequate assessment of PARPA.[103]

According to Amade Sucá, a positive consequence of PARPA has been that although being a process which is brought from outside the country and driven by the World Bank, it has at least made the government to work for bringing civil society and state actors together and made the parties to debate on the issues with each other. PARPA processes have also helped civil society actors to understand and learn more about the content of the poverty reduction strategies. G20, the coalition of CSOs engaging in national and provincial poverty observatories has successfully been making its own analysis of the country's development, agenda and results.[104]

Other positive results that CSOs have achieved in advocacy work include the approval of better land and family laws, having a greater share and influence in designing the state budget and economic and social plans, the establishment of an electoral observer, and selection of a civil society representative as a chair of the National Elections Committee. In general, the government has recognised that civil society has a role that it can and should play in various development operations. One of the most remarkable achievements so far has been Mozambique's debt cancellation. It counted to a large extent on the campaigning and co-operation made by CSOs both locally and internationally under the Jubilee 2000 campaign.[105]

Ownership

The poor and the marginalized of the society are at the centre of CSOs' efforts in Mozambique, although not always in the most appropriate way. The issues emphasised by CSOs can be relevant to these people, but are not always prioritised by

99 Pitkänen & Nokelainen 2007.

100 Adam 2006.

101 Adam 2006.

102 SARPN 2007.

103 Francisco & Matter 2007.

104 Sucá 2006.

105 Adam 2006.

local communities or the marginalised groups themselves. CSOs that work on the national level have often difficulties to link their approaches and operations well with the concerns of local communities, because very often these CSOs are not established to represent the communities, but to inform and support them. In addition, the traditional elite based and active in the rural areas is an integral part of Mozambican civil society. This socially vibrant group participates in the activities of different types of CSOs, for example in the fight for civic rights, land issues, management of forests and fishing resources, and trade related issues. On the other hand, there are movements, networks and CBOs formed by local communities that truly represent the interests of the local people, but they often lack the capacity to develop their activities efficiently.[106]

There is an ongoing debate on the legitimacy of CSOs. For instance, questions have been raised concerning the CSOs that participate in the G20 platform: who do they really represent, who gave them the mandate to say that this is the model of sustainable development that civil society is striving for? Too often the Maputo based CSOs meet only among themselves and debate with CSOs based elsewhere in the country is lacking. Often these Maputo based groups have a leading role in defining CSOs views in regard to national policy processes. There is certainly a will to change this situation, but yet much more discussion and co-operation is needed between different kinds of civil society actors and groups from different parts of the country.[107] Currently, an initiative led by the Community Development Foundation (FDC) is aiming to evaluate the level of cooperation among CSOs and impact of their activities in Mozambique.[108]

Civil society and other sectors

Relations between Mozambican civil society and the state vary on different levels and areas. On a number of issues the relationship is constructive, for example in issues related to national debt. Especially the Ministry of Women and Social Action and the Ministry of Health tend to consider CSOs as viable partners, and they consult CSOs in various issues.[109] In some other issues the relationship appears to be somehow conflictive, such as in the discussions on minimum wages, and there are some sectors within the state which do not favour the idea of the existence of CSOs as independent stakeholders. CSOs are reported to have less promising experiences of co-operation especially with the ministry of justice. Generally, the government tends to favour CSOs' participation at the level of "low politics", but prevents them from interfering in the decision making processes on a higher level. On the other hand, there seems to be more openness towards CSOs on the national level politics than on the province, district or local levels. One explanation for this is that in remoter areas people often consider the government as superior, which they cannot challenge. On the province level, however, governmental bodies have recently become more open for working closely with CSOs.[110]

The relations between civil society and private sector are rather weak in Mozambique, as there is no tradition of cooperation between them. In general, CSOs have much less cooperation with private sector than with the state, and the activities and campaigns of CSOs are targeted more towards the government than the private sector. When CSOs want to target an issue in the private sector, they tend to turn first to the government and ask the politicians or officials to address this issue.[111]

In many cases private sector actors have closer relationships with the government than CSOs. Many politicians and government officials are active in the private sector themselves. Companies can push their agenda directly through their connections. For example, the private sector can arrange meetings with government officials in expensive hotels, and the representatives of private sector have the funds needed for travelling around in the delegations of top-level politicians, when CSOs usually cannot afford this. On the other hand, the private sector is being pressured by the government in order to improve the living conditions of the poor. Similarly, the private sector can put pressure on the government to approve laws that are favourable for private sector development.[112]

There are few occasions where CSOs and private sector actors have co-operated. In the G20 group representatives of private sector have been included, but they often work separately

106 Adam 2006.

107 Sucá 2006.

108 Sucá 2007.

109 Adam 2006, Sucá 2007.

110 Adam 2006.

111 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

112 Sucá 2006.

and they do not always come to the meetings with CSOs.[113] CBOs and other local associations have had relatively much cooperation experiences with the private sector, although these relationships have sometimes turned problematic. Common issues have concerned, for example, the exploration and management of natural resources for the uses of eco-tourism and agro-industry, as well as companies' social responsibility. Some companies have given support to CSOs for building social infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals. They have also supported CSO income generation projects. The motives behind these activities have sometimes been questioned when they have turned out to be more propaganda and marketing than actual activities that improve people's well being. In any case, further co-operation and new forms of collaboration between these sectors are widely desired, and it is likely to see such partnerships becoming more popular in the near future.[114]

The most common forms of co-operation between Mozambican CSOs and international CSOs relate to financing and/or advocacy work. Common agendas of CSOs allow, for example, exchange of information and implementation of joint advocacy campaigns. Currently many international partnerships include political work and building together an agenda for improving the livelihood conditions of the marginalized groups. Perhaps the most commonly cited and most successful example of this has been the campaigning on debt issues. International CSOs are also important sources of funding for Mozambican CSOs, and they connect local CSOs with other foreign funding sources. Foreign CSOs' financial support is most often aimed at institutional capacity building and implementation of projects. Very often the forms of political co-operation and financial support are interwoven.[115]

Since the emergence of modern civil society, donors have driven the international relationships of Mozambican CSOs to a considerable extent. Local CSOs have not been able to make their own plans, and they have adopted the plans of foreign CSOs and international development agencies without giving their own contribution in the planning process. The local reality has not always been taken into account, and programs that have given positive results in other countries have been replicated to the Mozambican context. Donors are not entirely guilty for this, as local CSOs lack abilities to make demands and oppose the donors when needed. The situation has changed for the better during the last decade, and more genuine initiatives and participatory planning are included, but there is still a lot to be improved in this regard.[116]

Future challenges

In general, Mozambican CSOs seem to lack proper networks that would enable joint planning and coordination of activities, both nationally and internationally. Thematically or geographically overlapping activities are still common. Competition over funding and target areas is one of the obstacles of mutual co-operation, and thus it is also an issue which the donors should pay increasing attention to.[117]

CSOs need a certain level of financial autonomy. Now formal CSOs are almost entirely dependent on foreign donors' funding and, to some extent, on foreign political agendas. Mozambican CSOs should develop activities that can bring them own incomes and assure sustainability, but at least as important would be a change in donors' approaches towards more participatory financial planning and developing more open forms of funding instead of tightly allocated project funding. Co-operation with foreign CSOs should address directly the needs and weaknesses on local level, and not the priorities set by the foreign CSOs. Mozambican CSOs also need capacity building and institutional strengthening. What is particularly expected is support for capacity building to follow and monitor governmental policies and activities.[118]

On the other hand, CSOs have some problems with legitimacy and credibility. Most often this happens when national level activities are planned and implemented solely in Maputo, or when CSOs try to copy project models from other countries without modifying them into local contexts. Civil society should be able to prove its ability to bring positive changes, as there are more and more surveys, studies and reports, but limited practical actions in the society resulting in visible improvements for the living conditions of the majority. Strengthening CSOs' legitimacy and building better linkages to the grassroots are

113 Sucá 2006.

114 Adam 2006.

115 Sucá 2006.

116 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

117 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

118 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006, Simione, Cassamo & Sucá 2006.

thus essential. The platforms of CSOs need to address these problems so that other CSOs or platforms could give them support to represent civil society on certain political issues. Most importantly, CSOs should be able to bring along contributions that originate genuinely from Mozambican civil society, without external pressure.[119]

In addition to strengthening co-operation between CSOs and their networks, mechanisms are needed to strengthen co-ordination between civil society, government and the private sector. So far the relationship between these sectors has resulted in quite few outcomes or concrete changes in the lives of the most vulnerable groups. Despite the different kinds of interests that are sometimes in contradiction, there is a need for CSOs and private sector actors to build more contacts with each other and to establish common platforms for negotiating about issues relating to sustainable development.[120]

In the area of political advocacy the facilitation of civil society in influencing public poverty reduction programmes and other governmental activities needs to continue. According to the sources of this summary, the Poverty Observatories are seen as a relevant mechanism in this, but they do not yet work effectively enough to enable the true participation of civil society actors. Yet CSOs need to have more possibilities for critical and pro-active approaches towards state governance, and they need more capacity to produce concrete alternatives and proposals for governmental policies. As co-operation between policy makers and large CSOs has gradually become more institutionalized at the national level, there is now a need for fostering direct debate also with province, district and local level leaders.[121]

The huge challenge is the removal of impoverishment structures that have international or even global dimensions, such as unfair international trade policies, the management of debt, conditioned development aid packages, or development policies that fit poorly into local contexts. In addition to co-operating with Northern CSOs, Mozambican civil society could establish more partnerships with other Southern, and especially other African, civil societies.[122] This could make the African civil movements look more unified and independent in the eyes of the Northern decision-makers, and amplify the important messages originating from the grass roots in the global South.

119 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006.

120 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006, Simione, Cassamo & Sucá 2006.

121 Adam 2006, Sucá 2006, Francisco & Matter 2007.

122 Adam 2006.

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Civil Society in Zambia and Mozambique

Zambia and Mozambique, both countries where KEPA has offices, have vibrant civil societies with crucial roles to play in efforts to build democratic societies capable of addressing severe developmental needs. This report examines the nature of civil society in Zambia and Mozambique in relation to problems at a national level and in terms of outside involvement by international development NGOs and global financial institutions. It provides a brief historical overview of both countries followed by a presentation of their respective civil societies.

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