

SOME REGIONAL AND NATIONAL NGOs
IN INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS:

DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

Anu Lounela



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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to explore the civil society movement and globalization process in Indonesia as part of KEPA's Need Assessment Study. Kepa (The Service Centre for Development Cooperation) is an umbrella organization for about 200 NGOs in Finland. It is concerned with the current globalization process, and the consequences of neo-liberal economic policy, free international investments and agreements concerning these investments (WTO, MAI, IMF etc.) in the South. Transnational corporations (TNC) are reaching a more powerful economic position than some nation states. They are able to exploit natural resources and cheap labour in southern countries. Thus, Kepa is monitoring the growing power of transnational corporations in the global markets and world economy. Kepa wishes to raise public debate on issues concerning the growing power of transnational corporations and the effects they have in southern countries.

This Need Assessment study has been implemented by through my stay for more than half a year in Indonesia (1998-1999) working together with a local NGO, Insist (Institute for Social Transformation), in Yogyakarta, Central Java. I conducted a field trip to Riau (West Sumatra) and to West Kalimantan (Borneo). During my stay in Java I participated in the activities of Insist and partly through their experiences tried to understand the network of NGOs at the national level. That was made possible because the activists from Insist have a good knowledge of the NGOs that are active in Indonesia. I also took part in national seminars held by some national NGOs (for example, WALHI-Friends of the Earth of Indonesia, and KOMNAS HAM-National Human Rights Committee)

My concern is primarily the civil society movement of Indonesia, but also in their position and activities in this globalization process, and in the political changes of Indonesia. While visiting Riau and West Kalimantan, it became quite obvious that most of the NGOs and local communities I met were concerned about the current globalization process, development, and transnational corporations, since these factors strongly

affect the life of local communities and indigenous peoples.

With "civil society" I mean local community groups, NGOs and other civic actors independent of the state. The concept of civil society in this study traces itself back to that

Sphere of social life which organizes itself autonomously, as opposed to the sphere that is established and/or directly controlled by the state. (...) The expression "civil society" also alludes to a new semantic of social transformation, including new concepts and commitments. "The people," in such context, is the autonomous, democratic civil society, as it expresses itself in organizations independent of the state and its formal or corporate structure.¹

In this study I have adopted a categorization of Indonesian "civil society" that has emerged in Indonesia. Those who oppose the state (ideology) and take a marginal position in society are called transformative groups, those who tend to cooperate with the state and accept its ideological foundations with critical comments could be called reformist ones, and those who are following the state lines are conformists. This categorization also shows us the ideological understandings and positions of NGOs in Indonesia.

My focus is also on environmental and social problems caused up by transnational corporations. The framework of this need assessment study is the "globalization" process, which, of course, could be understood in many ways. In this study, globalization is understood as intensification of (neoliberal) economic relationships across the national borders, cultural homogenization, worldwide communication networks, and the increasing marginalization of social majorities, including poor farmers, workers, and cultural minorities such as indigenous peoples.² Following Esteva (1998, 21), I suggest that we should move from "global thinking" to "local thinking," and look for the solutions from the local level. This paper provides an overview of how "a globalization project" brings changes to the local level in

Indonesia, and how these changes are understood and answered by local groups, including NGOs and community groups.

In this study I concentrate on NGOs at the local level, in Riau and West Kalimantan. This is in line with the idea that we should understand the dynamics of NGOs not only at the “centre of power”, Jakarta, but also at the regional level. And as we can see, there are plenty of important differences at the national and regional levels.

NGOs in different regions of Indonesia have a weak position comparing to those at the national level. This is furthered by the long historical process of weakening of the traditional systems of local communities through economic, environmental and political exploitation. This exploitation have been conducted by the New Order government of Indonesia, military and local and transnational corporations. That is why, the Indigenous Peoples movement in Indonesia tend to demand that the government of Indonesia admits the Indigenous Peoples rights over their land and natural resources. International support would be needed for their struggle.

This study would not have been possible without the help of many people and organizations, and local communities. My biggest thanks belong to those NGOs and local communities in the outer islands of Indonesia and in Java, which have been the focus of this study. Especially I would like to thank Chion and Masiun, John Bamba and Stepanus Djuweng from LBBT and Dayakologi Institute in West Kalimantan, Indro Tjahjono andf Mahmuddin from Skephi, Arimbi Heroepoetri from Walhi. Beside them I would like to thank other NGOs that took part in this study, which are Riau Mandiri, Adat Petalangan Foundation, HIPALHI, SHK, Pancur Kasih, Mitra Mandiri, and Walhi Kalbar. Actually this study is theirs. All the Insist staff, especially Nuer Fauzi and Yando Zakaria, Mansour Fakih and Roem Topatimasang, with their comments have helped me a lot. In Finland Iam grateful to Timo Kaartinen, Marko Ulvila, Otto Miettinen, Mark Waller, Olli Lounela, and Paivi Ahonen and other Kepa staff who have supported this study. Finally, the biggest thanks belong to my husband Saleh Abdullah, for all his support.

1. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OVER INDONESIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT

Organized civil society in Indonesia is long rooted in the time before Indonesia won independence in 1945. Religious organizations, especially Islamic ones, have been actively organizing the civil society already for hundreds of years, and they also have an important role in the forming of some of the current NGOs. I will not go deep into the history of Islamic organizations, but it is necessary to give an overview on their history and current position.

Apart from Islamic educational Institutions (*pesantren*), the first Indonesian Islamic organizations were formed in the beginning of the 20th century. Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta (Central Java) and its main aim was to further education and welfare, and spread Islam purified of Javanese syncretistic elements. They were also against colonialism and feudalism. Today there are about 28 million members in Muhammadiyah, which is active mainly in the cities. Nahdatul Ulama (NU) was founded in 1926 as a counterbalance to Muhammadiyah. NU might accept Javanese traditions mixed with Islam, and that is why it is often called tolerant and a traditionalist organization. It has about 30 million members, and is the biggest Islamic organization in the world.

NU and Muhammadiyah have very important roles in the organizational history of Indonesia. In its early history, NU had political aspirations and was a political party. However, in 1973 the Indonesian New Order government demanded that there be only three political parties, and that all of them be based on Indonesian Pancasila state ideology. Since then, both organizations have been ideologically apolitical. However, beside those organizations there emerged some Islamic NGOs that wanted to further certain civil society rights and activities. The best known one is probably P3M, a pesantren (Islamic religious educational institution where the students live for many years) based NGO that aims at discussing Islamic teachings, democratization, human rights and gender issues. This NGO has been considered very important in uniting the NU and Muhammadiyah ideologies and relating them to the concerns of universal rights.

Ever since the independence, the first president, Sukarno, and the vice president, Hatta, strongly emphasized development (*Pembangunan*). However, while Sukarno stressed political development, Hatta argued for economic development. Sukarno encouraged the communists to unite and to join with nationalists and religious group, and it was usual for people to join one of those groups. The communists were effective in organizing their movement. However, before the 1960s religious groups and the army started to oppose the growing position of the communists. In 1965, Sukarno and the communists were thrown out of power, and the army, lead by Suharto, took control. Enormous waves of killing occurred all across Indonesia. Religious groups (for example NU) and some student groups took part in the pogrom against the communists, and about half a million people were killed. From then on, the organizational freedom became restricted. Leftist ideologies were no longer acceptable, and many people converted to Islam or joined Islamic groups in order to show that they were not communists. NU, and to a lesser extent Muhammadiyah, also gained more popularity.

The New Order government did not encourage political activities. Its main agenda was economic development. Indonesian state philosophy, Pancasila, became almost a sacred mantra.³ According to Antlöv, to oppose *pembangunan* is as political as opposing Pancasila.⁴ In 1969, the New Order government inaugurated the first five-year economic development plan (Repelita). The emphasis on economy also influenced the position of the civil society. Since political activities became more and more restricted, the organized civil society became "apolitical" in its orientation. Indonesian NGOs were born in this context.

In an earlier study⁵, I explored the position of national NGOs in Indonesia. NGOs have grown up with the development ideology inaugurated by the New Order government. In that time they did not criticize development as such, but economic development that only stressed growth, claiming that development should

be more participative and grass roots oriented (bottom-up). Many religious organizations (Islamic and Catholic) had an important role in that movement.⁶ The next generation conducted action researches or programmes for the people while criticizing the consequences of development projects. However, they also cooperated with the government (Environmental organizations such as Walhi).⁷

After 1973, NGOs also attracted many student activists and some political ones since political activity became restricted. Suharto forced all the parties to be united into three. Therefore, NGOs could be seen as some kind of an opposition political force during the New Order regime. It is interesting that many NGO activists in 1998-1999 have joined political parties, and the leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU have become top leaders of new political parties (PAN-National Mandate Party) (PKB –The National Awakening Party, Abdurrahman Wahid is not officially leading the new party, but is a founder and a visible figure of the party). The ideological division of the new parties somewhat follows the division between NU and Muhammadiyah.

In 1985, all social organizations had to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. If an organization was considered to oppose the New Order policy or Pancasila, it could be dissolved. Since then, the NGOs had Pancasila as their basic ideology and they could not publicly espouse any other.⁸ In 1999 the law was dissolved.

Some have also claimed that foreign donors have, until now, had an important role in directing the activities of local NGOs. In the 1970s and 1980s, NGOs were drawn into development projects to improve the life of local people. These projects were not initiated by locals, and were not grassroots oriented.

1.1. THE MAP OF NGOs IN INDONESIA

In Indonesia there have been at least three types of NGOs during the New Order government. There were those that refused to collaborate with the government, those which included "spies" from the government, and finally those who were completely dependent on the government. It has been claimed that Indonesian NGOs are ideologically divided in two: those who support development, and those who support advocacy.

However, the situation in Indonesia has been changing recently as has the position of NGOs. According to Fakhri, this division is too simplified, and he prefers to categorize NGOs as conformists, reformists and transformists.⁹ Conformists are those who work without theory and clear vision and mission, but they adapt themselves to the dominant structure. Reformists make up 80% of NGOs in Indonesia. They support a participatory approach, and claim that strengthening the role

of civil society in development should be taken as a primary aim. However, they do not question the development ideology (hegemony as it is called by Fakhri), but concentrate on methods and techniques. Transformative NGOs again question the mainstream ideology (development), and try to find an alternative vision and mission through critical education and participatory studies.¹⁰

According to my experiences, since September 1998, there are currently NGOs that are willing to cooperate with the government. They have opinions on such issues as environment, gender, indigenous people's rights and land issues. However, this quite new phenomenon is not accepted by all NGOs.

NGOs in Indonesia could be studied by their attitude toward development ideology that is strongly furthered by the Indonesian government. During the 1990s, a new consciousness about developmentalism has emerged. NGOs have started to ask if they could provide an alternative as social organizations for such problems as poverty, environmental problems and gender issues. It has been asked if they could create ways to solve these problems, and not only respond to current problems.¹¹ Thus, in the 1990s many national NGOs have been very actively introspective and concerned with mission and a vision finding. There are seminars and workshops discussing the role of NGOs in Indonesia today, globalization, environmental problems, human rights issues, and indigenous peoples rights.

According to Fakhri, there are some problems that could be said as crucial when looking at the map of Indonesian NGOs.

NGO activists:

- are biased toward the state and they are a part of the state's development discourse
- are scientifically and positivistic-oriented in their methods and practices
- are an elite that cannot position them outside of their own class
- follow the logic of modernism and developmentalism
- are gender-biased and do not take women's rights seriously
- are reductionists in their approach to the problems of civil society
- place the people in the lower position and as their object.¹²

Not many people have studied the regional differences between the NGOs. It is clear that NGOs in Jakarta and in Java have a very different position from NGOs outside Java. Those outside Java have a lack of material and human resources. Thus, it became very clear during my study trip that there is a wide gap among the NGOs at the national and regional levels. Those I studied concentrated on similar kinds of issues, but they had different kinds of resources and sometimes understanding of those issues.

1.2. NGOs IN A CENTRAL JAVANESE TOWN; Yogyakarta as a starting point

Yogyakarta is an autonomous region of Central Java. There are about three million inhabitants in the region, and about one million inhabitants in a Yogyakarta city. It is a student and cultural city, but also there are more than seventy NGOs. Yogyakarta is led by Sultan Hamengkubuwono Xth, who is well respected even among the students and NGOs.

There are 74 officially recognized NGOs in Yogyakarta. There are human rights NGOs, NGOs that focus on gender issues and women's rights, farmers rights, children's rights, and few which focus on environmental issues.

Nowadays, there are NGO, student meetings, or seminars almost every week. During 1998-1999 NGO happenings have been increasing since the situation in Jakarta has been restless.

In Yogyakarta, one can express ideas freely, have demonstrations in the campus, and there are hardly ever violent occurrences. The military is not visible. NGOs might work together with the universities and hold seminars on almost any topic.

NGOs in Yogyakarta or in Jakarta have been said not to be able to organize themselves and further real democratization and reformation. There is a confusion about mission and vision, and lots of internal struggles and jealousy persist among them. However, I saw that during the last half a year there has been a real effort to unite their forces. That is maybe due to the situation where many new money-oriented NGOs have emerged (because of some foreign donors and monetary institutions). Thus, there is a need to clarify the map of NGOs.

According to the director of Forum LSM of Yogyakarta (NGO Forum, a coordinating NGO for 74 NGOs in Yogyakarta), the awareness of students and common people has sharply risen in the 1990s. There is also emerging a new generation of NGO activists. However, NGOs have not been able to take part in reformation process, and that is why they need to reposition themselves. He also said that donors that have big influence in a country like Indonesia, should direct their activities somewhere other than Jakarta, which is already filled with different donors. Local NGOs do not have easy access to information or donors when they are far away from the "centre." So NGOs would need methodological training, information and theoretical background.

INSIST-Institute for Social Transformation

Insist focuses on the training and education of NGOs, different community groups and students. It is divided to three units: research, education, and publications. It has a few continuous programmes besides the independent programmes implemented by individual staff.

Insist has a democratic structure whereby any of the staff is able to implement a project (as long as it follows the principles of Insist) and to become a head of the team for the project, whereby s/he is responsible for its budget and the process. The projects are discussed and realized in teams that consist of Insist staff, especially Mansour Fasih, Roem Topatimasang. This structure has some positive and negative features. The staff of Insist is very creative and able to produce much in a very short time without drowning in bureaucratic problems. It has a striking capacity to support NGOs and student groups because of its ability to respond quickly. But at some point it seemed that there was no cooperation between different staff members since they all had their own projects. However, this was acknowledged, during my stay, and there was an effort to integrate the activities of different staff members into a more coherent whole.

The assumption of plenty of need for methodological training and theoretical knowledge in the NGOs became very clear during my time with Insist. There were more requests for training than Insist could fulfil. It is extremely important for Insist to implement its Involvement programme aimed at systematic and structured education and training for different civil society groups from different regions of Indonesia.

Insist also publishes books. It has published eight books during 1999, and will publish some more soon. It also publishes a magazine called Wacana (Discourse) which aims at creating dialogue between different civil society groups about the current issues (civil society, democratization in Indonesia, economy of the people, environment).

Insist can be categorized as a transformative NGO. Its aim is to facilitate different civil society groups to realize their mission and vision, but first of all to facilitate them to decide what these are. Insist considers it very important to give training and explore the needs of NGOs in the current environment of Indonesia.

Since this study concentrates on NGOs especially in the regions outside of Java, I will now explore the conditions they are working in, and the themes of "development" and globalization, which have become a part of their work in different ways. Thus, I look at three different levels consecutively: globalization and development, local community groups and NGOs.

2. DEVELOPMENT AND THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES; Land Rights

Under Suharto (1967-1998) the government stressed economic development (*pembangunan*) as an ideology and policy, which legitimized the New Order's power. The state became a tool for the political elite, bureaucrats and military to control the land - and natural environment - as a commodity. This policy has been continued by president Habibie's government. Indonesian development policy has meant that national economic growth is a measure for any kind of well being and prosperity. Consequently, industrial development and investments have been encouraged. This industrialization has again been based on the exploitation of the natural resources and low-pay labour. Development has become a concept by which one can be identified as supporting the Indonesian government or as being against it. If you support development you support the government, otherwise you "act against government."

The policy of "Economic Development" legitimizes the exploitation of natural resources. Forestry has been one of the fastest growing sectors. Since the 1980s, employment in the forestry sector has grown faster than in the agricultural or any other sector. The export of timber products has also grown significantly, bringing foreign exchange to the country. The government has encouraged the development of the forestry sector as the hope for the future.

The state considers every forest area as state-controlled land.¹³ This includes land owned by indigenous peoples. Forestry companies are given licenses for land rent for 20-45 years, and they enter Indonesia with the idea that the land and forests are "empty." Companies usually do not conduct thorough research about the local conditions before starting their activities in the "empty" forests. That is why nowadays there are plenty of land conflicts. Some of the conflicts emerged between companies (and its workers), and the local people, who oppose the companies because they either pollute the land or have taken land considered by the local people to be communally owned.

2.1. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND DEVELOPMENT

The government has not acknowledged that there are indigenous peoples in Indonesia, but it claims that all the Indonesians are natives (*pribumi*). However, according to Indonesian NGOs, indigenous peoples have their own definition, and should be noticed as a specific group. In Indonesian language, Indigenous peoples is translated as *Masyarakat Adat*. The next definition follows the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact:

- Indigenous Peoples have special attachment to the lands and territories and might claim ownership to their land, marine and natural resources.
- Indigenous Peoples have a right for self-determination and they have a sense of shared ancestry.
- Indigenous Peoples have their own languages, cultures, spiritual world (cosmos) and knowledge. Thus, they are in unique position for transferring their knowledge to the following generations.
- Indigenous Peoples have their own political, cultural and social institutions.

Some Indonesian NGOs have made their own definition of Indigenous Peoples "as a group of people who own the pedigree of their ancestors (by birth) in certain geographical areas and has its own system of value, ideology, economy, politics, culture, social system and territory."¹⁴

According to some NGOs, indigenous peoples of Indonesia are threatened because of the current development policy and state regulations which do not affirm their rights. The most destructive projects are forestry projects such as plantations and timber estates, but also mining. For example, in West Kalimantan it has been predicted that there would not be room for indigenous peoples, if all the planned forestry projects there were implemented.¹⁵

2.1.1.1. INDONESIAN LAND POLICY AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The Indonesian constitution (UU 45) and its regulations simultaneously manage to confirm and undermine the land rights of indigenous peoples.¹⁶ Communally owned land is considered land governed by the state, although Agrarian Law no 5, 1960, recognizes the local community's right to their land. However, this regulation becomes unclear with the notion that all the land can be used by the state for the national interest. Thus, the state regulates the implementation of the *adat* law which otherwise would regulate the land use.¹⁷

The constitution does not clearly express what kind of *adat* (customary law)¹⁸ it means when it states that the valid agrarian law over earth, water, and sky is *adat* law as long as it does not conflict with national interests. In Indonesia there is *hak ulayat* which could be translated as owning/using together, or *hak adat* (custom) which regulates the individual use or right for land. In Indonesia there are many *adat* communities which have different laws that regulate land use. At present the constitution only refers to *hak ulayat*.¹⁹

Hak ulayat is derived from Minangkabau culture and the concept does not extend to Eastern Indonesia. That is why it is also assumed that the constitution is Minangkabau biased and only admits the communal right. The Constitution also favors the permanent land use, but does not acknowledge rotating cultivation whereby the land is left untouched for many years. The *adat* communities may convert their land to the certified land (they are asked to do that), but this again is against their cultural concept of land use and ownership, since land could be borrowed or used by different individuals or families. The concept of ownership promoted by the government has a modern bias.²⁰

The national interest is usually identified with economic development as described above. Forestry companies are encouraged by the state to bring money into Indonesia by starting HTIs (Tree Plantations) and HPHs (Logging Concessions). The vagueness of the land law has created a situation where local communities cannot defend their customary land rights, and forestry companies are able to gain large areas of forest for industrial use.²¹ Thus, for example Riau and West Kalimantan have experienced serious environmental and cultural changes during the last two decades through "development."

3. RIAU; environmental destruction and civil society movement

I went to Riau in December 1998 for two weeks, to conduct a study among the few NGOs I already knew something about: local Skephi (Joint Secretariat for Forest Conservation), Riau Mandiri, HIPALHI (The Safety of Nature and Environmental Control), and the Adat Petalangan Foundation. I interviewed NGO activists and followed and took part in their activities. I discussed with community groups (Petalangan) in their own surroundings, where they had the opportunity to express themselves in their own language without the feeling of fear that in Indonesia sometimes disturbs "free communication." Two weeks is a very short time, but through some earlier contacts and a long stay in Indonesia I hope to be able to describe the NGOs and the surroundings they work in Riau.²²

3.1. "GLOBAL PROJECT" IN RIAU; DEVELOPMENT

Riau is the second richest province in Indonesia if ranked by per capita GDP (\$US per annum), while the income to the province from the Indonesian state is one of the smallest in Indonesia (HIPALHI 1998, INDEF 1998)²³. Recently, there has been outbreaks of famine among the poorest groups. This is due to fact that most of the benefits gained through companies exploiting nature run in the form of taxes to Jakarta, or else remain with the companies.

A province Riau in West Sumatra was formed in 1957. Riau is considered as one of the richest provinces when natural resources are concerned. Riau has a long history as a trading area, since it is close to Singapore and Malaysia. Already for hundreds of years traders have travelled to Riau, which became a cultural and economic melting pot. However, it is only during the last two decades that Riau has experienced intensive environmental exploitation, when transnational and local companies started their activities in the area.

Since the end of 1970s, the government, more precisely the forestry department, has given plenty of licenses for oil palm and rubber plantations. The forestry department also issues licenses for Logging Concessions (HPH) and other Tree Plantations (HTI). According to Skephi, the approved forest conversion area in Riau is already about 2,6 million hectares.

Extensive industrial activities have brought lots of local and foreign transmigrants into the area (1970-1990 more than three hundred thousand people). In the industrial and plantation areas, especially, more than half of the population are transmigrants. This is especially true in Kampar regency in Riau, where I conducted part of this study.²⁵

3.2. FINLAND INVOLVED IN INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT

I have focused my fieldwork study on Pekanbaru, the capital of Riau, and Kampar regency. Some Finnish NGO activists have already visited the area, and have got to know some of the NGOs there. Therefore, Riau seemed to become a place where the mapping of NGOs and their current situation was needed. Riau is also a place where the Finnish forestry company UPM-Kymmene is active, together with its partner APRIL. APRIL has built a paper factory (RAPP) in Riau and is logging from the rainforests of Riau. This has also been noticed by some environmental and human rights NGOs in Riau and in Finland.

RAPP is the biggest pulp and paper factory in Asia. Since 1995, at least twenty thousand hectares have been devastated annually for the supply of the mill with its more than 750,000 tons capacity for pulp production.²⁶ Its concession land covers about 280,000 hectares.

The activities of APRIL in Riau have been questioned by many. It had at least three land conflicts with three different communities, and it has been accused of

cutting natural forests, which are already disappearing from the area.²⁷

In these land conflicts at least 1,750 ha have been claimed as communally owned land (*tanah ulayat*) by the villagers of Delik, Sering and Kerinci in the Kampar regency.²⁸ Recently there have occurred other land disputes as RAPP's sister companies have clashed with local people.

In the next chapter I explore the situation of the local people, their conception of land and the problems they have to face with RAPP/APRIL as it extends its activities in the Kampar regency. There has been much discussion about the forestry companies and their background (for example Kuvaja & Ulvila & Wallgren 1998; Lounela Kepa Report 1997; Miettinen & Selin 1999; Ulvila 1996). Thus, I will concentrate on NGO's land rights and indigenous people in Riau and West Kalimantan.

3.3. INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN RIAU

Riau has 3,895,000 inhabitants of whom roughly 33,585 are counted as indigenous peoples by the government. There are six different ethnic groups categorized by the government as indigenous peoples (*masyarakat adat*) in Riau: *suku Akit, suku Bonai, suku Sakai, suku Hutan, suku Laut, and suku Talang Mama*, which are spread across different regencies.²⁹ According to Tenas Effendi (chairman of *Adat Petalangan* Foundation), there is at least one more indigenous people group, *Petalangan*, that inhabits the villages of Delik, Sering and Kerinci in the Kampar regency.³⁰

Tenas Effendi says that the Petalangans could be considered as an indigenous people having their own adat (customary Law) concept of nature and land, oral traditions and arts, although due to social and environmental changes some of their traditions seem to be disappearing.

In this study I will explore the experiences of Petalangans, as they are experiencing the globalization and marginalization process in their own territory. The problems of forestry industry at the local level could be studied through their experiences, as they live where PT RAPP is most active in Riau. Increasing pollution and changing environment in the area, and so-called "development" is touching every Petalangan living in the area.

The three villages of Delik, Kerinci and Sering lost 1,750 hectares of what they consider their own *tanah ulayat* when RAPP took over and converted the land into plantations and concessions. Moreover, the pulp and paper factory of RAPP has been built on land communally owned by Sering village, and is located only about 20 kilometres away from the village along the Kampar-river.³¹

3.3.1. TANAH ULAYAT: MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

In order to understand the problems indigenous groups have to face, when they are "developed" by the state or companies, or when their natural surroundings are destroyed, we have to explore their concept of land and nature.

Environment in this study is connected to people. Nature is seen as something socially constructed in the sense that nature is understood through everybody's own understanding depending on the place, cultural background and language. That is why there also are many different contexts and understandings of nature. This means different "traditions", cultures and livelihoods.

Tanah Ulayat has two basic features: 1. The more work an individual puts into a certain piece of land, the greater the community's recognition of the individual's right to it, otherwise community might allocate the land among its members. 2. The transfer of land rights is subject to strict community control.³²

"*Tanah Ulayat* is our communally owned land, which we got from the King of Pelalawan already centuries ago. We know the borders of the land from the natural borders, as the land is divided following the mountains and hills, rivers and other natural marks, the borders are still clear", an *adat* leader told me in a Delik village in Riau.³³

Petalangans have their own relationship with the land and forest, and they know how to conserve the nature around them. Petalangan people already have long practised rotating cultivation. They categorize their land depending on its use. There are: *Kampung* Land (for the house etc. in the village), *Dusun* land (gardens), *Peladangan* land (cultivated fields), *Rimba Larangan* land (a kind of protected forest for different species of animals and trees that cannot be cut according to the customary law).³⁴

Petalangans have had (*adat*) sanctions against those who destroy the forest. The forest is considered a body. Actually, it is the same as one's own body. Every tree species has its meaning and function. Medical care and rituals, arts and beliefs are connected to the forest. Petalangans say: "Take care of your land and forest and your life will be fortunate."³⁵

The villagers of Sering and Kerinci gathered together in Sering to discuss the problems of land, forest and RAPP. They told that: "We have taken care of our land, fields and gardens to make our people happy. Our life depends on forest and taking care of the garden. Our land is reserved for our grandchildren. We don't want to give it to RAPP. For the land already taken by the forestry company (1750 ha) we ask at least for compensation. Otherwise, we want our land back. You see, nowadays the land is closed from us, it is surrounded by the wires, and we are afraid to enter there."³⁶ Petalangan people have fought for their ancestral territories (*tanah ulayat*) now for more than six years.

The Petalangans I met expressed their concern for the lands they earlier have been able to cultivate as gardens or paddy fields. This land has been earlier divided among the three *batins* (fountainhead) of Delik, Sering and Kerinci. The land is divided into different categories according to its use among the Petalangans. This system is complex, and is based on sustainable resource management among the villagers. The *batins* might give *adat* sanctions about the land use to control that the land use is not against the wishes of the community. However, after the companies started their activities in the area, it had not been possible to control the land with traditional means.

Batin Sani (Delik) told that the borders of land divided between different batins of Petalangan are clear. However, since the government of Indonesia has claimed that all the land is basically controlled by the state, the status of *tanah ulayat* has become unclear, and it is now difficult to prove where the *tanah ulayat* stands.

Different provinces have different regulations concerning communally owned land (*tanah ulayat*). In Riau, the local government does not acknowledge that indigenous groups have their own land rights, although in a neighbouring province communally owned land is officially recognized and regulated.

3.3.2. RAPP, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AND THE IMPACT ON PETALANGAN PEOPLE

To understand how the forestry companies have such a big influence in some provinces of Indonesia (some call it neo-colonialism), we have to explore the political-economic system that is not *visible*, but occurs everywhere: the KKN (*Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme* - Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism). Most of the enterprises, local or transnational, have to work together with the national and local government, the military or police. Under New Order there was a kind of network of banks, companies, military and bureaucrats involved in KKN. It is no secret that Indonesia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. This opens the doors to resources that otherwise would be off limits.

After New Order collapsed there was a reformation whereby KKN has become the target of a clean up process. However, as my experience in Riau proved, at least in the provinces there is still plenty of talk about corruption and moneyed politics. People told me that RAPP is also involved in corruption. I heard rumours that the new governor of Riau enjoys a close relationship with RAPP, and he was chosen without almost any support. I was told that money politics were involved. That is why some people thought it would be difficult to criticize RAPP at the local level.

1997-1998 was extremely destructive for the Indonesian environment and forests. Because of poverty and political chaos, the robbing of the forests has become "brutal". Riau, South Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan have been

mentioned as seriously affected by the current situation. The officials and police are often involved in the theft of wood. According to the research team from the University of Gadjah Mada, there is a network involving a boss, his workers, and poor people. This network again has connection with the companies.³⁷

In Riau there is also plenty of illegal logging besides the legal forestry. It is possible that immigrants and people losing their land and livelihood in Riau are involved, since they may feel they have the right to get benefit too, or they might search for an income.³⁸ According to Riau Mandiri, it is evident that RAPP extracts natural forests, since it could not get enough wood from anywhere else, and since its plantations have been planted only in 1995.³⁹ That is why some of the trucks I saw going to RAPP's factory filled with sizeable wood that could not come from anywhere else than natural forest (see Ulvila 1996). This wood is partly from the concessions where APRIL has got a licence from the forestry department, but also from the other forest areas.⁴⁰ This seriously furthers the deforestation of natural forests in Riau which has been said to be one of the most seriously destroyed forestry areas in Indonesia.

According to some sources, RAPP has also polluted the river of Kampar⁴¹ and changed the infrastructure of the area. New roads (which are already completely destroyed by the oversize trucks), the whole "city" of Kerinci (built in 1992 when RAPP started in Riau), a pulp and paper factory by the Kampar-river, and harbor for the transportation have been built in the area. The air in the city of Kerinci is filled with dust and pollution because of the trucks and factory. According to the villagers living along the Kampar-river, the water is dirty and undrinkable, which wasn't the case just a few years ago. There are more foreign workers in the area, and people have complained about prostitution (and short marriages) and increasing crime in the area. Almost all the people I discussed with, from activists to indigenous groups and ordinary people, claimed that RAPP was responsible for the big changes in Kampar regency.

According to the villagers of Sering, it is now the pollution that destroys their life. Petalangans have difficulties to get clean water to drink. They suffer from stomach sicknesses, and in the mornings there are dead fish floating in the river. At least 21 villagers suffer from skin diseases, and there have recently been lots of fever diseases that they earlier did not have. "Twice a week there is somebody seriously sick (children, elders, and others, especially those who are fishing). One villager died three days ago after suffering for a long time from skin disease. We cannot cure these people, as we do not know anymore how to cure these kinds of sicknesses, and the traditional herbs and plants are disappearing. Our healers are confused."⁴²

Petalangans claimed that they do not have enough land to practice rotating cultivation and take care of their (honey and rubber) gardens. They have to burn forests (for cultivating their paddy fields) in the smaller areas. Thus, the land has no time to recover as before. The

ecological system is disturbed. That is why they are forced to enter the industrial work or to look for income from other sources.

It may be true that the most vulnerable ones are those who depend on natural resources, such as water in the river, sea, and forests. For the Petalangan people, it was difficult to see what they could do apart from demanding money from the company. However, it seemed very difficult to reach a compromise with RAPP. Petalangan people felt they have been failed by almost everybody. Did they have to become workers in the factory and plantations build on the land previously owned by their ancestors?

3.4. THE CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT IN RIAU: Conflicts and Confusion

In Riau I was able to meet four NGOs, Riau Mandiri, HIPALHI (The Safety of Nature and Environmental Conservation), and Skephi's local branch, and the government-oriented Adat Petalangan Foundation. In this chapter I will also describe the needs and ideas expressed by the NGOs I met in Riau.

3.4.1. NGOs AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: The Riau Case

Before meeting with the local NGOs, I met with some journalists and local intellectuals, and talked about NGOs and the problem of local indigenous groups and environment. The initial picture I got of local NGOs was that they had serious orientation problems. They were accused of accepting money not only from the companies but also from the governmental officials. I was told that NGOs did not care about the people or about principles, but only money. It was claimed that they help the forestry companies in order to get money, although in principle they resisted their activities in the area.⁴³

There are 30 officially listed NGOs in Riau, and 12 student organizations that are also counted as NGOs. According to some NGOs during the year 1998, there have emerged about 60 NGOs more, since the government, foreign donors, and international monetary groups (IMF, Asian Development Bank etc.) have directed money to almost any NGO that wants to take it. However, these NGOs were claimed to look for money by creating "developing the poor" programs, or issues such as AIDS that they know the donors like.⁴⁴

There is a difficulty to form a forum of NGOs since the NGO activists in Riau are not interested in advocacy and discussing, they hardly ever come to any seminars or meetings, especially if the subject is advocacy. They are not open about their work, which causes others to become suspicious.⁴⁵

3.4.2. SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RIAU: NGOs and foundations

RIAU MANDIRI was formed in 1989, and aims to "raise the well being and safety of the people through developing the natural and human resources, especially for those who are considered marginal (*rentan*)."⁴⁶ It is especially concerned with environmental problems, including damaged forests and polluted rivers, that cause suffering and poverty for ordinary people. Riau Mandiri claims, that it is the development policy (*pembangunan*) of the Indonesian government, that has caused many problems, and has sacrificed marginalized people in Indonesia. For that reason Riau Mandiri ideally aims at empowering people.

According to Riau Mandiri, the marginalized people are those who do not have access to natural and other resources, and they do not have the possibility to take part in the "development process". Riau Mandiri is especially concerned with socio-economic issues concerning the poverty-stricken and marginalized people, and the relations between the companies, local people and the Indonesian government.

Riau Mandiri is said to be an open NGO to anybody to work with, as long as they have same interests. It has 14 people working in its office, and works with a wide network of international NGOs. It has been funded by CUSO (Canada), IFS (Sweden), PACT (USA), FNS (Germany), and many others, not to mention Indonesian NGOs (32 listed ones) it works with. Ideologically it is based on Pancasila and the constitution -45, and it also has had programs with the Indonesian government. Riau Mandiri was often mentioned as the best NGO in Riau.

Current programmes of Riau Mandiri include charity programmes, where it shares rice to the marginalized people in Riau (collaboration with the government of Japan, and OzIndo/Australia), monitors Programmes of Word Bank, and collaborates with FANA international and Duta Awam Solo Foundation from Java. Recently it has started consulting companies that are active in Riau. Its newest program includes the Community Development Program by RAPP. In the same time it has become a new negotiator between the people of Delik and RAPP about the land compensations. Sering and Kerinci have refused to take part in the negotiations, but Delik already accepted the compensation offered by the RAPP.

According to some journalists and local figures, Riau Mandiri has been the most qualified NGO (maybe besides HIPALHI) in Riau. However, the recent agreement with RAPP has caused many to be suspicious of Riau Mandiri. It has been accused of caring only about money, not people. Riau Mandiri itself says that without its help people in Delik, Sering and Kerinci would not get any kind of compensation. Riau Mandiri wants to give them advocacy not to sell the land, but to rent it in order to get it back later on.⁴⁶ However, people in Sering and Kerinci do not trust Riau Mandiri, since they think it collaborates with a RAPP that has taken their land. Their idea of what they want from the RAPP also differs

from the idea of Riau Mandiri. In the end, the communities were in conflict with each other.

The Community Development Program by RAPP is very controversial. The villagers of Sering and Kerinci feel that they never asked for any development, and that they need to have their *rights* back to control their land, or at least get compensation.⁴⁷

According to my observations, the position of Riau Mandiri has become slightly difficult. It was somewhere between a developmental-oriented and an advocacy-oriented NGO. However, maybe the most serious thing was that it was not trusted by people themselves (except the villagers of Delik), because it was not able to stay "neutral", but decided to become a consultant for the RAPP. Thus, following the approach used here, Riau Mandiri could be said to be a reformist-oriented NGO, though sometimes it was almost conformist in its orientation. Even though it strongly criticizes development, it also adapts to it while stressing the participation of the local people.⁴⁸

THE ADAT PETALANGAN FOUNDATION was formed in 1984, but it has been most active only over the last four years. There are seven people working for it, but only temporarily. The chairman, Tenas Effendi, is a locally and nationally renowned writer and self-educated "anthropologist", who has written many books about folklore, culture and the recent changes in the lives of the Petalangan people. He has been considered vocal in defending Petalangers' rights for land, and their own mode of life. This foundation focuses on the questions of *adat* of Petalangan people, and their rights. Tenas Effendi has also formed Setinggi Foundation, which aims to help indigenous peoples.

The Adat Petalangan foundation works in cooperation with Ford Foundation, Toyota Foundation and KITLV from Leyden. It might also have a connection with the government, at least as a kind of a mediator between the indigenous people and the local government. Recently, it has started a programme to "cultivate" local groups in cooperation with the government and the companies. Their aim is to help Petalangers to develop gardens, rear chickens, and start a fishery in the villages, by building artificial fishponds. Ideally, the companies would buy food items from the local groups, and not from the supermarkets as it currently happens. If this kind of a "development program" could succeed with Petalangan people, it would be implemented on other groups. The program would be implemented over five years, after which the Petalangan people should be independent and able to run their own businesses.

The Petalangan Foundation strengthens *adat* by teaching about Petalangan culture in the institute of the foundation and through the creation of a museum containing their cultural items. "The disappearing habits, handicrafts and knowledge would be collected into the museum while implementing the development programme."⁴⁹ It is clear that this kind of thinking wakes a lot of resistance among the many NGO activists.

According to Tenas Effendi, NGOs in Riau hardly ever go to the field or have real connection with the people. There is no way other than asking for moral help from foreign countries, since the local government cannot do anything unless there is change at the national level (Jakarta), and the companies do not carry responsibility of what they are doing in Riau. The most difficult problem is that companies think they have a legal right to take the land, since they have got the license from the Indonesian government. The companies do not ask what is the situation at the local level. Now all the repressed groups are demanding their rights back, and people are too angry and already lost too much, say Tenas Effendi.⁵⁰

It seems that the Adat Petalangan Foundation is not well known by local people in the villages of Delik, Sering and Kerinci. It was also defined as governmental organization, or as coopted by the companies⁵¹. However, it has a great influence since it works together with the government and companies, and is supported by big donors. This foundation was following the line of conformists, whereby it knew all the problems of indigenous groups, but it did not have clear vision how to help them.

3.4.3. ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN RIAU

SKEPHI (Joint Secretariat for Indonesian Forest Conservation) was founded in 1982 in Jakarta⁵². It has a local branch in Riau and a home-office there. SKEPHI has been in Riau continuously for five months now. It has been monitoring local NGOs, collecting data, and getting to know the local conditions and peoples including local villagers in Delik, Sering and Kerinci. Skephi's aim is to collect data about the environmental problems caused by the forestry companies, and to give advocacy to local people, to strengthen their own culture and habits, and to preserve the natural surroundings they live in.

According to Skephi, it is very difficult to be active in Riau as an NGO without getting enemies. That is why Skephi has decided to monitor the situation and try to get data. This again is difficult because of the lack of money, or because of the official institutions, which refuse to give any data (including the companies). If there was an initiative from the indigenous groups, skephi would like to start an advocacy programme there.

I was told that only Skephi, Dr. Tabrani Rab (Doctor), and Marganti Manalu (a journalist who has helped the local people), were believed by the villagers from Sering and Kerinci. Tabrani Rab was trusted since he was considered not to have any interests himself. All the villagers I met regretted "the Manalu's case". Manalu was accused of agitating people to resist RAPP when RAPP wanted to build a road on the *tanah ulayat* land in Delik (10.10.1997). Manalu has been arrested and will be a prisoner for three years. In August 1998 he was removed to a small island in between Riau and Singapore. His lawyer said he has not been able to use a telephone. Villagers from Delik, Sering, and Kerinci claimed that Manalu had not been agitating them.

It seems that SKEPHI has problems in starting activities in Riau, as it needs to conduct a need assessment study. It should also be able to be "neutral" in the eyes of local NGOs, and not get involved in local conflicts. That again seems to be very difficult. Until now it seems that Skephi is well accepted by other NGOs and local communities. However, it did not seem to have clear aim for its activities in Riau. This might be because there seemed to be a break in communications between the main office and Riau office of Skephi. According to Skephi, this is also due to their commitment to wait for local initiatives. It does not want to intervene in a local situation. When I was leaving from Riau, the local groups from Sering and Kerinci wanted to ask for advocacy from Skephi. Skephi is clearly a transformative NGO. It strongly criticizes the development ideology and is looking for alternatives. It also emphasizes the local initiative as a starting point for its activities.

HIPALHI (The Safety of Nature and Environmental Control) was founded in 1987. Its ex-chairman Andreas Herry K. is responsible for activities of HIPALHI which has been considered a representative of Walhi in the region. However, lately, Walhi has decided not to have a representative in Riau.⁵³ It is concerned with environmental issues, such as conserving biodiversity and natural resources, especially in forests. It studies how the disappearing rainforests and other types of forests influence the ecosystem as well as the local people. It has been very active in campaigns. There have been hundreds of articles published by local and national newspapers about its statements in Riau (1987-1997). However, Hipalhi stopped its activities in 1996, when the local NGO Forum was dispersed and HIPALHI clashed with local NGOs. I was told that the conflict started because of ideological reasons. In the office of Hipalhi there was plenty of information, but the place seemed to be almost deserted. Thus, it is difficult to say what will be its future when there is a new chairman.

Hipalhi seemed to be a vocal and advocacy oriented actor among the NGOs. Some of its aims were described as being to:

- rescue the forest, Land and Water resources through conservation and developing agrarian programme for dry land
- give advocacy to local people according to their needs
- promote the conservation of ocean ecology
- support changes in the social policy and controlling the government in their development programs.
- develop an economic and environmental program of using natural resources governed by the local people

My problem was that I was not able to observe any of their programs, since they had no longer ran any activities. There was much information from before 1996, and articles published about HIPALHI statements and studies before 1997. However, there are also people who were very suspicious about Hipalhi. That might be because its activities were stopped some years ago, although it was said to be silently active all the time.

Articles are still getting published about current cases handled by its chairman. Since HIPALHI was not active, I had difficulties to see its ideological lines. However, according to some NGOs it could be called as reformist-oriented NGO.

3.4.4. THE PROBLEMS OF THE LOCAL NGOS

NGOs in Riau seem to be very action oriented. According to Skephi, NGOs mainly try to find money and fulfill their material needs. That is why they are dispersed and cannot work together. It might be that there is a big need for money, and competition among them is hard. In general, it can be said that NGO activists in Indonesia have difficulties to work as volunteers, since they cannot get their living from any other sources. That is why they take on projects that also bring them income. However, according to many activists and journalists, NGOs in Riau are disoriented and distanced from the ordinary people.

I was also told that NGOs are not able to help the people, since they hardly ever go to the field to find out what the people really want and need. SKEPHI had decided to stop any other activities but monitoring in the area since the situation among the NGOs, and between RAPP and Petalangan people and NGOs was already so confusing. Besides that, the local communities seemed to feel suspicious of some NGOs as they felt that they are only misunderstood, or not noticed by those NGOs.⁵⁴

The condition and dispersion of NGOs in Riau have caused the people not to believe in NGOs and their activities. As the local power structure has been very repressive, and the government officials and companies work together with the police, army and even universities, there has not been much room for either NGOs or people.⁵⁵

There has not been a real meeting between the NGOs to discuss the current situation of Riau and its civil society. That might be because the activists, prominent figures, local communities and government were all suspicious and sometimes hostile toward each other. In the end, there is no commitment, but "one could win with money". (It was amazing how often I heard that somebody has been "bought." Journalists are bribed, and RAPP was said to pay out money in almost every instance, or at least it tried to do so).

Local NGOs are lacking in knowledge and information. Therefore, they have a very fragile commitment and vision. Most of the local NGOs seem to be reformist-oriented, and follow the development ideology also implemented by the Indonesian government.

3.4.5. THE NEEDS OF THE LOCAL NGOS AND GROUPS IN RIAU

My first impression of the NGOs in Riau is that they do not have clear orientation, and there is lots of confusion

with vision, and misunderstandings and conflicts among the NGOs. Because of the very short time I spent there, it is almost impossible to say what is the reason for the situation. Some reasons mentioned are: the repressive power structure in Riau, the culture of corruption, materially oriented thinking, non-educated human resources, strict competition for funding, and mentally and materially exploited people.

According to Skephi, there is a big need for training, workshops and evaluation of the work of NGOs in Riau.

Local NGOs and foundations asked for moral support, and for information about the companies and NGOs active in Finland. Skephi suggested that NGOs such as INSIST (Institution for Social Transformation), which concentrates on training and advocacy, would give training on issues such as theoretical background, methodology, participatory approach. According to Skephi's representative, this kind of aid would be much more important than material aid, although both are needed. Hipalhi was willing to receive any kind of critical comment about its activities in order to be able to act better. Adat Petalangan Foundation mentioned moral support since it already seemed to have lots of funding. Riau Mandiri again told that it needs funding for its program for local people and the study for the *adat* (customary law) among the Petalangers. The study would explore which groups still have strong *adat*, and which have already lost their *adat*. The study would be

needed for a programme to strengthen the *adat* among the local groups. They also suggested they would need to conduct a study about the pollution of Kampar River, but they would need money for that. Actually, Riau Mandiri expressed the fact that if it gets funding from others than RAPP it would give up the community development programme. Now they thought that the local people had to "get even something."

NGOs such as Riau Mandiri, HIPALHI, and Petalangan Adat Foundation suggested that one should struggle for the official recognition of communal land (*tanah ulayat*) at the level of a province (*peraturan daerah*), and then at the national level. That would mean also that there should be a clean government to control the laws and regulation beside the civil society groups. Until now that has not been the case. They also suggested that international NGOs would take the role of pressuring Indonesia at the national level.

I was not able to visit local student groups who have an important role in Riau in strengthening the civil society. NGOs, local prominent figures and local communities all were supporting students and had a positive picture of their ideas and activities. However, there was no strong connection between the NGOs, students and local communities. That is why it would be good to have some connection also with some student groups, although they can be seen as somewhat radical by some.

4. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, AND NGOs IN WEST KALIMANTAN: STRUGGLING FOR LAND

In this chapter I describe the role of NGOs in the development of West Kalimantan. I have been studying the role of NGOs empowering Indigenous Peoples of West Kalimantan, and indigenous peoples management of natural resources, as an objective of the Kepa's need assessment study. The NGOs that I met in Pontianak named "development" (*pembangunan*) a major factor for the destruction of Indigenous Peoples cultures and rights for their land, beside the environmental destruction, that is becoming severe following the economic crisis in Indonesia. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how this "development," realized by Indonesian state and government, and transnational and national companies, is faced and answered by local Indigenous Peoples and NGOs, and how the destruction of land rights and environment have emerged.

In order to understand the position of Indigenous Peoples, Dayaks, in West Kalimantan, we first of all have to understand the culture and customary laws (*adat*) of Dayaks and their way of managing natural resources in West Kalimantan. With this background we might understand also why some local NGOs concentrate on indigenous peoples rights, and the reasons Dayaks has become threatened.

The island of Kalimantan (or Borneo) is divided into three administrative parts: Kalimantan, which is governed by Indonesia, the Malaysian Federated States of Sabah Sarawak, and the state of Brunei Darussalam. Indonesian Kalimantan is again divided into four provinces: West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan. Kalimantan has a mix of different ethnic groups such as Malays, Chinese, Javanese, Maduranese, Buginese, to mention a few. However, its Indigenous Peoples (*masyarakat adat*) are named as "Dayak" (since 1757), which is actually a name given to some different indigenous ethnic groups living in Kalimantan. The approximately 450 ethnolinguistic groups living in Borneo, are considered to have similarities in their languages, living styles (a long house), food, customary laws (*adat*) etc.⁵⁶

4.1. METHODS

The NGOs for this study were selected by following criteria: they were engaged in activities that concerned environment and Indigenous Peoples rights, they were already publicly known, and were recommended to me by other Indonesian NGOs and INSIST staff.

The six NGOs that were included in the study are Pancur Kasih, LBBT (Lembaga Bela Benua Talino-Institute for Community Legal Resources Empowerment), IDR (The Institute of Dayakology Research and Development), SHK (System Hutan Kerakyatan, Community-Based Forest System Management), Mitra Mandiri Foundation, and WALHI Daerah Kalimantan Barat (Regional branch of WALHI). I spent 16 days in West Kalimantan. I had four day trip with LBBT to follow their projects in the villages and to discuss with local Indigenous groups. I talked with about fifteen NGO activists, and with tens of the Indigenous peoples, Dayaks.

The villages I visited were chosen because they were also the regions where local NGOs LBBT, SHK, and IDR were active. There the land conflicts have also been rising lately. Land conflicts in those areas are often connected to the projects of FINNANTARA INTIGA (forestry company that is owned by three companies: ENSO from Finland 30%, Indonesian state company Inhutani III 40%, and Indonesian biggest tobacco company Gudang Garam 30%). Indigenous Peoples living in the area face rapid social changes besides the environmental destruction and the destruction of their *adat* land.

4.2. "DEVELOPMENT" IN THE CONTEXT OF WEST KALIMANTAN

"We are physically independent, but still colonialisd by the modernity. In our village, forest is destroyed and logged. Consequently, land erosion takes place. The morality is weakening and our mentality is destroyed. People who have

money and position cause other people to suffer. Foreigners seek money and exploit our natural resources. HTI and HPH are financed by foreign investors. The life of the local people is not harmonic anymore. We have become the victims of the development, but it is time to wake up now. Don't let the lions of development become more greedy and nasty, eating all the food of Kalimantan people. Otherwise, we will die." (Readers' letter translated from Kalimantan Review No, 42, th VIII, February 1999).

According to Stepanus Djuweng, there are five external reasons for the destruction of the Indigenous People's life: big religions; formal education; capitalistic economy and globalization; regulations and the constitution of Indonesia that do not favour Indigenous Peoples; and communication technology.

The local government of West Kalimantan wants to achieve an increase of 10.9% in economic growth by encouraging large scale investments on palm oil and industrial tree plantations (HTI), and mining. In West Kalimantan, the provincial governor has reserved 3,2 million hectares for oil palm plantations, of which two hundred thousand hectares are in use.

The tropical forests of Kalimantan were in 1990, 44,964 million hectares. There are at least 301 logging concessions occupying 31,150,400 hectares of forest land. There are at least 22 companies with HTIs in West Kalimantan. One of the biggest is Finnantara Intiga. Some 1,599,000 ha of land has been set aside for the development of the HTI projects, 1,229,000 for the pulp-HTI, 105,000 for non-pulp, and 65,000 for transmigrant-HTI.⁵⁷

Finnantara Intiga has a license from the Indonesian government for 300,000 hectares of HTI, of which they have realized about 10,000 hectares. The forestry department delivered licenses for plantations without regarding that there actually already are people living in the area. However, Enso, a stockholder of Finnantara Intiga, has had its own policy when entering West Kalimantan. It is said to negotiate with indigenous peoples before cutting the forest or starting the acacia plantations.

Beside the companies, there are lots of transmigrants from other islands, who are brought by the companies. Transmigrants take part in the state's transmigrant program, or just follow their families. Any HTI-project should include also a transmigrant programme. This kind of transmigrant nucleus industrial forests scheme (PIR-Trans HTI) benefits the government, private companies and the transmigrants.⁵⁸ However, it also marginalizes indigenous peoples.

4.3. THE POSITION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

There are approximately 3.9 million inhabitants in West Kalimantan, of which 41% are Dayaks and their different subgroups. Dayaks consider land, rivers and forests

most important in their life. Their customary law regulates how to use the natural resources, and who has the right to a certain resource. "The very basic character of the *Masyarakat adat* is the attachment to the land and the Earth's resources. In land is the oral history of human beings. Land is not only an economic resource, but it is the basis for cultural, social, political and spiritual activities...land links the past, present and future generations."⁵⁹

Following the adat, Dayaks have their own way of managing land and forests, which are divided into different categories according to its use. The land is categorized as 1) primary forest and sacred land that are left completely untouched since plants and herbs are collected there 2) farming land that is for swidden rice cultivation⁶⁰ 3) rubber garden 4) fruit gardens 5) houses and village (collective and individual) 6) breeding locations and fishing sites 7) cemetery places.⁶¹

Many people claimed that Dayaks "destroy" the nature by shifting cultivation. Dayaks are accused of burning the forests in order to create paddy fields. However, Dayaks consider the term shifting cultivation wrong, since Dayaks themselves call it rotating cultivation (*perladangan rotasi*). Dayaks rotate in five to seven years cycles from one field to another, leaving the old field to recover during the cycle.⁶² Therefore, they do not normally open the new land, if it is not necessary. Normally, a family inherits land opened by their ancestors.

The forest offers a place to hunt different animals (deer, pigs), gather some herbs and plants, and cultivate rubber trees and fruits. A forest is a birthplace of Dayaks' beliefs, cultures, and religious practices. Thus, we might understand that Dayaks feel threatened with those taking their land or resources. From this feeling emerges a conflict with those who destroy the forest or the land from them (companies and transmigrants). Nowadays, Dayaks also have to change their way of managing natural resources, since there is a lack of land when many HTIs (Industrial Tree Plantations) and HPHs (Logging Concessions) extend to the land and forests of Dayaks.

4.3.1. THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND

Indigenous Peoples, Dayaks in this case, are almost forced to give up their land to the companies after the companies have a license from the government. They are not usually forced straight by the forestry companies, but by the state officials (village headman, subdistrict head) and police. The state officials normally invite Dayaks to negotiations between the forestry company and local communities concerning the surrendering of the land.⁶³

In the case of Finnantara Intiga, their projects will probably cover one hundred thousand ha, and affect the life of seven thousand families in fifty-two villages. According to director of IDR, the conditions of the

deal are ridiculous for the Dayaks living in the area. For example, from one hundred thousand ha taken by the Finnantara Intiga, 10 percent will be given back to the people, which will mean ten thousand ha all together.⁶⁴

In the negotiations the local groups (Dayaks) are asked to sign the agreement to give up their land to Finnantara Intiga for 45 years without any conditions. However, when I visited the villages that have been contacted by Finnantara Intiga and Enso, it became clear that negotiations are not so simple. Most of the villagers (head of the families) that attended the meeting to sign the agreement did not know what they signed. They were often pressed by the village head (nominated by the Indonesian government) to sign the agreement "for the sake of development". Some NGOs claim that Inhutani III, which is a stockholder of Finnantara Intiga, has a special task-force team that consists of officials, village head, and several villagers, who are paid monthly incentives to influence the people to give up their land to the company. In a place where it is very difficult to obtain a paid job we can imagine that there are many who are willing to do the job.⁶⁵ Those who refused were accused of not supporting the government and also of acting against "development".⁶⁶

Villagers did not understand that after the agreement they could not enter their forests anymore, and that those areas would be entirely changed. Also the villagers were promised jobs which they never got.

I visited three villages: Lanong, Kotup, and Nibok. Dayaks in the villages were divided in their opinion about the forestry company. However, it was clear that it has brought a problem to them. In Lanong the problems arose when the Finnantara Intiga negotiated with the villagers, and 19 from 45 villagers felt the agreement was not suitable for them. The village headman pressed them to sign the agreement. Finnantara Intiga started to convert the land and build a sand road to and through the village. The company also forbid them to burn their own forest for the paddy fields, so that some villagers became desperate and could not plant rice. The road done by the Finnantara Intiga was so bad that for some time it was impossible to go to the village by other means than tractors or by feet.⁶⁷ According to the villagers, earlier it was easier to enter the village.

The project has caused many changes in the life of villagers. Maybe the most crucial ones were economic problems when their land became scarce, and land problems were followed by the social problems. Nowadays, a family has two hectares for farming or gardens to make living. That means that they have to change the way of cultivating rice as they cannot rotate anymore. Following the Indonesian economic crisis, the price of food has skyrocketed. *Adat* head in the village of Lanong told that his relationship with his family is completely broken, since he did not agree with Finnantara Intiga, but some others in his family agreed. He told that he was threatened to be beaten and killed if he did not stop complaining about the company to the state officials. In Nibok I was told that the villagers were promised jobs from the company, but there was only one villager (a

child of the village head), who was accepted to work in the company. The villagers experienced an economic hardship.⁶⁸ Thus, it is maybe no wonder that Dayaks felt cheated and sad.

The land conflict emerges when companies rely on Indonesian national laws and regulations that are obscure, and do not take into account the indigenous people's rights. Actually, the idea that land is state land (*tanah negara*) is a heritage from the Dutch colonial rule, whereby it was thought that "unoccupied" or unregistered land belongs to the Crown.

Land issues have been the most controversial issues in Indonesia. It is an area with the most open conflicts and disputes. This is partly because the companies have a lease to the land from the Indonesian government, and the Indigenous Peoples' tenurial rights to the land that is considered *adat* land (*tanah adat*), are completely ignored.

The developmental ideology realized by the Indonesian government has driven Indigenous peoples into a corner. That is why there are continuous physical conflicts in West Kalimantan. The conflicts are heightened, when Dayaks ask their land back, or for compensations for the land already robbed by the companies. In the most extreme cases the Dayaks burn the base camps of the companies.⁶⁹ However, the local NGOs do not support any kind of violent activity of any kind. NGO activists understood these acts as desperate deeds and frustration accumulated during so many years of struggle for the land.

Development furthered by the companies and Indonesian government has not been favoring Dayaks, instead it has marginalized them, when their land and natural surroundings have been taken away.

Often NGOs are asked to mediate in the land conflicts or they get accused by the government of causing these conflicts.⁷⁰ We have to be aware that companies usually have some connection to the military, as mentioned by S. Djuweng⁷¹, since the military funding depends on the exploitation of mineral and natural resources. That is why, when there is a conflict between the forestry (or other) company and local people (*masyarakat adat*), the military is almost always involved defending the company. That again makes local people feel afraid of the company. NGOs are also often terrorized by the military.

4.4. THE CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT AND DAYAKS IN WEST KALIMANTAN: Empowering Indigenous Peoples

The NGOs I met in West Kalimantan seemed to be better organized than the NGOs in Riau. Most of the NGOs I met in West Kalimantan had a clear mission and vision of their activities. They aimed at empowering Indigenous Dayak communities, and giving support for control over their lives at economic, cultural, social, legal

and political levels. I was told, the decisions of the activities concerning the Dayak communities were done together with local communities. Actually Dayaks also run the NGOs. Methodologically, most of the NGOs seemed to have a participatory approach to and close relations with the grassroots level.

PANCUR KASIH

In 1981, some Dayaks concerned about the situation of the Dayaks in general decided to form an NGO. This NGO, Pancur Kasih, was a response to the problems, such as Indonesian development policy, and to companies that deculturalize and threaten the existence of the Dayak peoples. According the director of Pancur Kasih, AR. Mecer, Dayaks have always been considered as "stupid and poor". In the end, the activists felt that they themselves want to create a "good life" and educate themselves.⁷² The NGO called Pancur Kasih Foundation wanted to provide formal educational services, including knowledge about the Dayak culture. Pancur Kasih focused on socio-economic and cultural empowerment.

Pancur Kasih has three activities: education, economy of the people, and social empowering. They have a school with 700 pupils from secondary school to high school. Thus, the ones who established Pancur Kasih were mainly teachers. Nowadays there are 10 staff members in the office, but beside that there are 35 teachers, and the members of Credit Union (CU) are more or less ten thousand people.

In 1987, Pancur Kasih established a cooperative Credit Union (CU). CU is maintained by Dayaks themselves, and it offers cheap loans to the Dayaks. Nowadays it is the biggest CU in Indonesia, with eight thousand members and total assets of Rp seven billion. In 1991, Pancur Kasih established a rural bank called BPR PANBANK, which lends small business loans to the rural communities. The bank is under the rule of Central Bank of Indonesia, but it is independent as it is only involved in local lending. In 1992, it established Dayak Solidarity Funds Movement in order to provide socio-economic support to its members beginning the year 2000. Pancur Kasih facilitates community mapping (PPSDAK) documenting Dayak land and natural resource use based on indigenous knowledge and wisdom.

Its network includes Remdec (Resource Management and Development Consultant), Elsam (Institute for Policy Research), YLBHI (The Legal Aid Foundation), KPA (Consortium for Agrarian Reform), JKPP (Participatory Mapping Network) and a Christian NGO. It has a low profile and financially it is self-sufficient.

IDRD-Institute of Dayakologi Research and Development

At the end of the 1980s, there emerged in Pancur Kasih a study group whose aim was to discuss political and

cultural issues that concerned Dayaks. The government's development programs were criticized especially. In 1990, IDR (Institute Dayakologi) was established. It has a focus in empowering and collecting indigenous knowledge and wisdom. IDR has had many research projects.⁷³ They criticize development, and consider that there is no sustainable development, but rather sustainable ability.

IDR has five divisions: research; publication; cultural advocating; organizing rubber trappers; and the program of an institutional independence. It records and collects Indigenous knowledge and folklore, and publishes the information in the form of books and magazine. IDR also publishes a monthly bulletin called the Kalimantan Review. The cultural documentation is aimed at empowering the communities and strengthening their own capacity. There are twelve staff members in IDR.

IDR has also established Pancur Dengeri, a West Kalimantan-wide cooperative for Dayak rubber farmers. This program aims to organize three thousand Dayak farmers in order to create a sustainable forest management programme based on the local production of the rubber. Rubber is considered the primary indigenous commercial crop for the Dayaks of West Kalimantan.

Its network includes INFID (International Forum on Indonesian Development), Walhi (Indonesian Forum for Environment), KPA (Consortium for Agrarian reform), and JAPHAMA. Its donors are Ford Foundation, Bilance, LPPSKWI (Indonesian Conference of United Churches), MC Arthur Foundation, and Danida. It aims to become financially self-sufficient by 2005. Its international network includes The International Alliance of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples from Tropical Rainforests. It is also a confounder of AIPP (Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact), member of the NGOs Working Group on the ADB (Asian Development Bank) monitoring the projects funded by ADB.

LBBT

In 1992, Pancur Kasih, IDR, WALHI Jakarta, YLBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) and LBH Surabaya (Legal Aid) established an NGO called LBBT (Institute for Community Legal Resource Management) as a need emerged for community legal empowerment, especially when concerning the land rights. LBBT has 14 staff members who mainly do advocating in the villages. They are concerned with land rights of the Dayaks.⁷⁴ They aim at revitalization of indigenous law systems and empowering the community through paralegal training and community organizing efforts. They have few divisions: Community Organizing (CO), Law Review and Reform, and Institutional Empowerment. LBBT organizes training through CO with following subjects: lobbying and advocacy (part of the Law Review and Reform programme).

The staff of LBBT mentioned that it has developed its strategic planning with Roem Topatimasang and Remdec staff. The staff ideally has a field trip once a month and spends there approximately one or two weeks. As far as I was able to follow their activities, they seemed to be able to have quite good relationship with local Dayaks. They avoid taking the cases to the court, since the court is considered corrupted and not reliable.

The NGOs that belong to this family of Pancur Kasih, Dayakologi Institute, LBBT and SHK are all transformative in their orientation. They try to find alternative solutions for Dayaks to preserve at least part of their lifestyle and culture, and they are very critical toward the development ideology implemented by the companies and furthered by the Indonesian government.

Walhi Kalbar

The local branch of Walhi has been functioning in West Kalimantan since the beginning of the 1990s. At that time it had about seventeen members, but in few years the amount dropped to four. The reason for this decline in members was explained by the director of Walhi Kalbar, Laurentius Majun, as a consequence of ideology of Walhi, whereby they should not accept funding from the government. Those who were afraid of these principles did not want to stay in Walhi Kalbar.

Local members of Walhi wished for it not to have its own programs, because they suspected that there could be overlapping activities with local NGOs.⁷⁵ Thus, the role of regional Walhi would be only to gather information. If the central Walhi (Jakarta) asked for the information, local Walhi would send it there. It does not get any straight funding from a central Walhi.

Its latest own programme was a research about the forest fires in 1997. The other program is environmental advocating about oil palm plantations for local communities. Otherwise, Walhi Kalbar has been mediating information

Mitra Mandiri

Mitra Mandiri is a local NGO that has been founded in 1995. Its director is also an executive director of Walhi Kalbar. Their offices are also in the same building. Mitra Mandiris' activities included an economic cooperative that was worked by Dayaks themselves. It had seven staff members.

It got funding by Bilance Belanda for a project of empowering forest farmers and monitoring four plantation projects. It was also funded by Tides Foundation from California for advocacy, and was supported by Rockefeller Foundations for a development project that was to be done in West Kalimantan and Riau (with Riau Mandiri).

4.4.1. THE PROBLEMS OF NGOs OF WEST KALIMANTAN

NGOs in West Kalimantan, as in the other parts of Indonesia, face many problems. I will explore the external problems first, and then some internal ones. West Kalimantan, even as the other regional areas in Indonesia, have a power and administrative structure that follows Javanese administrative structure, from the village level to the regional government. The army and police have a big role in "restoring the peace", while the economic decisions are made in the central government (Jakarta). Thus, many Dayaks feel that they are marginalized "in their own country". Their land is given to the transmigrants (mainly Maduranese) or taken by the companies. If there is any "development" which some Dayaks would like to take part in, they were not accepted because they were seen as non-educated.

The NGOs in West Kalimantan have developed with this kind of background. It is no wonder they are all very critical against (sustainable) "development", centralist power structure, military power, and the foreign companies that exploit the natural resources earlier managed by the Dayaks. The directors of Pancur Kasih and IDR, and the staff of LBBT mentioned companies such as Finnantara Intiga as one of the biggest dangers for the life of Dayaks. Companies like Finnantara Intiga destroy the nature and the culture of Dayaks, and in the end threaten the Dayaks until the edge of extinction.

The forestry companies want to negotiate with either NGOs, or they cooperate with the army and state officials and bureaucrats in order to pressure the Dayaks and NGOs. Local NGOs consider the forestry companies a serious threat to the Dayaks. Dayaks' criticism against the companies and state policy, and their resistance causes also dangerous situations. For example Pak Adeng, who was killed last year, and whose family claims that village head and Finnantara Intiga are behind the murder, was also a Community Organizer from LBBT. Thus, it is easy to create mental terror among the villagers and NGO activists. However, the villagers seem to be much more afraid than activists, who already consider that kind of struggle as a part of their work.

Thus, externally, NGOs face the problem of insecurity. Since 1997, the situation in West Kalimantan has been very tense. I was told that almost every West Kalimantanese carries a weapon. That is partly because of the small war between the Dayaks and Maduranese in 1997, when maybe thousands of people were killed (brutally) in Sanggau area. During the conflict, the director of Pancur Kasih, AR. Mecer, was arrested and interrogated as a provocateur. He told that: "NGOs have been seen as the enemies of the state, the activists are always suspected as provocateurs. Nothing has changed during the so-called reformation in the regional areas (*daerah*)."⁷⁶

It seems that most of the NGOs are terrorized at least some of the time, and are used to it. There was also the feeling that things will get better now there are going to be big political changes.⁷⁷

Internally, the NGOs in Kalimantan seemed to be in better condition than NGOs in Riau. At least Pancur Kasih, IDRDR, LBBT and SHK had clear ideological visions and missions. They were consciously building up complex of NGOs that in the end could be financially self-sufficient, and offer Dayaks education and other services. However, some critics say that they have many overlapping activities, since all of them are interested in same issues. They have also been criticized as exclusive NGOs, since the staff members are almost only Dayaks and non-Muslims. Thus, they might not be "open organizations". They could be also criticized for building up strong NGOs, instead of supporting the Dayak communities enough to strengthen the community institutions. According to Nuer Fauzi⁷⁸, this is partly because the conditions of local communities and NGOs included in this study differ. The local communities are more suppressed and vulnerable than the NGOs. Pancur Kasih, LBBT and especially IDRDR has all strong links to the Christian community and church. That is kind of a shelter for their activities. Their "space of democracy" is wider.

When Dayaks rioted and burned base camps, NGOs were always in danger of being accused provocateurs. However, they could not support that kind of activity, but considered the reactions as a strategy chosen by the Dayaks alone.

Of course, there are some internal conflicts and rearrangements in NGOs too, but I would guess that is the case in every NGO.

Mitra Mandiri again seemed to have some problems with its credibility in the eyes of the other NGOs. It was claimed to have some problems with local Dayaks. It was said that Mitra Mandiri did not continue programs where internal problems emerged, but left the Dayaks to struggle by themselves. Beside that, they were said to have financial problems with their cooperative. None of the Dayaks I met ever talked about Mitra Mandiri.

Walhi Kalbar

The director of regional Walhi explained that there is no regular wage, and he could not hire any staff. There seem to be difficulties in communications between the central and regional Walhi. They could not agree about the funding and activities. Also, the program that should be done together with central Walhi, voters' education, was considered strange. First of all Walhi is an environmental organization, and the regional NGOs were not early enough delivered their part of funding they needed for taking part in the program. Also regional Walhi in West Kalimantan was disabled since it could not do any statements or campaigns in the region.

It could not really function because it had to respect the wishes of Walhi's member organizations, meaning that it should not have its own programmes. Also, it did not get its own money, since the member-organizations of Walhi again were afraid that Walhi would occupy

their place with its programmes. Because the NGOs are very sensitive about central-region relationships, they do not support the idea that central Walhi could have its own activities in the region. Ideologically Walhi was somewhere between the transformative and reformist organizations.

4.4.2. THE NEEDS OF THE NGOs

The NGOs I met in West Kalimantan are financially doing rather well, they have good international relationships and they seem to be accountable. They also have a strong international and national networks.

Pancur Kasih is financially self-sufficient, it seems to have enough staff, and it has much educational materials and human resources. The most crucial need for them might be moral support from foreign countries and information mediation.

IDRDR seems to have enough funding. Since it focuses on research and cultural revitalization, it has a need of theoretical knowledge (especially anthropology was mentioned), they would like to have an anthropologist as their staff member. IDRDR has also established Pancur Dangeri (Rubber Trappers Cooperative), and they would like to have cooperation with Finland (Kepa) and CNS (Brazil) to further the south-south dialogue. They would also like to find somebody who could arrange fair trade with Kalimantanese rubber trappers cooperative. The director of IDRDR also said they would be happy if the position and activities of Finnantara Intiga could be questioned publicly. Thus, there is a need for information exchange. However, it is not IDRDR's primary focus. IDRDR would like to conduct a study about the impacts of forest fires on indigenous peoples, their customary institutions and natural resource management.

LBBT staff told that they have a need for theoretical and analytical knowledge and framework through training and written material. They also suggested that some Finnish donors could fund a program of paralegal advocacy for the Dayaks who are threatened by Finnantara Intiga.

Mitra Mandiri seemed to be in a need of funding, staff, and international and national networking. According to Laurentius Majun, NGOs in Kalimantan easily are ideologically obscure and receive money from anywhere. If you do not do so, you are thought strange. The organization was willing to have any program that concerned Dayaks threatened by the HTI and HPH companies.

4.5. SOME REMARKS ON WEST KALIMANTAN

The overall situation in West Kalimantan is quite tense, since the so-called reformation has not yet reached most of the regions of Indonesia. Outside of Java, or more precisely Jakarta, the military is still repressive and visible.⁷⁹ Local groups are repressed and there is no democratic space for expressing one's aspirations. I was

often told that Dayaks (and others) are carrying weapons, and that the war of 1997 was not yet finished. "They have walked over us for decades, and we have always been quiet, but we have our limits also", told one young Dayak in the village. Thus, NGO activists told that West Kalimantan is a time bomb, and if somebody wants to create a problem there, it needs only a small fire.⁸⁰

However, the NGOs were quite well able to create a network with local communities. Almost every time I went to their office, there was a person from the village who wanted to expose his/her "case".

It is possible to do networking with Kalimantanese NGOs. However, LBBT seems to be debating about whether it should have any projects or not. Thus, recently there have been some internal conflicts. The lack of theoretical reference was visible and sometimes led to the absence of an analytical framework. This was also acknowledged by the activists themselves. The

directors of the NGOs were the stores of a knowledge and theoretical framework. That is why, it was often mentioned that there would be a need for theoretical knowledge.

It is clear that strengthening civil society and local communities through advocating and training produces some results. When they know which are their rights, the communities are able to demand their rights. It is also important that these Dayak NGOs do not "strengthen" ethnic lines although they are defending ethnic minorities. However, the Dayak communities and NGOs are also facing big obstacles, such as the military, powerful companies which are cooperating with the military, the "development policy" of the Indonesian government, the state structure and so on. For this reason there is need for advocacy, moral support, education and well-planned activities that take account the whole context of the problems the Dayaks are facing.

5. THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF INDONESIA AND NGOs

Indonesian parliamentary elections were held in seventh of June 1999. While I was in the country the elections and current political situation, constitutional changes, and violent occurrences were the main topics of discussion. Unlike most expectations, there was hardly any violence during the elections, although in outer islands (outside Java) the situation has been very tense. For example in Aceh hardly anybody dared to vote, and in mid July 1999, there were at least 50,000 refugees who escaped the Indonesian military forces (TNI) to the camps. The counting of the votes were delayed few times on. 16.7.1999 the counting of the votes ended. PDI-P of Megawati got most of the votes and 154 seats in the parliament (462 seats + army, altogether 500 seats), the next one was GOLKAR which presidential candidate is the current president Habibie, with 120 seats. According to KIPP (the Independent Committee for Election Monitoring), there were at least 2,250 violations of elections since the beginning of the campaign until the announcement of the results.⁸¹

It seems that presidential election in November 1999 will be difficult, since many are afraid that Islamic parties will revolt if Megawati is chosen as a president. However, if Megawati is not chosen, the big masses behind her could revolt against what is considered undemocratic procedure. Thus, the people seem to be divided into the supporters of the current president Habibie, and Megawati. The political situation (and system) remains obscure and open for any possibilities, even for violent occurrences.

Indonesian NGOs have only slightly taken part in the political reformation process started by the students in 1997-1998. This might be because their ideological grounding is often obscure and they have been forced to be apolitical during the last 32 years of New Order power.

NGOs that have taken part in "voters' education" programmes have also been criticized for not having been able to follow democratic principles, where people should have right to vote or not to vote, and

that Indonesian current government is not considered legitimate. Thus, there is a division among the Indonesian NGOs.

Many of the older NGO activists are now involved in electoral monitoring committees and further the democratization "process". However, many ask how current corrupted government and electoral regulations could be believed, as there is hardly any difference with Suharto's time. Also, the fact that Suharto has been protected until now, shows for many that there are not real changes yet. However, many NGO activists are also taking part in politics and also becoming members of political parties, which is a consequence of the liberalization of Indonesian politics (anybody can form a party in current Indonesia). Those who joined NGOs as student activists for being unable to be openly politically active and express their political aspirations in anywhere else than NGOs, may now take their chance.

It has been argued that NGOs should reposition themselves in the current political change, and clarify their vision and mission. In that way they could strengthen the very fragile civil society of Indonesia.

The economic situation of Indonesia and its debt has been raised lately by a few NGOs which demand the postponement of the debts. Many NGOs that have taken part in so called Safetynet programmes (many of them are said to be formed by Indonesian government also) funded by IMF have been mocked by other NGOs, which consider those NGOs as irresponsible and money-oriented. There has been misuse of the money among the officials and even among the NGOs. It has been noticed that IMF politics and lending money to Indonesia have not been criticized by many Indonesian NGOs. It has been argued that it is due to the lack of information and hope that IMF money would throw Suharto and his followers out of the power. Indonesia is becoming one of the most indebted countries in the world.⁸² However, the few NGOs campaigning against IMF and debt have been heard, and even some politicians are taking the issue up.

CONCLUSIONS

Indonesia is a country that is slowly waking up from a nightmare of the last 32 years. Many NGO activists have encountered a mass of problems because of their activities, since they have been imprisoned or at least threatened by the government. However, many NGOs have also been following the development ideology implemented by the Indonesian government.

Those foreign donors active in Indonesia have had a major influence on the position, vision and missions of local NGOs. Donors have often furthered development and modernization, and have influenced on the structure and ideology of the NGOs. Also, they have favoured big NGOs that have "modern structure" that suits them better. This has led to the discrimination against small NGOs and to their dependency of the big NGOs and donors. Many NGOs have been clearly inconsistent with their practices, methods and vision and that might be because there is a need to please donors, and because they follow the model of western NGOs. Partly this inconsistency is due to the pressure of the New Order government.⁸³

The criticism by Mansour Fakhri towards Indonesian NGOs (Java) was a framework with which I started to look at the map of NGOs. However, in this study I concentrated on some NGOs outside of Java. The NGOs in Riau seemed to be more reformist-oriented than the NGOs in West Kalimantan, which were again more transformative NGOs. The problems that NGOs are facing internally (see page 7) differ among the NGOs in different islands. In Riau, NGOs were more state (ideology)-oriented and part of the state's development discourse, they formed an elite that did not have a close relationship with local indigenous peoples, they followed the logic of developmentalism. In West Kalimantan, the problems were different, as the NGOs were well aware of transformative-orientation and wanted to belong in that category. However, there the exclusiveness along the ethnic lines became a problem, since in a way it also follows the politics of the government, which has strengthened the ethnic divisions while stressing the unity of the Indonesian nation.

In Java, there are at least few issues that are very much influencing the work of NGOs. One is the "Javanese hierarchy structure." The Javanese hierarchy and idea of power have been studied by many anthropologists (idealized, some critics say). Javanese hierarchy emerges from the idea of Javanese power, whereby power accumulates and is absorbed into the power holder. If the power holder was weak, the power would dissolve. Power is expressed through hierarchy and status (age, gender, position etc.). In the Javanese Hindu-Buddhist states, on the top of the hierarchy was a king. The sultanates (Yogyakarta and Surakarta) are expressions of this hierarchical structure, where there are a sultan, his court, the elite, and the lower classes. Even Javanese language is divided into four levels according to the status of the speakers. It has been widely assumed that Suharto followed this idea of Javanese power when he was the president of Indonesia.

This idealization of Javanese power is still somewhat in evidence especially in Central Java. In the organizations (in this case NGOs) it might include the discrimination of younger activists, high position of the "boss" and older activists, whose activities are not easily questioned, and also some kind of information block, whereby new or younger activists are not informed of what happens in the organization.. This so-called Javanese hierarchy also causes younger activists, who are in a lower position, not to express their opinions, or to avoid discussions with a "boss" or with those who are in a higher position. What is interesting is that the structure does not have to be strengthened by their official status in staff, but it follows from their experiences, age and position among the NGO activists in Indonesia.

According to one activist from Insist, the cultural background influences the structure of the organizations. Actually a kind of "informal culture" prevails among the activists so that even the meetings are open to many people who are not formally members of the organizations. However, this might also support the above mentioned hierarchy by relating friends to each other and creating a network among them.

In Java the gender bias in practice is widely noticed ("women are not taken seriously or included"), also NGO activists form an elite, and many NGOs are part of the state's development ideology. It is, however, possible that the differences between the Jakartanese and for example Yogyakartaese NGOs are big. Yogyakarta is considered very "Javanese" in many ways.

It seemed that the younger NGOs in the regions outside of Java had more democratic and equal working surroundings, and that there the younger ones were able to quite equally discuss the activities of the NGOs, and take part in the decision making process. However, since my time in the regions was very brief, I could not prove how the structure of the organizations was functioning.

It was once said to me that the NGOs in Java are always lead by some "figure" who controls "his" NGO, and that NGOs split up when another figure comes along who threatens the first. This seems to have happened many times.

There is also dual approach to western donors. Western donors do lot of "bad", but they are a necessity. This is why western donors are suspected on one hand, but on the other are also welcomed and favoured. This creates a situation, where a western researcher or activists such as me, have difficulties to sometimes get "real contact" with local NGOs. Every NGO is afraid that a western donor tries to influence its work, even while it needs the funding. That creates a serious problem.

The study by Mansour Fasih I have referred to was conducted in Java, and does not tell us about NGOs outside of Java. It is very important to note that the NGOs I studied outside of Java were much more dependant on the local conditions, information and donors than many NGOs in nowadays Java (at least in Jakarta). Because of the few possibilities to have information and funding, discussions with other NGOs of their mission and visions, lack of theoretical knowledge, and more repressing state structure, they were much more vulnerable to inconsistency.

In Riau, especially, the inconsistency of NGOs was widely noticed. That could be because in Riau the environmental, social and economic problems were so serious, and because there the companies, politicians and maybe some others were playing money politics.

In Riau, NGOs that had been brought along the development ideology, had one foot in development and one foot in somewhere they thought people were (Riau Mandiri, and Adat Petalangan Foundation). In West Kalimantan, the situation was much better. However, it has to be noticed that NGOs in West Kalimantan have a strong connection to the church, and they have wide discussion channels to Java and foreign countries. Thus, they had a somewhat better position. There might also be some cultural differences, whereby the local cultural institutions are much stronger in West Kalimantan than in Riau, where "development" has already strongly influenced "local knowledge". Thus, one way to face the local problems could be to strengthen the local knowledge, in order to find local answers to those problems.

I started this study by exploring the globalization process in the mode of transnational companies that are active in Indonesia (Riau and Kalimantan). Those TNCs are also part of Finnish involvement in Indonesian development. Finnish involvement in the development in Indonesia has been noticed by local NGOs. In current Indonesia, NGOs are clarifying their vision and mission, and more NGOs are heading towards a transformative thinking while questioning the development implemented by the Indonesian government; the activities of the (Finnish) companies are widely criticized, as is development.

However, we will always hear many voices between and within the NGOs, as there is no one single movement that carries one voice, but rather a choir of voices influenced by the history of Indonesia (especially New Order governments' policy), international influences (donors) and the internal struggle of NGOs themselves.

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1. Esteva & Prakash 1998, 12-13. *This theoretical formulation of civil society traces back to Gramsci (1971)*.
 2. See Esteva & Prakash (1998, 4), *who claims that the globalization discourse that has replaced the development discourse is*

increasingly favouring social minorities who benefit from the intensification of economic relations, transnational corporations extending their activities etc. This modernization process causes extreme suffering for minority groups that are drawn out from their surroundings.

3. Pancasila is built on five pillars: belief on Supreme God; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy lead by the wisdom of deliberation among representatives; social justice for all of the people of Indonesia (Antlöv 1995; 37).

4. Antlöv 1995; 37-43.

5. Lounela: Keba report 1997.

6. Rahardjo M. 1993 269-270.

7. Rahardjo M. 1993, 275.

8. Antlöv 1995; 38.

9. Fakhri 1996, 120.

10. Fakhri 1996, 125-136.

11. Fakhri 1996, 4-6.

12. Fakhri 1996, 136-146.

13. See Sandra Moniaga: Hak-hak Masyarakat adat di Indonesia. Paper presented in the seminar of Komnas Ham (Lokakarya Nasional IV HAM 1998), 1-3. December 1998, Jakarta, p. 5.

14. See Heorepoetri Arimbi, working paper 1998. Walhi.

15. Djuweng (a)

16. Agrarian Law 1960, and UU NO 5/1967. See Lindsey T. 1999, 50. Fauzi N. 1999, 2.

17. Recently, there have been more and more opinions voiced that support the amendment of UU45, which is seen very weak in some points. (Kompas 15.7.1999). The indigenous peoples movement is mainly demanding that UU 45 should clarify the land law and the rights of indigenous peoples. Discussions with Yando Zakaria. Insist. 13.7.1999.

18. Adat in Indonesia could be understood as norms and customs. Through adat the people's position in society and universe is clarified. (Antlöv 1995; 93). Adat differs from place to place according to the community.

19. See Zakaria Y. & Soehendra D. Seminar paper in YLBHI. 1994. Jakarta.

20. Discussions with Yando Zakaria (KPA- Consortium for Agrarian Reform, and Insist). Insist. 10.7.1999 2

21. In 24.6.1999 Ministry of agrarian affairs announced a new regulation (Agraria/Kepala BPN number 5, 1999) which stated that if adat community can prove that it has a certain area of land and natural surrounding, where the community has its own way of managing natural resources which is covered by the adat law, the land could be registered as land owned by the adat community. (Kompas 5.7.1999). However, as the regulation is meant to clarify

the UUPA 1960 and it is inferior to the constitution, it will not help the communities much. Furthermore, it only legitimizes the right for land that could be proven adat land, and is not currently in use of other instances .

22. Nita K. Purnawati is responsible for the transcriptions, and she took part in the field research. Also this study would have been very different had I not stayed at the home of Maman Mahmuddin (Skephi) in Pekanbaru, Riau. His help and knowledge were extremely important during my fieldwork.

23. INDEF (Institute for Development of Economics and Finance), seminar paper presented in Jakarta 3.12.1998/YPBHI.

24. Mubyarto 1993, 2.

25. Mubyarto 1993, 1-2.

26. Friends of the Earth. It has been estimated that at least 35 000 ha of the forests has been devastated already (SGS).

27. Miettinen O. & Selin T. 1999, 47-48.

28. Interview with Skephi 13.1.1999.

29. Kantor Wilayah Departamen Sosial Propinsi Riau 1998, 1.

30. Interview with Tenas Effendi. 7.12.1998/Pekanbaru

31. According to Tenas Effendi (1998, 635), people are classified as "very poor" in a Kampar subdistrict. Some are already working in factories or plantations, but many consider this as improper and "cheap work". Earlier they were able to collect honey and rubber, but it is almost impossible nowadays (oral information by the tree batins of Sering, Kerinci and Delik December 1998).

32. Fitzpatrick 1992, 181.

33. Interview with villagers. 10.12.1998. Delik

34. Effendi T. 1998, Menyimak Kearifan Masyarakat Petalangan Dalam Mengelola Dan Melestarikan alam Sekitar, Pekanbaru, unpublished paper.

35. Effendi T. 630-631. KITLV

36. Interview with the villagers 12.12. 1998. Sering.

37. 23.12.1998. Kompas, national newspaper.

38. HIPALHI (The Safety of Nature and Environmental Control) said that Riau is destroyed not only by legal logging but also by illegal logging and robbery. There are 362 illegal sawmills that buy wood from anybody, stamps the wood, and sell it to the companies like RAPP. Interview 10.12.1998, Pekanbaru. It is also told that there are no other factories along the Kampar-river. But I could not verify this information.

39. Interview with Riau Mandiri. 10.12.1998

40. Discussion with Miettinen O. May 1999. Helsinki

41. According to HIPALHI, RAPP uses water from Kampar-river over its allotment, and its water cooling system throws to the Kampar-river water that is too hot, and also contains dangerous

chemicals. Also the PH value of the river have changed from 6 to 10. I have not been able to verify the study of HIPALHI as it is very difficult to get valid knowledge from Indonesia. The government officials and RAPP are not willing to give any information of the real situation, and NGOs do not have means (money or technical skills) to do tests (interviews with SKEPHI and Riau Mandiri 10.12.1998).

42. Interview with villagers, Sering. 12.12.1998

43. Interviews in Pekanbaru: redactor of Genta magazine, 7.12.1998; journalist of Forum Magazine, 5.12.1998; Dr. Tabrani Rab, 6.12.1998; SKEPHI 4.12.1998.

44. Riau Mandiri 5.12.1998, 1998.

45. Riau Mandiri, 5.12.1998, Pekanbaru.

46. This idea is bit tricky since the Indonesian government usually only leases land for the companies for 25 or 45 years. However, according to Ribut Susanto, many companies lengthen the time before the lease ends and they do not do it openly.

47. This programme was criticized by HIPALHI, SKEPHI, Genta, and journalist of FORUM and the villagers of Kerinci and Sering as a cosmetic and based on companies' own needs. The position of Riau Mandiri is therefore difficult if it accepts the programme. Especially since RAPP is criticized by all the above mentioned instances (and Riau Mandiri itself) as one of the worst destroyers of nature and mode of life of Petalangan people in Riau.

48. In the mid 1999, organization called Hakiki was formed in Riau when some activists walked out from Riau Mandiri. Hakiki focuses on women issues (through education and organizing), it also has a program on empowering and revitalizing Adat institution at the community level and mapping. Hakiki has joined JKPP (Participative Mapping Network) that functions in regional and national levels while its main initiator is Pancur Kasih from West Kalimantan. The organization seems to have some potential uniting some activists for intellectuals and community people who have been suffering from the very unclear situation among the NGOs in Riau.

49. Interview with Tenas Effendi. 12.12.1998. Pekanbaru.

50. Interview with Tenas Effendi 12.12.1998, Pekanbaru.

51. SKEPHI, Insist. January 1999.

52. See Lounela 1997, 11. Kapa.

53. Discussions with Arimbi Heroepoetri, Walbi. 19.7.1999.

54. The villagers of Sering and Kerinci 11.12.1998

55. All those interviewed confirmed this.

56. Djuweng & Krenak 1996, 2.

57. Djuwen

58. Semedi & Riyanto 1996, xiii.

59. Djuweng(b). 1997, 27

60. This land is often understood as *alang-alang* (coarse grass) and claimed by the Indonesian government and many forestry companies as useless land that could not produce hardly anything anymore. The government and companies call the programs sometimes reforestation. However, it was many times explained by local Indigenous Peoples and NGO activists that one can plant rubber trees there, and that land and fields are intentionally left to "sleep" so that they might recover again. A villager in Koptup village told that: "There is no useless land, *alang-alang* could be used for planting rubber trees, or if it is paddy fields. It is still rich land." Interview. .Kotup. 28.1.1999.

61. Djuweng(a).1997, 14.

62. According to Chion from LBBT, the cycle has been shortened to 3-4 years because of the lack of land. Interview. 25.1.1999.

63. This is based on the information from the field trip in Lanong and Nibok and Kotup. Kotup people told that officials who wanted to ask them to give up their land to FI were even joking about pistol they had brought along. We were not afraid, I was told in the village. 28.1.1999

64. Interview with Stepanus Djuweng 26.1.1999

65. Djuweng 1997(a), 35-36.

66. Interviews with villagers in Nibok and Lanong. 26.1. 1999

67. When I went to the village, the road was so bad that even professional motorcyclists were dubious about driving there.

68. Interview with the villagers 30.1.1999, Nibok.

69. While I was in Kalimantan, there was one case of base camp burning, and few smaller conflicts between the Dayaks and different companies. Besides that, there was a case of Adeng, an adat chief and Community Organizer from the local NGO LBBT, who was killed mysteriously, and found from the forest 2.9.1998. Local Dayaks and even some activists doubted that the case was connected to Finnantara Intiga, since Adeng actively campaigned against the company and was threatened by the village head that he will be killed if he did not stop campaigning.

70. This kind of conflict emerged while I was in Pontianak. A base camp of one forestry company (sister company of PT ERNA) was burned down by Dayaks in Ketapang. When I met a director of Pancur Kasih, AR. Mecer, he had received a fax that he is going to be arrested by the police because he was thought be a "provocateur". In 1997 he was already once arrested when there was a "war" between the Maduranese and Dayaks. Until I left, Pontianak nothing had happened. However, this kind of mental terror seemed to influence NGO activists' work.

71. Djuweng(b).1997, 21.

72. Interview 3.2.1999, Pontianak.

73. Impacts of development programs on the livelihood of Dayaks; oral traditions of dayaks; the rich biodiversity inherent in Dayak culture, to mention a few.

74. The first day I entered their office, there was a villager from Belitang Hulu who wanted to tell about their problems with FI. After one year of struggling and burning of one of the company's

base camp, the company has agreed to pay land compensations for local Dayaks. Interview 25.1.1999.

75. Based on discussions with activists in LBBT and IDR.D.

76. Interview in 3.2.1999, Pontianak.

77. There is always some scepticism when talking about the changes in Indonesia. The recent riots and killings in the islands, the latest ones in Ambon and Aceh have caused hundreds of deaths in few weeks in July-August 1999, the riots create a feeling of insecurity. Many suspect that riots could break out still in West-Papua and Kalimantan at least.

78. Insist, and KPA (Consortium for Agrarian Reform), discussion 12.3.1999, Yogyakarta.

79. 12.3.1999 military took control over Ambon (Maluccas) where there have been violent clashes since the beginning of 1999. The background of the problems has similarities to West Kalimantan, where the Indigenous Peoples are repressed by the military, and marginalized by Javanese power structure and officials. Indigenous

peoples are also marginalized by the newcomers who are privileged by the companies, and become able to control the business.

80. Since I came back from Indonesia in the end of March, the situation in West Kalimantan exploded again. Hundreds of people were killed in Sambas region, and there were tens of thousands of refugees in Pontianak. Quite mistakenly, the conflict has been thought to be only because of the transmigration programs. Maduranese who live in West Kalimantan, are often poor and they are workers in different plantations and factories, or they are becak drivers. However, they are disliked because they work for companies that have occupied the land of local people, and because of cultural reasons whereby Maduranese are thought to be violent and aggressive. The basic problem is in the narrowing living space of indigenous peoples living in the area.

81. Kompas 16.7.1999

82. In June 1999 group of NGOs formed an anti-debt campaign organization GANTI (INFID, IDEA, INSIST, MA'ARIF NU, YBKS) to raise the debt issue.

83. Discussions in Insist during the study.

Glossary

Adat	Custom, Customary law
Batin	Fountainhead
Daerah	Region
Hak adat	Customary right
Hak Ulayat	Communal right for land, community land
HTI	(Hutan Tanaman Industri) Industrial Tree Plantation
HPH	(Hak Pengusahaan Hutan) Logging concession
Kolusi	Collusion
Korupsi	Corruption
Masyarakat Adat	Indigenous Peoples
Nepotisme	Nepotism
Pancasila	The five principles of the republic of Indonesia: <i>The belief in one God, Humanity that is just and civilized, The unity of Indonesia, Democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation, Social justice for all Indonesians</i>
Pesantren	Boarder school of Koranic and other studies for children and young people
Pembangunan	Development
Peraturan Daerah	Regional rules
Perladangan rotasi	Rotating cultivation
PIR-Trans HTI	Transmigrant nucleus industrial forests scheme
Pribumi	Indigene, native
Rentan	Vulnerable
Repelita	(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun) five-year Development Plan
Rimba Larangan	Protected forest
Suku	Ethnic Group
Tanah Dusun	Garden
Tanah Kampung	Communal land
Tanah Negara	State land
Tanah Peladangan	Cultivated fields
Tanah Ulayat	Customary Land

Indonesian Non-Governmental Organizations

Adat Petalangan Foundation	
ELSAM	Institute for Policy Research
HIPALHI	The Safety of Nature and Environmental Control
IDRD	The Institute of Dayakologi Research and Development
INFID	International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
INSIST	Institute for Social Transformation
JKKP	Participatory Mapping Network
KIPP	The Independent Committee for Election Monitoring
KPA	Consortium for Agrarian Reform
LBBT	Institute for Community Legal Resource Empowerment
LBH Surabaya	Legal Aid Foundation of Surabaya
LPPSKWI	Indonesian Conference of United Churches
Mitra Mandiri	
Pancur Kasih	
Remdec	Resource Management and Development Consultant
Riau Mandiri	
SHK	Community-based Forest System Management
SKEPHI	Joint Secretariat for Forest Conservation
YLBHI	Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation
WALHI	Friends of the Earth of Indonesia



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